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ADMIRAL TURNER'S SPEECH FILES

23 MAY 1973

REMARKS ON NAVAL AVIATION; from an address to the SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM at the NAVAL AVIATION COMMANDERY by STANSFIELD TURNER

NAVAL AVIATION COMMANDERY'S SECOND ANNUAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM APPROVED FOR RELEASE ON 08 SEP 2001 BY SP594R003600150001 MAY 1973

PLEASURE NAVAL AVIATION COMMANDERY'S SECOND ANNUAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM
ADMIRAL CHRIS CAGLE ASKED ME LEADOFF - REACHED A NEW ERA IN —
NOT AN AVIATOR - CRUDESFLT CDR - COMMANDING A CARRIER TASK
GROUP MED
TIME NAVY SO PAROCHIAL NO AVIATOR TRUST "BLACKSHOE" —
OR SPEAK IN PUBLIC
GREAT SIGN OF PROGRESS - MOVING AWAY FROM PAROCHIALISM
ALL OF US GUILTY - NOT JUST AVIATION COMMUNITY

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PRESENT JOB - SCOTCH PAROCHIALISM - ALL OFFICERS STUDY ALL PLACES

INSISTING NAVAL WAR COLLEGE BE NAVAL - NOT PRIMARILY
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OR DIPLOMACY

MID-CAREER EDUCATION OF 450

DESTINED TOP LEADERSHIP

COME FROM A NEWTONIAN UNIVERSE

VOCATIONAL EXPERIENCE

AUTHORITARIAN WORLD

PROPER

BUT MOVING UP

OUR OBJECTIVE - DEVELOP CONCEPT OF THINKING
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THREE VERY IMPRECISE SUBJECTS - MUST GRAPPLE -

WHETHER IN WORLD OF MILITARY OR BUSINESS

FIRST, UNCERTAIN WORLD OF BROAD QUESTIONS

SECOND, INEXACT WORLD OF MANAGEMENT DECISIONS

THIRDLY, PROBABLISTIC WORLD OF TACTICAL DECISIONS -

TECH CHANGING

COMPOUNDING THE COMPLEXITIES - IMPRECISE OBJECTIVES

UNCERTAINTY OF NOT HAVING A STANDARD OF MEASURE - PROFIT AND
LOSS STATEMENT

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WHEN SAY TO NOT HAVE SPECIFIC STANDARD OF MEASURE MEAN 2 THINGS

FIRST, DOD CANNOT ESTABLISH & AGREE UPON BASIC OBJECTIVES -

AS EASILY AS YOU IN BUSINESS

WHY A MILITARY?

WHERE & WHEN MIGHT EMPLOY IT?

QUESTIONS ON OBJECTIVES LESS AMENABLE THAN IS QUESTION HOW A

CORPORATION CAN SATISFY A CONSUMER'S NEED

SECONDLY DIFFICULTY IN MEASURING PERFORMANCE
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BUSINESS WORLD: SALES, PROFIT AS % OF SALES, TURNOVER,
RETURN ON ASSETS, RETURN ON STOCKHOLDERS INVESTMENT
WE LACK SUCH TOOLS

NEED FOR MILITARY MEN WHO CAN APPROACH COMPLEX PROBLEMS
ESTABLISHING MILITARY OBJECTIVES & MEASURING THE DEGREE OF
FULFILLMENT

WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE TEST OF WAR
NOT ONLY SKILLED CRAFTSMEN - DRIVING SHIPS
ARCHITECTS OF INEXACT POLICIES - VAST IMPORT
TASK OFFICERS FACE IN 1973 IS COMPOUNDED
FOUNDATION HAS DISAPPEARED

ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR OBJECTIVES
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READINESS FOR ACTION ALONG THE SOVIET - CHINESE PERIPHERY
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ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR SUCCESS - HELD LINE

ONLY EXTENSION TO CUBA LEAP FROG ACROSS THE SEAS

WITH CONTAINMENT GONE WE MUST NOW REDEFINE OBJECTIVES & MEASURES

COURSE - TAKING THE STUDENTS BACK TO TWO FUNDAMENTAL REASONS

FIRST, DETERRENT IN PEACETIME

SECONDLY, INSURANCE IN CASE DETERRENCE FAILS

TODAY, SOME WHO AVOW THAT OUR NEED FOR MILITARY
INSURANCE HAS DIMINISHED

JUST AS UNDERSTANDABLE - NEW SPRINKLER SYSTEM

DETENTE APPEARS TO BE APPROACHING

ALSO THOSE WHO CONTEND - NOT IN OUR INTERESTS - TO USE THE
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PRESENCE OF MILITARY FORCES - SUPPORT FOREIGN POLICY

DOMESTIC NEEDS ARE TOO URGENT

SABER RATTLING IS TOO RISKY

ARGUE EACH OF THESE POINTS INTERMINABLY DEBATE NOT BE
BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF

NO INSURANCE OR NO PRESENCE CAPABILITY & OVERWHELMING
SUPERIORITY

DEBATE ON POINT IN BETWEEN

WHERE ACCEPTABLE FOR COUNTRY TO SET ITS DEFENSES CAN BRACKET
START FROM THE ASSUMPTION - HONORING OUR NATO COMMITMENTS
HOW MUCH MILITARY POWER REQUIRED IS MATTER FOR DEBATE
NEARER TO THE OTHER EXTREME

AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN PROLONGED AMBIGUOUS GROUND WAR IN ASIA

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CONSENSUS MUST LIE SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN

SPECTRUM - VAST SCOPE - INSURANCE - WAYS EMPLOY

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IS NOT CAPABLE OF IDENTIFYING THIS
EXPLICITLY

WEIGH PRIORITIES IN LIGHT OF THE CHANGES -

WORLD ENVIRONMENT

DOMESTIC ATTITUDES

IMPACT OF EMERGENCE FROM THE BI-POLAR WORLD

START OUR STUDENTS WITH THUCYDIDES

ERA A BI-POLAR FOCUS - ABERATION

NUMBER OF POWERS TO BALANCE

BALANCE OF POWER MEANS JUST THAT

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MUST HAVE POWER - NOT LIMITED TO MILITARY FORCE

INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH, NATIONAL WILL, MORAL STATURE,

ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY

ISSUE MILITARY STUDENTS PROBE FOR THAT TYPE OF MILITARY FORCE COUNTRY NEEDS.

COMPLEMENT OUR OTHER SOURCES OF POWER

IF A PRIME PURPOSE - MILITARY FORCES IN 1970's IS TO BALANCE
OR PROVIDE NEGOTIATING RATHER THAN TO CONTAIN

CONSTRUCTION OF FORCES MAY BE DIFFERENT

SOPHISTICATION FOR A MILITARY MAN TO THINK OF

INFLUENCING

IN ADDITION TO FIGHTING

UNDERSTANDING HOW OTHERS' DECISIONS CAN

INFLUENCE THEIR DIPLOMATIC DECISIONS

OTHER WORDS

A WORLD OF MULTI-POWER NEGOTIATIONS, REQUIRES

MILITARY POSTURE THAT HAS VIRTUES OTHER THAN SIMPLY BEING
CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE NEXT FELLOW'S

MAY ACHIEVE YOUR MILITARY PURPOSE

WITHOUT DIRECTLY ENGAGING THE ENEMY - ONLY A FRACTION OF HIS FORCE -
QUICK ENGAGEMENT - HASTILY TERMINATED

SUGGEST TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT

PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE INTERDEPENDENCE MILITARY,
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC FORCES

WHAT ARE IMPLICATIONS ~~Approved For Release 2001/11/08~~ : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600150001-0

MY VIEW INCREASING DEMAND AVIATION ELEMENT

ALSO DEMAND CAREFULLY REVIEW - TYPE OF AVIATION FORCES

BEST FULFILL BROAD SPECTRUM

ESSENTIALLY WORKING BETWEEN TWO EXTREMES

ONE : FULL SCALE CONFLICT WITH ONLY SOVIET UNION

AT OTHER: NEED STABILIZING INFLUENCE OF DISPLAY U.S. MIGHT
INTERNATIONAL SITUATIONS.

FORMER CASE - CLEARLY NEEDS SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY.

NEED F-14's ~~out~~MANEUVER ADVANCED SOVIET FIGHTERS

F-14's AND PHOENIX ONLY SYSTEM CAN TOUCH HIGH ALTITUDE
FIGHTER-BOMBER.

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WHEN TALK OF ENGAGEMENT WITH SOVIETS CAN NOT IGNORE FEATURE
RECEIVES PUBLICITY - VULNERABILITY

NUCLEAR SUBMARINE ESPECIALLY IF EQUIPPED - MISSILES

SO TOO LONG RANGE BOMERS WITH MISSILE CAPABILITY

MISSILE-EQUIPPED SURFACE COMBATANTS.

IF WE ASSUME CARRIERS OPERATE CLOSE (KOREA AND
VIET NAM) ~~OF THREE~~ LOOK FORMIDABLE

IN KOREA AND VIET NAM CARRIERS PROVIDE AIR
SUPPORT, INTERDICTION

NO SEA OPPOSITION

HOWEVER FORMIDABLE THREAT IF ENGAGED
SOVIET UNION

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MUST ACKNOWLEDGE CARRIERS NOT GOING TO PULL UP OFF SOVIET TERRITORY
IN THE EARLY DAYS OF A WAR

FOREMOST TASK WOULD BE TRADITIONAL ONE - CONTROL OVER SEA

NO OTHER PART COULD SUCCEED SHIP BY SEA

IN EARLY DAYS THEN CARRIERS SECURING SEAS

ONLY THEY HANDLE TRIPLE THREAT

REQUIRES QUANTITIES OF FIGHTERS TO KNOCK DOWN
BOMBERS

ATTACK AIRCRAFT KNOCK OUT SURFACE COMBATANTS.

REQUIRES ANTI-SUBMARINE FIXED WING HELOS

THAT IS WHY STARTED PROGRAM TO EQUIP ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT, EVEN AT
EXPENSE OF FEW VA

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SOME PEOPLE STEP BACKWARD

TRUE ONLY IN BACK TO ORIGINAL MISSION OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

FIRST GREAT SUCCESS MIDWAY

EASTWARD ADVANCE OF JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES

TODAY CARRIER KEY ELEMENT STOPPING SOVIET ADVANCES
INTO SEA LANES

AS THREATS ARE PROGRESSIVELY EATON AWAY MORE
CARRIERS' EFFORT FREED

WHEN LOOK AT NEXT LOWER ORDER CONSIDER USSR LIMITED GEOGRAPHICALLY
EACH SUPPORTING ALLY BECOME INVOLVED

HERE ROLE DEPEND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

MIGHT ANTICIPATE LESSER AIR THREAT BASED WITHIN

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SUBMARINES RULED OUT

STILL REQUIRE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS BUT TIME TO SHIFT
FORESHORTENED.

NEXT RUNG DOWN POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE KOREAS OR VIETNAMS UNLIKELY
UNPOPULAR

HERE ROLE SHIFTS MAINTAINING AIR SUPERIORITY

NAVAL THREAT LIMITED

MANNING THIRD COUNTRY SUBMARINES

HOW SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT HOW MUCH SOVIET
EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED

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FINALLY MUST LOOK BOTTOM RUNG

STRONG EXPRESSION PEACTIME PRESENCE

UNIQUE ADVANTAGES

CARRIER FORCE THREATEN BOMBING INTERRUPTION

THREATEN TO HALD ALL SHIPPING

THREATEN TO EXPOSE TO SURVEILLANCE

BIGGEST OF "STICKS"

BETWEEN EXTREMES CALCULUS OF ECONOMICS

MORE CONCENTRATE ON SOPHISTICATED FEWER UNITS

LESS CAPABLE HANDLE LOWER END NUMBERS MAY BE IMPORTANT

ONE ABILITY RESPOND RAPIDLY UNITS STRATEGICALLY

DISPLACED

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OTHER ABILITY TO APPLY ONE AREA WITHOUT HAVING TO DENUDE ELSEWHERE
NOT PREDICTING WHICH USES
ONE WE PUT OUR MONEY ON
BY WE I DON'T MEAN JUST MILITARY
TASK FOR PUBLIC

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OUR ROLE - PREPARED TO COMPREHEND AND TO FOLLOW COURSE THE
NATION SELECTS

PURPOSE, DEDICATION, AND PROFICIENCY

ALSO MUST ADVISE THE DEGREE FORCES CAPABLE OF
SUPPORTING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

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PURPOSE OF A WAR COLLEGE

INTELLECTUALLY PREPARE THE NEXT CROP

TO UNDERSTAND THE SOCIETY THEY SERVE

DEAL WITH THE IMPRECISE, UNCERTAIN NATIONAL
CHARACTER -WILL

NO SIMPLE WAY FOR THE PUBLIC TO EXPRESS THAT WILL

THROUGH THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT

REQUIRES FROM THE PUBLIC A POSITIVE APPROACH

TO MILITARY MATTERS

DANGEROUS TO BACK INTO AN EVALUATION OF MILITARY NEEDS

DISINTEREST - DISMAY

EXTRAVAGANT END UP WITH THE MILITARY PREPARING

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MOVE INTO THE ERA OF THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE
PUBLIC MUST ASSUME A GREATER RESPONSIBILITY
DIRECTION TO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
THE END OF THE DRAFT - NOT MEAN THE END OF PUBLIC
CONCERN
GIVING SENSE OF POSITIVE DIRECTION TO MILITARY
PURPOSE - ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
IN ENSURING SUCH FORCE BOTH TAILORED AND EMPLOYED
AS THE NATIONAL WILL DICTATES
STRIVING, THROUGH HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
TO BE READY TO WORK WITH YOU
LOCATING CONSENSUS ON MILITARY PURPOSE WE REQUIRE AS
GUIDANCE

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RISKS OF ERRORS SEVERE - TECH AGE OF SWIFT AND TREACHEROUS
WEAPONRY AND BALANCING FORCES
DEDICATED IN HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
ENSURING LEADERS OF TOMORROW
SENSITIVE TO YOUR DIRECTION
WORTHY OF YOUR RELYING ON THEM
WHATEVER PURPOSE YOU SELECT

NAVAL AVIATION COMMANDERY

SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM

23 MAY 1973

It's indeed a pleasure to be here / at the Naval Aviation Commandery's Second Annual Seapower Symposium. / When Admiral Chris Cagle asked me to be the leadoff speaker, / I felt that we had reached a new era in the Navy. / As you can see, I'm not an aviator, / although as a Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Commander, / I had the privileged opportunity / of commanding a Carrier Task Group of the SIXTH Fleet in the Mediterranean. / There was a time / when the Navy was so parochial / that no aviator would trust a "blackshoe" to command carrier forces / or to speak in public about ~~naval aviation~~ carriers. / A great sign of progress in the Navy today / is that we are moving away from parochialisms of this sort / parochialism that all of us are guilty of / by ~~any means~~ not just the aviation community, by any means.

In my present job at the War College, / I am attempting to scotch parochialism / by ensuring that all officers / study about all phases of the Navy. / We are insisting that the Naval War College be naval / not primarily an institution of international relations or diplomacy. / I am involved in directing the mid-career education / of 450 hand-picked officers and career civilians / from all of our military services / the State Department,

Coast Guard and the CIA. These are men who are destined for top leadership positions. They come to the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. from what I call a Newtonian Universe, a universe of rational explanations for almost all phenomena. Their vocational experience and most of their training and education have been in a technical world where right and wrong answers must exist and an authoritarian world of military decisions that are either correct or incorrect.

Our objective at the Naval War College is to develop in these officers a concept of thinking about three very imprecise subjects with which all senior decision makers must grapple. The first subject is Strategy or the uncertain world of broad strategic questions such as "How does the United States adapt from the bi-polar world of just the U.S. and Soviet Union of the 1950's and 60's to the multi-polar environment of the U.S., Soviets, European community, China and Japan, of the 1970's and 80's?"

The second subject that we cover is the inexact world of management where we face decisions such as "Do we purchase one very capable and survivable billion dollar aircraft carrier or do we buy two or three smaller carriers each with limited capabilities?"

Thirdly, we deal with the probabilistic world of tactical decisions amidst technologies which are changing so rapidly that standard doctrines are always outdated. Compounding the complexities in all of these cases, we face the ultimate un-

certainty/ of not having a standard of measure/ such as most of you gentlemen enjoy/ in the profit and loss statement! / (At least I hope that most of you are enjoying yours.) /

When I say that we do not have/ a specific standard of measure/ for our \$80B corporation in the DOD/ I mean two things./ First,/ our corporation, the Department of Defense,/ cannot agree upon basic objectives/ as easily as can those of you in business./ Why do we want a military?/ Where and when might we employ it./ These questions regarding objectives/ are less amenable to clarification/ than is the question of how a corporation/ or a company best sets out to satisfy a consumer's needs./ Secondly, we also have difficulty in measuring performance./ How well did the Navy satisfy its customers/- you the public last year? / Compared with the Army? / Now in the business world/ there are fortunately many good measures/ such a sales, profit as a percent of sales,/ turnover, return on assets,/ return on stockholders investment. / We lack such tools. /

There is a great need for military men/ who can approach complex problems/ such as establishing military objectives/ and measuring success without waiting for the test of war. / To do these things we need men who are not only skilled craftsmen/ at the relatively exact arts of driving ships and aircraft,/ but men who are architects of inexact policies/ of vast national and international import. /

The task that these officers face in 1973 is compounded by the fact that the very foundation on which we have based our military objectives since World War II has disappeared.

George Kennan's policy of containment has gone the way of monolithic communism. We can no longer justify military force on pushing back communism wherever it may exude.

We are accustomed to measuring our objectives in terms of readiness for military action anywhere along the Soviet-Chinese periphery. We measured our success in terms of how well our foreign policy, backed by military preparedness, held the line. Interestingly, the only extension of communism since 1949 was to Cuba, not an extension of perimeter, but a leapfrog across the seas.

With containment gone, we must now redefine our objectives and our measures of success in new terms. Thus, in our course at the Naval War College, we insist on taking the students back to the two fundamental reasons for military power - first, insurance in case of war and second, use as an instrument of foreign policy in peacetime.

Today, though, there are some who avow that our need for military insurance has diminished if not disappeared. This is understandable, just as understandable as it is for a man who has paid for a new sprinkler system in his factory to ask whether he can reduce his fire insurance premiums. Detente appears to be approaching; in turn, military preparedness appears to be less critical.

There are also those who contend that it is not in our interests today to use the presence of military forces in support of foreign policy. They point out that our domestic needs are too urgent to afford this capability or that sabre rattling is too risky.

One could argue each of these points interminably. The debate would not be between the extremes of no insurance or no presence capability on one hand and overwhelming superiority to all potential opponents on the other. The debate would be about some point in between, some point where it appears acceptable for this country to set its defenses. I think that we can bracket that point.

I would start from the assumption that one acceptable point between the extremes would be our honoring our NATO commitments if Western Europe were assaulted. There are few people in this country who do not agree that our vital interests lie in preventing Western Europe from falling into the orbit of the Soviet Union. How much military power we require to prevent this and of what kind, is a matter for considerable debate.

Now, nearer to the other extreme, most people today want to avoid involvement in another prolonged ambiguous ground war in Asia. National consensus on our need for military forces must lie somewhere in between support for NATO and aversion to more Vietnams. The spectrum covers a vast scope of insurance against potential conflicts and possible ways to employ military force

for diplomatic purpose. / Even with the best techniques / that tools like systems analysis can offer us / precise numerical analysis is not capable of identifying this point. / It is a matter of weighing national priorities. /

We must weigh those priorities / in light of the changes both in the world environment / and in domestic attitudes. / On the international scene / this means recognizing the impact of our emergence from the bi-polar world / into a multi-polar one. /

At the War College / we start our students with the study of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian Wars / in the 5th Century B.C. / This was an era of a bi-polar focus. / We point out that bi-polar periods have been aberrations in history. / More often there have been a number of powers / to balance against each other. / Balance of power, means just that. / You must have

power to be a player in the game. / Power, though, is not limited to military force. / National power is comprised of industrial strength, / national will, / moral stature, / organizational ability / and other elements / in addition to military strength. / The issue for military students, / is to probe for that type of military force which the country needs / to complement our other sources of power. / If a prime purpose of having military forces in the 1970's is to balance / or, to provide negotiating pressure / rather than to contain by military action as in Korea and Vietnam, / the construction of those forces may be different. / It requires sophistication / for a military man to think in terms of influencing / rather than fighting and winning, / especially in understanding how other's perceptions of our military might / can influence their diplomatic decisions. /

In other words, / a world of multi-power negotiations / requires a military posture that has virtues other / than simply being capable of defeating the next fellow's. / In fact, in an era of negotiations / you may achieve your military purpose / or fail to do so without directly engaging the enemy, / or perhaps by engaging only a fraction of his force / in a quick engagement that is hastily terminated. / I suggest that today's environment / will require us to pay more attention / to the responsiveness of our military forces / to political and diplomatic needs, than heretofore. /

What are the implications of these trends for naval aviation? / In my view / it places increasing demands on the aviation element of the Navy. / It also demands that we carefully review / what type of aviation forces can best fulfill / the broad spectrum of uses that is evolving. /

Essentially we are working between two extremes. / At the one, we have the spectre of full scale conflict with the only other major sea power, the Soviet Union. / At the other, we have a need for the stabilizing influence / of a display of U.S. military might in troubled international situations. /

In the former case, / against the Soviets / Naval aviation clearly needs sophisticated weaponry. / We need F-14's that can out maneuver / the growing number of different advanced Soviet fighters. / The F-14's and Phoenix combination / is the only

weapons system on the U.S. drawing boards / that can touch the very high altitude fighter-bomber / coming into the Soviet inventory. /

When we talk of engagement with the Soviets / however, / we simply can not ignore / that feature of naval aviation that receives abundant publicity / the vulnerability of our carriers. / The nuclear submarine, / especially if equipped with long-range missiles, / is a real threat. / So, too, are the Soviets' long range bombers with their missile capability. / And we even have to concern ourselves / with missile-equipped surface combatants. / If we assume that our carriers will operate close to enemy shores / as in Korea and Viet Nam / [] these three threats will look very formidable. / In Korea and Viet Nam the mission of carriers / was to provide either air support close to our own troops / or interdiction of enemy supply lines more distant from the front. / There was no sea opposition. / However, we would face a formidable ~~sec~~ threat / if we engaged the Soviet Union. / We simply must acknowledge / that carriers are not going to pull up / right off ~~any~~ Soviet territory / to conduct close air support or deep interdiction in the early days of a war. / Our foremost task in such a war / would be the traditional one of ensuring control over those portions of the sea we need. / No other part of our strategy could succeed / unless we can ship reinforcements, / equipment and supplies by sea. / In the early days of a major war, / then, the carriers will be involved in securing the

seas. Only they are equipped to handle the triple threat air, surface and submarine. This requires quantities of fighters to knock down enemy bombers that can release weapons at a naval force or convoy from over 100 miles. It requires attack aircraft to knock out enemy surface combatants. It also requires anti-submarine fixed wing aircraft and helos. That is why we have started a program to equip each of our carriers with anti-submarine aircraft, even at the expense of a few attack aircraft. Some people think that this is a step backward. That's true only in the sense that it takes us back to the original mission of aircraft carriers control of the sea. The first great success of American carriers was in the battle of Midway. There, we checked the eastward advance of Japanese naval forces. Today the carrier is the key element to stopping possible Soviet advances into our sea lanes, whether it be with submarines, aircraft or surface combatants. ~~As, In~~ In the course of time, these threats are progressively eaten away more and more of the carriers' effort will be freed for close air support and interdiction.

When we look at the next lower order of naval warfare, we must consider the possibility of warfare involving the Soviet Union, but limited in some manner, probably geographically. Perhaps we are each supporting an ally and become directly involved ourselves. Here, the role of the carrier would depend on just how the rules of engagement were perceived by

each side. / For instance, we might anticipate a much lesser air threat, / probably limited to that which could be based within the allied nation. / We might even find submarines ruled out, / since anti-submarine measures tend to be geographically expansive. / We would still require highly sophisticated weapons, / but the time it would take to shift / from sea and air control to attack operations might / be considerably foreshortened. /

On the next rung down the ladder, / we must imagine the possibility of future Koreas or Vietnams, / as unlikely or unpopular as that may seem today. / Here the role of the carrier shifts abruptly / to maintaining air superiority above the battlefield, / close air support and interdiction. / The naval threat would be limited. / Only the possibility of partial Soviet manning / of third country submarines / would render anti-submarine aircraft necessary. / How sophisticated the remaining aircraft need be / is factor of how much, if any, / Soviet equipment had been supplied to our opponent. /

Finally, / we must look down at the bottom rung. / Here a carrier can clearly be a strong expression of peacetime presence, / displaying United States' concern. / The carrier has unique advantages in this role. / A show of carrier force / can threaten bombing destruction or intervention. / It can threaten to halt all shipping in the area. / It can threaten to expose a situation on land / to surveillance that may incriminate one side / or the other. / Finally, the carrier constitutes the biggest of "sticks". /

in Theodore Roosevelt's terminology. / It transmits an unmistakable message of U.S. concern / concern that may ultimately result in punitive actions / military or non-military /

Between the extremes of these potential uses of naval aviation, / there is a calculus of economics. / The more we concentrate on the sophisticated demands / at the upper end / the fewer units we can afford. / Less capable units can handle the lower end of the spectrum / and numbers may be important there for two reasons. / One is an ability to respond rapidly / as a result of having lots of units strategically displaced. / The other is the ability to apply forces in one area / without having to denude our military posture elsewhere.

I have not been predicting / which uses of naval aviation will most likely come into play in the decade ahead. / The one we put our money on / will largely determine the shape of naval aviation in those days. / By we I don't mean just the military; / it is a task for the public with our help. /

The military man's role is to be prepared to comprehend / and to follow whatever course the nation selects / and to do so with purpose, dedication, and proficiency. / We also must advise whether our forces are capable / of achieving the national objectives or strategy. / The purpose of having a War College today / is to intellectually prepare the next crop of naval leaders / to do this / to understand the society they serve, / and to deal intelligently with the imprecise, / uncertain and subjective character of the national will. /

There is no simple way for the public to express that will under our democratic process. It must, of course, be through the Congress and the President. I submit though, that this requires from the public a positive approach to military matters. The most dangerous course I can imagine would be for us to back into an evaluation of military needs through disinterest in the military or through dismay at the magnitude of the task. Nothing could be more extravagant. We could well end up with the military preparing for a set of objectives that might be 180° out from an unexpressed public opinion.

Thus, as we move into the era of the All-Volunteer Force, the public must assume a greater responsibility for providing direction to the military establishment. The end of the draft, must not mean the end of public concern for and interest in your armed forces. In short, giving a sense of positive direction to military purpose is an essential element to ensuring that such force is both tailored and employed only as the national will dictates.

We are striving, through higher military education today, to be ready to work with the civilian public in locating the consensus on military purpose that we require. The task demands higher and more flexible intellectual capabilities in military men than ever before. The risks in making errors or in inadequate preparation are severe in this age of swift and treacherous weaponry and of intricate balancing of international forces.

We are dedicated in higher military education / to ensuring that
the military leaders of tomorrow / are sensitive to the public's
direction / and worthy of its relying on them / for whatever purpose
is selected. / Your help in reaching this goal would be deeply
appreciated. /

Thank you.

CHANGE OF COMMAND REMARKS
24 JUL 1975

PRIVILEGED - I.C. KIDD

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

THOSE WHO WORK --

EXHILIRATING -- REWARDING

MOST GRATEFUL TAKE TIME

- - - - -

THANK YOU -- GENEROUS REMARKS

THANK YOU EVEN MORE - HONORING SECOND FLEET

UNSTINTING SUPPORT YOU AND COUSINS HAVE GIVEN - KEY

SUCH SUCCESS AS WE IN SECONDFLT HAVE HAD

ALSO GRATEFUL SPECIAL EMPHASIS

ADM HOLLOWAY PLACED ON MAINTAINING OPERATIONAL READINESS
SECOND AND THIRD FLEETS.

ATTEMPTED FOLLOW LEAD BY FINDING NEW WAYS TO STRESS
OPERATIONAL PREPAREDNESS DESPITE HAVING LESS OPPORTUNITY

TO OPERATE AT SEA DUE TO SPIRALING COSTS OF FUEL

GRATEFUL THREE GROUPS

LEARNED TO DO MORE WITH LESS

1. GROUP COMMANDERS

CARGRU 4 - 6
CRUISER DES 2 - 8 - 12
PHIB GROUP - 2
SERVGROUP - 2

IMAGINATION IN FINDING WAYS SIMULATE BEING AT SEA
AND IN OBTAINING MUCH POSSIBLE EVERY HOUR AT SEA - SUPERB

2. COMMEND C.O.s - SHIPS, AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS

SERVED IN SECOND FLEET

IN MY VIEW, NONE HAVE MANPOWER, MONEY, MATERIAL
OR TIME NEEDED TO DO YOUR JOB AS SHOULD BE DONE.

THEY ARE ONES THAT SHOULDER RESPONSIBILITY -

SET PRIORITIES--- NEGLECTING HERE --EMPHASING THERE

DELIGHTED ENTHUSIASIC WAY RESPONDED TO EFFORTS
EMPHASIZE OPERATIONAL READINESS - THEN UNITS

3. GRATEFUL STAFF - COMSECONDFLT

RESPONDED GREATER ALACRITY AND EFFICIENCY

IDIOSYNCRACIES YOUR COMMANDER - THAN DESERVED.

TO ALL THREE GROUPS -

YOU MUST CONTINUE -- INSIST MORE ATTENTION TO COMBAT

OUR READINESS FOR

1. THERE IS MORE THAN CAN BE ACHIEVED EVEN WITHIN
RESTRICTED RESOURCES

2. THERE IS AN INCREASING NEED FOR READINESS IN THE
ATLANTIC. THE ATLANTIC SEA LANES ARE THE BASIC FIBER OF OUR ALLIANCE
WITH EUROPE, NATO. TODAY, IN PEACETIME, BOTH FRIEND AND FOE ARE
ESTIMATING THE CAPABILITY OF THE STRIKING FLEET AND THE SECOND FLEET
TO SECURE THOSE SEA LANES IN THE EVENT OF WAR. IF WE SHOULD BE
JUDGED NOT READY, WE WILL HAVE FAILED A KEY ASSIGNMENT FOR OUR COUNTRY.

3. ADDITIONALLY, THE ESSENCE OF OUR PROFESSION IN
MAINTAINING PEACE THRU READINESS FOR WAR. THE HEART AND SOUL OF A
NAVY IS GOOD PEOPLE. WE CAN SHOP TO ATTRACT GOOD MEN AND WOMEN

ONLY IF WE ARE TRULY PROFESSIONALS.

THE FUTURE OF OUR NAVY AND IN SOME MEASURE, THE WELL BEING OF OUR COUNTRY DEPENDS ON WHETHER YOU MEN OF THE SECOND FLEET ARE KEEPING READINESS FOREMOST IN YOUR MINDS AND IN YOUR ACHIEVEMENTS.

IT HAS BEEN FUN TO ATTEMPT TO LEAD YOU IN THIS DIRECTION DURING THE PAST YEAR. IF I MUST MOVE ON, I AM DELIGHTED THAT THE REINS ARE BEING ASSUMED BY A TRUE PROFESSIONAL, VADM JOHN SHANAHAN. I WISH YOU GOD SPEED IN THE WONDERFUL CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY THAT LIES AHEAD OF YOU.

7 February 1975

U.S. AND USSR NAVAL FORCE BALANCE:

JUST A NUMBERS GAME?

By Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner

Those interested in national security matters often complain that it is difficult to understand the contemplated use of naval forces in today's world. Superficially, at least, we still appear to be planning for a decisive showdown at sea with the Soviet Navy in ignorance of the fact that the world has changed around us and that power today is often wielded in non-military ways.

In fact, naval strategy has changed. Pragmatically it has been forced to change as a consequence of having to accommodate to developing technology. However, theoretically we remain wedded to the ideas of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan who articulated the case for sea power so persuasively at the end of the 19th century. This fixation with past philosophy has denied contemporary naval strategy the underpinnings which

would permit a better understanding of the Navy's role inside and outside the Naval Service.

The immense stature of Mahan in the memory of the U.S. Navy, much like Horatio Nelson's in the Royal Navy, has made any effort to update his thinking by his heirs in the profession seem puny and presumptuous. But challenge we must because Mahan was not a prophet. He was an historian who studied British sea power of the period 1660 to 1812 and then applied the lessons which he learned to the nearly whole century of British rule of the seas from 1812 to the 1890's.

Mahan's conclusion that a large battle fleet controlling access to overseas markets was the essential ingredient of national well being and power fitted neatly with the imperialism of his era. It helped to popularize Mahan in Germany, Japan and the United States. While Mahan's study of history may have been relevant then, it is not a useful rationale for naval strategy in the 1970's. The colonial system has faded. With the advent of the submarine and the military aircraft superior battle fleets ceased to be the determinant of supremacy at sea. The Battles of the Atlantic in both World Wars exposed forever the

myth that a main battle fleet action between surface ships could still yield total control of the seas to one nation. Yet, because Mahan and Nelson still dramatically symbolize the importance of battle fleets to Navy men, the evolving nature of true naval power has been largely obscured.

In addition to the vast technological changes since Mahan's day, the fact that the world is in the midst of a major historical transition, perhaps as significant as the transition from the Middle Ages to the Age of Enlightenment, makes the question of how to structure and use naval forces extremely complex. Clasic big power use of force and American-led crusades to spread democracy around the world are now as unacceptable to the people of most countries as Communist infiltration has been to us. In America there is the beginning of an awareness that the American way is not necessarily right for everyone; that nations must solve their problems in ways compatible with their cultural dictates. Evolving nations recognizing the US-USSR power balance are no longer vastly intimidated by either. The growing number of small states who are members in the United Nations strengthens their voice in world affairs and may balance or cancel in some ways the physical prowess of the

major world powers. Given these trends, Mahan's concept of total "control of the seas" has been replaced by one of "freedom of the seas". Rather than aspiring to control all of the seas as Great Britain could in the 18th and 19th centuries, we can at best attempt to ensure that no one denies us our right to use those seas essential to us. To this end the United States must possess a naval force-in-being which other nations recognize as being in some form of "balance" with the forces of any other comparable naval power.

In the past, the balance of naval forces could be easily estimated by the size of Battle Fleets. Measurements like tons of ships or numbers and calibers of guns with refinements for such things as armor plating, speed and maneuverability were sufficient. Witness the simple 5:5:3 and 10:10:7 ratios established by the naval disarmament conferences of the 1920's and 1930's. Today the equation is far more complex. The replacement of conventional guns on classic hull types by a bewildering array of missiles, rockets and electronic weapons on various platforms has left naval power advocates adrift without a yardstick. Intuitively it has been recognized that the old standards of

assessing comparative naval strength are no longer valid. But, unlike the soldier who can still make a persuasive case based on equivalent force ratios (i.e. if the enemy has so many divisions then we need so many to deter him from attacking), the naval officer must now assess strength by estimating the extent of his ability to perform certain kinds of naval missions versus the enemy's ability to stop him. A weapon versus weapon or ship versus ship comparison is meaningless because any one mission can be accomplished in a number of ways by a variety of platforms (i.e. ships, aircraft, submarines). Ratios are therefore less applicable to sea forces because the equation is more complex than that for most other kinds of warfare.

The first step in estimating the balance of naval forces between the U.S. and the USSR is to compare their respective missions. The United States Navy has four major missions:

1. Strategic Deterrence - Deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies

2. Sea Control - Ensure our free access to and movement on the seas

3. Projection of Power Ashore - Support war on the ground by means of air attack, amphibious assault, or naval bombardment

4. Naval Presence - Demonstrate and protect American interests throughout the world by the existence, movement or immediate presence of naval forces

Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, S.G. GORSHKOV, in a recent series of articles on sea power describes the Soviet Navy's missions generally as:

1. Strategic Offense - Deter nuclear attack on the USSR through the marriage of nuclear powered submarines to ballistic missiles


2. Strategic Defense - deny the use of the seas to ships or submarines which could launch an attack against the USSR

3. Support of Ground Operations - although Gorshkov is not explicit in how this will be carried out, it can be inferred that this includes the ability to interrupt enemy supply lines to a land campaign as well as to support Soviet forces ashore from the sea.

4. Naval Presence - promote Soviet interests around the world.

A quick comparison of the U.S. Navy's missions and those of the Soviet Navy underlines the one area of potential direct conflict at sea: Sea Control. (Figure 1)

**Areas of Potential Conflict at sea between
the U. S. and USSR Navies**



Strategic forces are not pitted against each other but against each other's homelands; U.S. forces for projection of power ashore are keyed to ground targets not naval forces; and the naval presence forces on both sides are working against each other's perceptions and those of third nations. However, sea control forces are designed

to be used primarily against a potential enemy's sea control forces. U.S. sea control forces ensure our right to utilize the seas for our strategic deterrent forces, for our projection of power forces including Army and Air Force forces overseas and, in a sense, for the credibility of our naval presence forces. Soviet strategic defense and ground support forces are keyed to denying us the seas for these very uses. Sea control is a two edged sword: from the Soviet side it is sea denial to our deterrent or projection forces; from the U.S. side it is sea assertion for all our naval forces and commercial shipping.

This is by no means to say that the only naval forces either we or the Soviet Union require are those for sea control. Clearly we each have other needs that can best be fulfilled by sea-based forces. Our respective strategic submarine forces assure a survivable retaliatory capability which is a key stabilizing factor in the delicate nuclear balance. U.S. sea based projection of power forces, which have been employed repeatedly since World War II, provide the capability to bring military power to bear in areas non-contiguous

to the U.S. when such action is dictated by our national objectives. Both the U.S. and USSR are likely to want to deploy naval presence forces when overseas events impact on national interests. Such forces have the unique capability of communicating a sense of interest without the irrevocable commitment that the movements of troops or even economic sanctions represent. Consequently, the U.S. and Soviet Navies are each deeply concerned about the operations of the other in the areas of strategic deterrence, projection of power and naval presence as well as sea control. It is a Soviet objective, for instance, to deny our strategic deterrent forces access to waters from which they can target the Soviet Union. The capability of our strategic forces to use whatever waters are necessary is, however, a sea control function and requires sea control forces and tactics. Our strategic deterrent forces in their strategic deterrent function do not conflict directly with the Soviet Navy, but do so only in the push and pull of asserting or denying sea control.

Because of this mission diversity and because ships are designed with a specific mission in

mind, ship-for-ship comparisons of naval inventories miss the mark. Many such comparisons which we hear about in public debate confuse the issue by mixing sea control "apples" with strategic or projection or presence "oranges". Even if numbers of ships, tonnage, etc. were valid indices in themselves, we would have to be careful about which parts of the inventory we counted. Because sea control is the fundamental of naval power, naval balance between the U.S. and USSR must be judged on its terms. To estimate that balance we must look first at how the United States might attempt to ensure utilization of the seas and how the Soviets might attempt to deny it. U.S. doctrine for ensuring Sea Control rests on four techniques or tactics:

- . by blockading enemy egress from his airfields or ports, - Sortie Control
- . by erecting barriers to enemy passage through geographic choke points or bottle necks enroute to the open ocean - Choke Point Control

- . by searching for, finding and destroying in Hunter-Killer style those enemy units which have gained the open ocean -

Open Ocean Operations

- . by winning local battles engagements around one's own protected forces, such as carrier task forces, amphibious forces, replenishment ships and merchant shipping - Local Engagement

The Soviets would likely attempt sea denial by the following tactics:

- . by attack with aircraft from land bases using either bombs or guided missiles (the Soviets are also generating a capability for taking their air power to sea in their new Kuril class aircraft carriers, but we do not yet know the specific role they will play)
- . by attack with submarines using torpedoes or missiles
- . by attack with surface combatant ships using missiles

• by laying minefields which would
attack U.S. shipping passing through
them

Thus the threat to our asserting our use of the seas is uniquely three dimensional - from the air, on the surface and beneath it. Additionally, it is worth noting that the Soviets under Admiral Gorskov's astute leadership have identified the special anti-ship requirements of sea denial. They have tailored their forces to that need by placing heavy reliance on the anti-ship missile, more so than the U.S. Navy which has concentrated more on anti-submarine techniques. Can we meet this three dimensional Soviet threat with its special emphasis on missiles? Each of our four tactics for ensuring sea control must be examined before we make our estimates.

Controlling the enemy's sortie from port or his passage through choke points are essentially attrition techniques. Air, surface or subsurface barriers are established which exact attrition on enemy forces as they attempt to transit back and forth. The analyst can develop a model, calculate encounter rates, detection rates and kill probabilities based on numbers and kinds of forces composing the

barrier. He can then produce a reasonable estimate of outcome. Much the same is true of the third tactic of U.S. sea control, open ocean search. Search theory procedures allow calculation of how often contact with the enemy can be expected and subsequent attrition occur. Thus to the extent that these three tactics determine "balance", it is possible to use sophisticated analytic techniques and the best available information on enemy forces to come to some reasonable conclusions.

Where the sea control equation becomes less manageable is in the case of local engagement. Traditionally this tactic has been treated in a manner identical to the three attrition tactics just discussed. Encounter and kill rates are calculated for each unit participating in the tactic. If we should decide, for instance, to use carrier based anti-submarine aircraft, destroyers, helicopters and submarines to protect a given task force, their total effectiveness would be the sum of the effectiveness of each type of unit taken as though it were operating in isolation. This approach badly misses the mark. What is distinctive about the local engagement case is the synergism of unifying dissimilar units

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so that they can act as a single weapon system.

For example, a carrier-based aircraft may establish first contact with an enemy submarine but in order to continue searching for other submarines may call in a destroyer to narrow down the sub's location and carry out the attack. Or the presence of a destroyer may force an enemy submarine to use high speeds to evade it while gaining a better attack position which in turn will enhance the probability that an aircraft with sonobuoys* will detect the submarine. Or perhaps a fighter aircraft on patrol may sight a periscope and, although its primary mission is to counter other aircraft, it could help to sink the submarine. This last example illustrates another complicating factor in estimating capability, namely the multi-mission capability of most naval forces. The destroyer which hunts submarines also fires missiles at aircraft and surface ships. The aircraft carrier is one day a platform for launching attack aircraft to project power ashore, and the next day a home for anti-submarine aircraft for asserting dominance of the seas. Counting ships, guns, etc. on either side does not give a clear picture of

*buoys dropped from an aircraft in the area of a suspected submarine which can transmit back to the aircraft any sounds made in the water by a nearby submarine. Used in patterns, the submarine's position can be established.

the relative strength. The whole may or may not be equal to the sum of the parts.

Nor is there an easy way to estimate what combination of forces for Sortie Control, Choke Point Control, Open Area Operations and Local Engagement may be our best mixture. If a war is likely to be short-lived, all three of the sea control tactics that rely on attrition will be ineffective. If the geographical area of fighting is limited, choke points may not exist. If the enemy determines when the war will start he may predeploy enough of his forces to diminish the impact of our trying to control his sorties. Intuition, tactical ingenuity and an ability to outguess the enemy, all of which are difficult to predict let alone measure, are critical to sea control operations.

So, too, is any appraisal of an enemy's capability for sea denial. Today the only potential enemy is the Soviet Navy. Smaller nations may be able to challenge our use of very restricted coastal waters only. Clearly, Soviet naval development over the past thirty years has been pointed toward denying us the capability of using the seas. The character of their building program with its emphasis on anti-ship and anti-submarine

weapons demonstrates this. Originally this appears to have been intended to deny our aircraft carriers access to waters from which our aircraft could reach the Soviet Union. Later, denial of the Polaris submarine probably became an added objective. There is continuing debate over whether or not Soviet naval ambitions today transcend these defensive objectives. Do they include denying us the open sea lanes to our NATO allies or access to Middle East oil? There is little question that the quantity and quality of their sea denial forces give them the capability of throwing down this gauntlet. Whether they would be likely do so is a question of whether their intentions would match their capabilities. Do they in today's circumstances? Would they in tomorrow's? How we answer these questions will be a major factor in deciding how much we want to spend on forces to assert our use of the seas in the face of the Soviet potential for denial. There is no simple formula or way to analyze whether our local engagement forces are in balance with those of the enemy. First it is difficult just to define what kind of an outcome would represent a satisfactory balance. Second, quantified analysis reaches its limits at what is known as the "engagement" level.

Individual encounters and possibly re-encounters can often be approximated by analytic techniques. What has never yet been treated adequately is the "campaign" level. Often a series of engagements are summed to hypothesize an extended campaign. Warfare is never mechanistic enough to make such summations meaningful. The tactics of each side will adapt as the results of engagements become known. Unpredictable elements will dominate unexpectedly: the weather, illness of a commander, unpredicted intelligence on the enemy, mistakes, etc. All of these uncertainties apply to individual engagements, of course, and reduce the probability that even analyses at that level will be valid. When we extend analysis to the campaign the multiplication of opportunities for such deviations makes the outcome less than useful.

With sea control, however, it is not only the probable outcome of war that counts. Our political, military and economic security are inextricably intertwined with the sea and ships. Our ability to ensure the movement of economic cargos by sea is a fundamental strength without which the United States would cease being the world power we have been for the past thirty years. It is freedom to

use the seas that permits us to maintain contact with the rest of the world. Equally obvious, our growing dependence on the import of raw materials and the exports to pay for them requires our use of the seas.

Some people are willing to predict that no one will ever challenge our right to use the seas. Others calculate that even if conflict at sea occurs, it is bound to be of short duration and our war reserve stockpiles of critical materials and our airlift capabilities will tide us over. But in the long run these rationalizations will not hold up. The attitudes and actions of both humans and animals are keyed to protecting their jugulars. Our perception of how vulnerable our nation's sea jugular is will always impact significantly on how we react in the world arena. It will not be a matter of precise calculation that with X naval ships or Y tons of combatants we will be in balance with the Soviets; or a matter of political estimates that in circumstance A the Soviets will try to interdict our sea lanes or in circumstance B they will not. It will be a matter of how exposed both naval and lay strategists perceive our position to be that will strongly influence our management of crises like the Cuban

missile crisis in 1962. Similarly, Soviet perceptions of where the balance of sea control lies will influence how aggressive a posture they take in world affairs.

Perhaps almost as important as U.S. and Soviet attitudes stemming from our respective sea control capabilities are third power perceptions of this balance. What these nations perceive the balance of sea control to be can affect their actions in world diplomatic and economic matters. The recurring theme in Admiral Gorskov's writing that naval forces are unique in their ability to be an adjunct to diplomacy in peacetime, indicates that the Soviets will play on their sea denial capability to create the impression that the United States may not be able to maintain its ties with the rest of the world. This kind of intimidation with military forces is nothing new to the Soviets, but their selective use of naval pressure in peacetime over the last ten years has been revolutionary. Their continuing naval growth has enabled them to begin to shift their pressures beyond the stalemated central front in Europe. Gorskov's writings again make it clear that they have set out to cast off the shackles of

being just a continental power and to establish a claim for world power status in the form of a potential for intervention in all parts of the globe. Just a few examples of how they are going about this:

- . Their expanded naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Norwegian Seas evidences a pincer movement on Western Europe
- . Their emphasis on naval presence and naval facilities in the Indian Ocean area shows their long awareness of the west's vital dependence on the flow of Persian Gulf oil
- . Their establishment of a continuous naval patrol off Guinea since 1971 may be related to the fact that Guinea is one of the few non-communist countries on which the Soviets rely for raw materials (Guinea has one-third of the world's bauxite reserves).
- . Their recurring patrols in the Caribbean demonstrate their intention to maintain a visible naval presence in the Western Hemisphere particularly in an

area which for many years we had looked on as an American preserve.

The quest for "balance" in naval forces is not just a scare tactic to generate a naval arms race. Balance is a matter of how we and others perceive our capability to prevent our life lines from being severed. That these perceptions are in part a product of our own rhetoric must be kept in mind as we debate the issue of naval balance in public. They are also a matter of knowing what forces we have and understanding what those forces are intended to accomplish. Basically this means understanding the complex Sea Control equation so that our perceptions are educated perceptions.

It is a challenge to all those who think about national security affairs to contribute to the articulation of a new naval strategy for the United States. The chances are that it will not be one individual who replaces Mahan, but a composite of both civilian and naval thinkers. For too long naval thinkers have been timorous of challenging Mahan's ideas. For too long civilian thinkers have been reluctant to grapple with the naval problem because of its apparent amorphism. It is time for the best intellectual talent in our nation to be encouraged to plunge deeply into the

difficult but navigable waters of naval strategy. There are no clear boundaries at sea, no conventional tactics, no thumb rule measures weighing offense against defense. Yet, our conceptual thinking cannot stand only on the words of an historian of the last century when three quarters of a new century has transpired; nor can we derive our lessons primarily from the experiences of a European nation while she was the world's premier sea power, when the United States has now held that position for over thirty years.

What we can do is to apply those analytic techniques which can help us to narrow down the problem. Then we apply judgement in deciding what constitutes "balance". No analysis can produce a definite answer, for two reasons. The first is that there are simply too many incommensurables and uncertainties that can not be quantified. Warfare is never conducted under laboratory conditions. The second is that perceptions count so heavily in the "balance" that we seek. Perceptions can never be anything other than inexact, but they can be educated by drawing upon analysis as much as is reasonable and then by applying judgment where analysis can not go. This may sound complex to

a layman, but the layman can do far better at this than he might expect, as long as he does not start from such over-simplified comparisons as ship counts. The days are behind us when we could afford the cost of a wide advantage over any potential naval opponent. We must tune the balance much more finely if the United States is to have the effective naval force it very much needs in the era ahead of stringent competition for resources. While ships may disappear below the sea when defeated in battle and leave no trace, the effects of naval defeats have altered the course of nations before and likely will again.

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
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to the U.S. when such action is dictated by our national objectives. Both the U.S. and USSR are likely to want to deploy naval presence forces when overseas events impact on national interests. Such forces have the unique capability of communicating a sense of interest without the irrevocable commitment that the movements of troops or even economic sanctions represent. Consequently, the U.S. and Soviet Navies are each deeply concerned about the operations of the other in the areas of strategic deterrence, projection of power and naval presence as well as sea control. It is a Soviet objective, for instance, to deny our strategic deterrent forces access to waters from which they can target the Soviet Union. The capability of our strategic forces to use whatever waters are necessary is, however, a sea control function and requires sea control forces and tactics. Our strategic deterrent forces in their strategic deterrent function do not conflict directly with the Soviet Navy, but do so only in the push and pull of asserting or denying sea control.

Because of this mission diversity and because ships are designed with a specific mission in

mind, ship-for-ship comparisons of naval inventories miss the mark. Many such comparisons which we hear about in public debate confuse the issue by mixing sea control "apples" with strategic or projection or presence "oranges". Even if numbers of ships, tonnage, etc. were valid indices in themselves, we would have to be careful about which parts of the inventory we counted. Because sea control is the fundamental of naval power, naval balance between the U.S. and USSR must be judged on its terms. To estimate that balance we must look first at how the United States might attempt to ensure utilization of the seas and how the Soviets might attempt to deny it. U.S. doctrine for ensuring Sea Control rests on four techniques or tactics:

- . by blockading enemy egress from his airfields or ports, - Sortie Control
- . by erecting barriers to enemy passage through geographic choke points or bottle necks enroute to the open ocean - Choke Point Control

. by searching for, finding and
destroying in Hunter-Killer
style those enemy units which
have gained the open ocean -

Open Ocean Operations

. by winning local battles en-
gagements around one's own
protected forces, such as
carrier task forces, amphibious
forces, replenishment ships and
merchant shipping - Local Engagement

The Soviets would likely attempt sea denial by the
following tactics:

- . by attack with aircraft from land bases using either bombs or guided missiles (the Soviets are also generating a capability for taking their air power to sea in their new Kuril class aircraft carriers, but we do not yet know the specific role they will play)
- . by attack with submarines using torpedoes or missiles
- . by attack with surface combatant ships using missiles

by laying minefields which would attack U.S. shipping passing through them

Thus the threat to our asserting our use of the seas is uniquely three dimensional - from the air, on the surface and beneath it. Additionally, it is worth noting that the Soviets under Admiral Gorskov's astute leadership have identified the special anti-ship requirements of sea denial. They have tailored their forces to that need by placing heavy reliance on the anti-ship missile, more so than the U.S. Navy which has concentrated more on anti-submarine techniques. Can we meet this three dimensional Soviet threat with its special emphasis on missiles? Each of our four tactics for ensuring sea control must be examined before we make our estimates.

Controlling the enemy's sortie from port or his passage through choke points are essentially attrition techniques. Air, surface or subsurface barriers are established which exact attrition on enemy forces as they attempt to transit back and forth. The analyst can develop a model, calculate encounter rates, detection rates and kill probabilities based on numbers and kinds of forces composing the

barrier. He can then produce a reasonable estimate of outcome. Much the same is true of the third tactic of U.S. sea control, open ocean search.

Search theory procedures allow calculation of how often contact with the enemy can be expected and subsequent attrition occur. Thus to the extent that these three tactics determine "balance", it is possible to use sophisticated analytic techniques and the best available information on enemy forces to come to some reasonable conclusions.

Where the sea control equation becomes less manageable is in the case of local engagement. Traditionally this tactic has been treated in a manner identical to the three attrition tactics just discussed. Encounter and kill rates are calculated for each unit participating in the tactic. If we should decide, for instance, to use carrier based anti-submarine aircraft, destroyers, helicopters and submarines to protect a given task force, their total effectiveness would be the sum of the effectiveness of each type of unit taken as though it were operating in isolation. This approach badly misses the mark. What is distinctive about the local engagement case is the synergism of unifying dissimilar units

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so that they can act as a single weapon system.

For example, a carrier-based aircraft may establish first contact with an enemy submarine but in order to continue searching for other submarines may call in a destroyer to narrow down the sub's location and carry out the attack. Or the presence of a destroyer may force an enemy submarine to use high speeds to evade it while gaining a better attack position which in turn will enhance the probability that an aircraft with sonobuoys* will detect the submarine. Or perhaps a fighter aircraft on patrol may sight a periscope and, although its primary mission is to counter other aircraft, it could help to sink the submarine.

This last example illustrates another complicating factor in estimating capability, namely the multi-mission capability of most naval forces. The destroyer which hunts submarines also fires missiles at aircraft and surface ships. The aircraft carrier is one day a platform for launching attack aircraft to project power ashore, and the next day a home for anti-submarine aircraft for asserting dominance of the seas. Counting ships, guns, etc. on either side does not give a clear picture of

*buoys dropped from an aircraft in the area of a suspected submarine which can transmit back to the aircraft any sounds made in the water by a nearby submarine. Used in patterns, the submarine's position can be established.

the relative strength. The whole may or may not be equal to the sum of the parts.

Nor is there an easy way to estimate what combination of forces for Sortie Control, Choke Point Control, Open Area Operations and Local Engagement may be our best mixture. If a war is likely to be short-lived, all three of the sea control tactics that rely on attrition will be ineffective. If the geographical area of fighting is limited, choke points may not exist. If the enemy determines when the war will start he may predeploy enough of his forces to diminish the impact of our trying to control his sorties. Intuition, tactical ingenuity and an ability to outguess the enemy, all of which are difficult to predict let alone measure, are critical to sea control operations.

So, too, is any appraisal of an enemy's capability for sea denial. Today the only potential enemy is the Soviet Navy. Smaller nations may be able to challenge our use of very restricted coastal waters only. Clearly, Soviet naval development over the past thirty years has been pointed toward denying us the capability of using the seas. The character of their building program with its emphasis on anti-ship and anti-submarine

weapons demonstrates this. Originally this appears to have been intended to deny our aircraft carriers access to waters from which our aircraft could reach the Soviet Union. Later, denial of the Polaris submarine probably became an added objective. There is continuing debate over whether or not Soviet naval ambitions today transcend these defensive objectives. Do they include denying us the open sea lanes to our NATO allies or access to Middle East oil? There is little question that the quantity and quality of their sea denial forces give them the capability of throwing down this gauntlet. Whether they would be likely do so is a question of whether their intentions would match their capabilities. Do they in today's circumstances? Would they in tomorrow's? How we answer these questions will be a major factor in deciding how much we want to spend on forces to assert our use of the seas in the face of the Soviet potential for denial. There is no simple formula or way to analyze whether our local engagement forces are in balance with those of the enemy. First it is difficult just to define what kind of an outcome would represent a satisfactory balance. Second, quantified analysis reaches its limits at what is known as the "engagement" level.

Individual encounters and possibly re-encounters can often be approximated by analytic techniques. What has never yet been treated adequately is the "campaign" level. Often a series of engagements are summed to hypothesize an extended campaign. Warfare is never mechanistic enough to make such summations meaningful. The tactics of each side will adapt as the results of engagements become known. Unpredictable elements will dominate unexpectedly: the weather, illness of a commander, unpredicted intelligence on the enemy, mistakes, etc. All of these uncertainties apply to individual engagements, of course, and reduce the probability that even analyses at that level will be valid. When we extend analysis to the campaign the multiplication of opportunities for such deviations makes the outcome less than useful.

With sea control, however, it is not only the probable outcome of war that counts. Our political, military and economic security are inextricably intertwined with the sea and ships. Our ability to ensure the movement of economic cargos by sea is a fundamental strength without which the United States would cease being the world power we have been for the past thirty years. It is freedom to

use the seas that permits us to maintain contact with the rest of the world. Equally obvious, our growing dependence on the import of raw materials and the exports to pay for them requires our use of the seas.

Some people are willing to predict that no one will ever challenge our right to use the seas. Others calculate that even if conflict at sea occurs, it is bound to be of short duration and our war reserve stockpiles of critical materials and our airlift capabilities will tide us over. But in the long run these rationalizations will not hold up. The attitudes and actions of both humans and animals are keyed to protecting their jugulars. Our perception of how vulnerable our nation's sea jugular is will always impact significantly on how we react in the world arena. It will not be a matter of precise calculation that with X naval ships or Y tons of combatants we will be in balance with the Soviets; or a matter of political estimates that in circumstance A the Soviets will try to interdict our sea lanes or in circumstance B they will not. It will be a matter of how exposed both naval and lay strategists perceive our position to be that will strongly influence our management of crises like the Cuban

missile crisis in 1962. Similarly, Soviet perceptions of where the balance of sea control lies will influence how aggressive a posture they take in world affairs.

Perhaps almost as important as U.S. and Soviet attitudes stemming from our respective sea control capabilities are third power perceptions of this balance. What these nations perceive the balance of sea control to be can affect their actions in world diplomatic and economic matters. The recurring theme in Admiral Gorskov's writing that naval forces are unique in their ability to be an adjunct to diplomacy in peacetime, indicates that the Soviets will play on their sea denial capability to create the impression that the United States may not be able to maintain its ties with the rest of the world. This kind of intimidation with military forces is nothing new to the Soviets, but their selective use of naval pressure in peacetime over the last ten years has been revolutionary. Their continuing naval growth has enabled them to begin to shift their pressures beyond the stalemated central front in Europe. Gorskov's writings again make it clear that they have set out to cast off the shackles of

being just a continental power and to establish a claim for world power status in the form of a potential for intervention in all parts of the globe. Just a few examples of how they are going about this:

- . Their expanded naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Norwegian Seas evidences a pincer movement on Western Europe
- . Their emphasis on naval presence and naval facilities in the Indian Ocean area shows their long awareness of the west's vital dependence on the flow of Persian Gulf oil
- . Their establishment of a continuous naval patrol off Guinea since 1971 may be related to the fact that Guinea is one of the few non-communist countries on which the Soviets rely for raw materials (Guinea has one-third of the world's bauxite reserves).
- . Their recurring patrols in the Caribbean demonstrate their intention to maintain a visible naval presence in the Western Hemisphere particularly in an

area which for many years we had looked on as an American preserve.

The quest for "balance" in naval forces is not just a scare tactic to generate a naval arms race. Balance is a matter of how we and others perceive our capability to prevent our life lines from being severed. That these perceptions are in part a product of our own rhetoric must be kept in mind as we debate the issue of naval balance in public. They are also a matter of knowing what forces we have and understanding what those forces are intended to accomplish. Basically this means understanding the complex Sea Control equation so that our perceptions are educated perceptions.

It is a challenge to all those who think about national security affairs to contribute to the articulation of a new naval strategy for the United States. The chances are that it will not be one individual who replaces Mahan, but a composite of both civilian and naval thinkers. For too long naval thinkers have been timorous of challenging Mahan's ideas. For too long civilian thinkers have been reluctant to grapple with the naval problem because of its apparent amorphism. It is time for the best intellectual talent in our nation to be encouraged to plunge deeply into the

difficult but navigable waters of naval strategy.

There are no clear boundaries at sea, no conventional tactics, no thumb rule measures weighing offense against defense. Yet, our conceptual thinking cannot stand only on the words of an historian of the last century when three quarters of a new century has transpired; nor can we derive our lessons primarily from the experiences of a European nation while she was the world's premier sea power, when the United States has now held that position for over thirty years.

What we can do is to apply those analytic techniques which can help us to narrow down the problem. Then we apply judgement in deciding what constitutes "balance". No analysis can produce a definite answer, for two reasons. The first is that there are simply too many incommensurables and uncertainties that can not be quantified. Warfare is never conducted under laboratory conditions. The second is that perceptions count so heavily in the "balance" that we seek. Perceptions can never be anything other than inexact, but they can be educated by drawing upon analysis as much as is reasonable and then by applying judgment where analysis can not go. This may sound complex to

a layman, but the layman can do far better at this than he might expect, as long as he does not start from such over-simplified comparisons as ship counts. The days are behind us when we could afford the cost of a wide advantage over any potential naval opponent. We must tune the balance much more finely if the United States is to have the effective naval force it very much needs in the era ahead of stringent competition for resources. While ships may disappear below the sea when defeated in battle and leave no trace, the effects of naval defeats have altered the course of nations before and likely will again.

TALK TO THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL
CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
FEB 20, 1975

by Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner

"The Influence Of Sea Power on Contemporary History"

Historically the term sea power has been defined and employed in many ways. Writers on strategy of the sea as prominent as Bernard Brodie have used it to refer primarily to the naval component. Others have emphasized that merchant shipping is an essential ingredient, in fact the sine qua non, but then have written primarily about the protection of merchant shipping in wartime. Clearly we must today acknowledge that sea power is more than warships and more than wartime. Many nations, the U.S. not the least, are becoming more dependent on the seas every day. Their capacity to utilize the seas in peace as well as war will be a fundamental determinant of what they are as a nation and what they can become. I would like then, to consider all three major uses to which we put the sea today: military, commercial and recreational. I would like to ask how these uses are likely to change in the

years to come and what any changes in the uses of the seas may mean to the relations between nations. My theme is threefold. First, that use of the seas by the nations of the world is increasing in volume and in importance; second, that a great potential exists to use the commonality of interests on the sea to move the world away from a spirit of international competition to one of unprecedented cooperation; and third, that whether or not the seas turn the world toward such cooperation will depend largely on how the United States approaches its unique role as the world's primary sea power.

Let us start, then, by reviewing how the use of the seas is evolving in the military sphere. We employ naval power today in four distinct ways which are known in naval parlance as strategic deterrence, naval presence, the projection of power, and sea control.

Strategic deterrence. The Navy does this by maintaining a survivable force of submarines equipped with ballistic missiles. These would enable us to strike back at an enemy even after he had delivered a surprise nuclear

attack against us. The possession by both ourselves and the Soviets of this type of assured second strike capability has been a major stabilizing force in the world for the past 20 years. Until the world power balance is more strongly influenced by other factors, this use of the seas for strategic submarine forces is not likely to diminish.

What impact will this continued reliance on sea based forces for deterrence have on our international relations? For one thing, it will have a major impact on our negotiating position on disarmament. It also makes us acutely aware of the importance of freedom of the seas in negotiations on the law of the sea and other international agreements. It makes us sensitive to apparent military threats to that freedom such as the current build up of the Soviet Navy, a build up which is designed primarily for interrupting movement by sea. We must also be sensitive to treaties, agreements or precedents in the commercial sphere that could impinge on either the accessibility of these strategic submarines to the sea, or their ability to remain covert while on

patrol. As the seas are populated for fishing, mineral extraction, shipping, and recreation, such activities should not coincidentally hazard the havens which assure the invulnerability of these important forces.

Next let us look at our use of the seas for a visible naval presence in support of diplomacy. Clausewitz said, "Battle in war is what cash settlement is in commerce, it need not ever actually take place, but if it does, it settles everything." Today, when the consequences of strife between major powers can be so very final, there are greater pressures than ever to avoid the ultimate expression of strife, the battle. Hence, there will be more competition below the threshold of open war, as in the show of military force in peacetime.

There are those today who question whether "gunboat diplomacy" is still effective. They argue that there are such inhibitions on the actual exercise of power that smaller nations are not as easily intimidated as in the era of colonialism. This is certainly true, but when a major power like the

United States maintains the means to intervene in other countries, and avows the will to do so if U.S. interests are threatened it must influence the actions of those countries.

It seems clear that the Soviets believe that they can take advantage of their growing naval power as a tool of diplomacy. Admiral Gorshkov stresses in his writings that naval forces have unique capabilities for furthering peacetime interests. The phenomenal growth of surface ships in the Soviet Navy can only be explained in these extra-military terms. Some of these ships certainly relate to defense against the intrusion of U.S. or NATO strategic submarines and aircraft carriers into Soviet waters. Some relate to the interdiction of sealines of communications. But despite Kruschev's dire statements about the demise of the Soviet surface navy, its dramatic growth has far exceeded these requirements. It apparently rests largely on the demands of naval presence.

I would suggest, then, that we are going to see a continued and growing display of our naval forces around the world in peacetime. Some of these displays will be preventive in

nature; gentle, routine reminders that the United States has interests in the area; others will be reactive to specific crises. How will these uses of naval presence affect our international relations? For one thing, we may, of course, find the Soviet Navy similarly employed in the same areas and circumstances. Some claim that this is dangerous eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation in which a reckless junior officer may light the fuze; others point out that it may be a safer way to express national concern than to move troops, execute economic sanctions, or to take other steps from which it is more difficult to retreat. In 1970, for example, the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet and our Sixth Fleet intermingled in the eastern Mediterranean during the crisis in Jordan. For a time the two Fleet Commanders cruised literally within an eyeball range, a tactically unsound maneuver for war, but one that gave each some measure of reassurance against the other's misinterpreting his intentions. Since then we have even negotiated a treaty between the Soviet

Navy and ours to control the maneuvers of our ships and aircraft when in proximity to each other.

Another aspect of the future of naval presence is the occasional suggestion that we should negotiate the total withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet naval forces from areas like the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean. I suggest that our appreciation of the value of naval presence makes it unlikely that we would do so. In many circumstances, not having Soviet naval units on the scene will not substitute for having U.S. ships there. For instance, we may want to exert pressure or indicate support through naval presence in circumstances where we are not necessarily at odds with the Soviets.

The third use of naval forces is in the projection of power from the sea onto hostile territories through air attack, amphibious assault or naval gun bombardment. This has been the only combatant employment of our naval power since World War II. Today there is an emotional residue from Vietnam that counsels against our even maintaining such a

capability. On the other hand, even since our recent withdrawal from Vietnam, there has been speculation in the press of this country as to whether we might project power in support of one situation or another. Being able to project our power around the world is an essential part of our world power status. We are unlikely to forsake it lightly. As long as we do maintain it, it will color all of our relations with other nations.

Finally in looking at the military uses of the seas we have sea control. To us sea control refers to our ability to ensure that the seas will remain open and free for all nations to use in peacetime and for the United States and her allies to use in wartime.

Historically there have been long periods when most nations used the seas by the grace of one dominant sea power. Great Britain enjoyed such status in much of the 18th and 19th centuries. However, the era when any one nation could totally dominate the seas has long passed. The submarine and later the long range aircraft changed all that. The Battles of the Atlantic in World War I and World War II showed how difficult it was for even a

coalition of vastly superior sea powers to wrest complete control of the seas from its opponent.

Today, the guarantee of free use of the seas rests largely on there being some "balance" of sea control forces between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. For over two decades we have seen the steady rise of a Soviet Navy oriented toward sea denial. Our response has been to emphasize forces which can be used to assert our right to use the seas should it be challenged. We will both continue to emphasize naval forces for sea control because I believe all of our uses of the seas, military, commercial and recreational, are dependent on them. This is not because we expect war to break out at sea any day. It is because the contest for sea control goes on even in peacetime. The peacetime utility of naval power rests heavily on perceptions. The balance of U.S.-Soviet sea control capabilities as perceived not only by the U.S. and the USSR but also by other nations in the world.

Moving on now to commercial uses of the seas, we can see that as developing nations

with burgeoning populations seek to attain a higher standard of living, they reach a point when they can no longer meet their own needs and must turn to their neighbors. The advantage gained through the international exchange of goods brings with it a dependence on the sea that is not easily forsaken thereafter.

Today three quarters of all international trade by weight moves by sea and nearly the same by value. As a reflection of increased worldwide productive capacity and this propensity to trade world, cargo tonnage increased between 1950 to 1970 more than fourfold. The ton miles in world trade of iron ore alone has increased 400% in the last 10 years. A former director of Lloyds of London recently quoted a study suggesting that the demand for shipping by 1980 will have grown from 330 million to 680 million deadweight tons. Substantial increases in sea cargoes seem as much in store for the United States as for the developing nations. These days one need hardly comment on the growing dependence of the United States on the import of raw materials.

That leads in turn to a need for increased exports to pay for them.

Increasing use of our ocean highways has numerous specific implications for international relations. All of them point toward the necessity for greater cooperation among the users of these ocean highways. We will need greater cooperation in traffic control (every 15 minutes while we sit here a ship transits the Straits of Malacca); we will need greater cooperation in Search and Rescue operations; in standards for ship design to increase the margin of safety as ships become larger and larger; and in measures to prevent ecological damage when the damage which could be caused by an accident to ships which may soon exceed one million dead weight tons defies imagination... Few of these problems of safety, rescue, and ecology can be solved on a unilateral, bi-lateral or even multi-lateral basis. We will need the widest coordination, otherwise those who suffer the most can be those who are most diligent in attempting to prevent these potential catastrophes.

We face a similar picture when we look at the future of commercial exploitation of the natural resources entrapped in or below the oceans. Who will adjudicate whether the emplacement of rigs for extracting oil or minerals interferes unduly with navigation? Who will establish and police boundaries for exploration, development or farming of the oceans? Who will control and punish common thievery, sabotage, terrorism and extortion? Ship jacking or oil rig jacking have not come into vogue, fortunately. But if we Americans look back to some of the antics that commercial interests played upon each other when we opened our frontiers to the West, just think what potential for mischief-making exists on the frontiers of the seas; small predator submarines, small but lethal long range weapons, sonic devices to locate and disrupt underseas cables and pipelines, etc. The old "laissez faire" management of the seas will not be adequate.

Some encouraging precedents have been set: there are numerous bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements regulating the size

of fish catches; the North Sea has been peacefully divided into a five patch quilt; there are recurring suggestions that there be some form of sharing of the revenues from the extraction of minerals and oil from the deep sea bed; and, of course, we are about to embark on another major conference on the Law of the Sea.

Still, the problems and issues that lie ahead are legion. The disposal of nuclear waste, for instance, is going to be a world problem. Where do you hide a deadly material with a half life measured in tens of thousands of years? There is now a serious suggestion that these or other wastes can be disposed of in subduction zones in the ocean depths where the earth's crust is creeping inexorably over itself. To meet the challenge of deciding whether such practices will save or peril mankind we must regulate our use of the seas. Yet ironically at the same time if we are to exploit the full potential of the seas we must promote greater freedom to use the seas. What we need is regulation for the benefit of all not nationalization for the benefit of the few.

This brings us to the third major use of the seas, recreation for mankind. Just last year over 46 million Americans alone spent over 4 billion dollars on their pleasure boats. The trend is similar in the rest of the developed world. And, perhaps most important of all is what a long glimpse of that cobalt colored sea will do for a man's soul on a quiet day, when the fresh salt air is wafting through his nostrils. I won't wax romantic on you, but I think anyone who has ever spent any time near the sea will agree that it is a priceless heritage which must be protected for the good of all peoples.

Looking over this whole spectrum of uses of the seas from military to commercial to recreational, what do these growing demands mean for mankind? It seems to me that they pose an exciting challenge for us; an opportunity of great portent. All around the globe today, on land and on sea, rational solutions to many of our common problems are imperiled by the spirit of nationalism and sovereignty. Sovereignty indeed has a fundamental place in our world society, but if

sovereignty can be defined as an ability to influence events of importance to a nation, there are an increasing number of events that can not be influenced by any one nation acting singly. To insist on full national sovereignty in such circumstances is to forsake sovereignty. In the years ahead the world must find ways in which to balance the legitimate demands for sovereign independence and the necessity for collective response to problems that transcend the competence of sovereign powers acting individually.

Is it possible that facing up to the issues of how to encourage the full utilization of the seas can establish some useful precedents? Perhaps it will be easier to work around the emotional concept of sovereignty in the environment of the seas.---After all, nations are less attached by past ownership, culture, or history to patches of the ocean than to pieces of territory. Moreover, the necessity for cooperation on the problems of the oceans is more readily apparent. Perhaps it is just the mental image of the fluidity with which those problems are carried around the world; perhaps it is the lack of ownership

of most of the oceans which makes it difficult to pass the buck; perhaps truly international problems on the oceans just are more tractable than those on land.

What is needed, though, are imaginative steps to establish a regime of the seas which will make all nations feel that it works for them, that it enhances their effective sovereignty. Clearly this will not be easy. On the one hand there are some countries whose lives have been intertwined with freedom of the seas for so long that they will find it difficult to appreciate that freedom at sea can not be infinite. There are others who approach the new vista for the seas with an attitude of seeking compensation for the paucity of their own resources in the riches of the world's oceans or of seeking retribution for what they look on as dictatorial regulation of the seas in the past.

It will take mature leadership and some firm direction to sort these matters out to the benefit of the entire world. The leadership that is needed must come from nations which understand sea power; from nations that

appreciate the common need for a good measure of freedom on the oceans; from nations that are sensitive to the needs of others and recognize that their own long term welfare is inescapably related to how effectively all nations utilize the seas.

The role of the United States in helping to solve these problems will be crucial. Certainly we are well qualified as a sea-going nation to understand the issues involved. And I think that our long history of generosity and compassion for others ranks us high on the list of nations who can be trusted to act in the best interest of all concerned. The job cannot be done alone nor should it be. It must be a truly cooperative international undertaking. But the United States should contribute her ideas and leadership unstintingly to ensure that parochial interests are suppressed and a regime of the sea is established on the basis of what is good for mankind.

A truly international regime of the sea could demonstrate the importance of cooperation between nations so much more readily than has ever been possible on land, where the issues of sovereignty, ownership, and tradition are

closely entwined. Thus, perhaps it is just possible, that the influence which sea power will have on contemporary history will be an influence for harmony and peace. At least it appears to me that an unprecedented opportunity for this exists. We must attempt to grasp it.

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years to come and what any changes in the uses of the seas may mean to the relations between nations. My theme is threefold.

First, that use of the seas by the nations of the world is increasing in volume and in importance; second, that a great potential exists to use the commonality of interests on the sea to move the world away from a spirit of international competition to one of unprecedented cooperation; and third, that whether or not the seas turn the world toward such cooperation will depend largely on how the United States approaches its unique role as the world's primary sea power.

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There are those today who question whether "gunboat diplomacy" is still effective. They argue that there are such inhibitions on the actual exercise of power that smaller nations are not as easily intimidated as in the era of colonialism. This is certainly true, but when a major power like the

United States maintains the means to intervene in other countries, and avows the will to do so if U.S. interests are threatened it must influence the actions of those countries.

It seems clear that the Soviets believe that they can take advantage of their growing naval power as a tool of diplomacy. Admiral Gorshkov stresses in his writings that naval forces have unique capabilities for furthering peacetime interests. The phenomenal growth of surface ships in the Soviet Navy can only be explained in these extra-military terms. Some of these ships certainly relate to defense against the intrusion of U.S. or NATO strategic submarines and aircraft carriers into Soviet waters. Some relate to the interdiction of sealines of communications. But despite Kruschev's dire statements about the demise of the Soviet surface navy, its dramatic growth has far exceeded these requirements. It apparently rests largely on the demands of naval presence.

I would suggest, then, that we are going to see a continued and growing display of our naval forces around the world in peacetime. Some of these displays will be preventive in

nature; gentle, routine reminders that the United States has interests in the area; others will be reactive to specific crises.

How will these uses of naval presence affect our international relations? For one thing, we may, of course, find the Soviet Navy similarly employed in the same areas and circumstances. Some claim that this is dangerous eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation in which a reckless junior officer may light the fuze; others point out that it may be a safer way to express national concern than to move troops, execute economic sanctions, or to take other steps from which it is more difficult to retreat. In 1970, for example, the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet and our Sixth Fleet intermingled in the eastern Mediterranean during the crisis in Jordan. For a time the two Fleet Commanders cruised literally within an eyeball range, a tactically unsound maneuver for war, but one that gave each some measure of reassurance against the other's misinterpreting his intentions. Since then we have even negotiated a treaty between the Soviet

Navy and ours to control the maneuvers of our ships and aircraft when in proximity to each other.

Another aspect of the future of naval presence is the occasional suggestion that we should negotiate the total withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet naval forces from areas like the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean. I suggest that our appreciation of the value of naval presence makes it unlikely that we would do so. In many circumstances, not having Soviet naval units on the scene will not substitute for having U.S. ships there. For instance, we may want to exert pressure or indicate support through naval presence in circumstances where we are not necessarily at odds with the Soviets.

The third use of naval forces is in the projection of power from the sea onto hostile territories through air attack, amphibious assault or naval gun bombardment. This has been the only combatant employment of our naval power since World War II. Today there is an emotional residue from Vietnam that counsels against our even maintaining such a

capability. On the other hand, even since our recent withdrawal from Vietnam, there has been speculation in the press of this country as to whether we might project power in support of one situation or another. Being able to project our power around the world is an essential part of our world power status. We are unlikely to forsake it lightly. As long as we do maintain it, it will color all of our relations with other nations.

Finally in looking at the military uses of the seas we have sea control. To us sea control refers to our ability to ensure that the seas will remain open and free for all nations to use in peacetime and for the United States and her allies to use in wartime. Historically there have been long periods when most nations used the seas by the grace of one dominant sea power. Great Britain enjoyed such status in much of the 18th and 19th centuries. However, the era when any one nation could totally dominate the seas has long passed. The submarine and later the long range aircraft changed all that. The Battles of the Atlantic in World War I and World War II showed how difficult it was for even a

coalition of vastly superior sea powers to wrest complete control of the seas from its opponent.

Today, the guarantee of free use of the seas rests largely on there being some "balance" of sea control forces between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. For over two decades we have seen the steady rise of a Soviet Navy oriented toward sea denial. Our response has been to emphasize forces which can be used to assert our right to use the seas should it be challenged. We will both continue to emphasize naval forces for sea control because I believe all of our uses of the seas, military, commercial and recreational, are dependent on them. This is not because we expect war to break out at sea any day. It is because the contest for sea control goes on even in peacetime. The peacetime utility of naval power rests heavily on perceptions. The balance of U.S.-Soviet sea control capabilities as perceived not only by the U.S. and the USSR but also by other nations in the world.

Moving on now to commercial uses of the seas, we can see that as developing nations

with burgeoning populations seek to attain a higher standard of living, they reach a point when they can no longer meet their own needs and must turn to their neighbors. The advantage gained through the international exchange of goods brings with it a dependence on the sea that is not easily forsaken thereafter.

Today three quarters of all international trade by weight moves by sea and nearly the same by value. As a reflection of increased worldwide productive capacity and this propensity to trade world, cargo tonnage increased between 1950 to 1970 more than fourfold. The ton miles in world trade of iron ore alone has increased 400% in the last 10 years. A former director of Lloyds of London recently quoted a study suggesting that the demand for shipping by 1980 will have grown from 330 million to 680 million deadweight tons.

Substantial increases in sea cargoes seem as much in store for the United States as for the developing nations. These days one need hardly comment on the growing dependence of the United States on the import of raw materials.

That leads in turn to a need for increased exports to pay for them.

Increasing use of our ocean highways has numerous specific implications for international relations. All of them point toward the necessity for greater cooperation among the users of these ocean highways. We will need greater cooperation in traffic control (every 15 minutes while we sit here a ship transits the Straits of Malacca); we will need greater cooperation in Search and Rescue operations; in standards for ship design to increase the margin of safety as ships become larger and larger; and in measures to prevent ecological damage when the damage which could be caused by an accident to ships which may soon exceed one million dead weight tons defies imagination. Few of these problems of safety, rescue, and ecology can be solved on a unilateral, bi-lateral or even multi-lateral basis. We will need the widest coordination, otherwise those who suffer the most can be those who are most diligent in attempting to prevent these potential catastrophes.

We face a similar picture when we look at the future of commercial exploitation of the natural resources entrapped in or below the oceans. Who will adjudicate whether the emplacement of rigs for extracting oil or minerals interferes unduly with navigation? Who will establish and police boundaries for exploration, development or farming of the oceans? Who will control and punish common thievery, sabotage, terrorism and extortion? Ship jacking or oil rig jacking have not come into vogue, fortunately. But if we Americans look back to some of the antics that commercial interests played upon each other when we opened our frontiers to the West, just think what potential for mischief-making exists on the frontiers of the seas; small predator submarines, small but lethal long range weapons, sonic devices to locate and disrupt underseas cables and pipelines, etc. The old "laissez faire" management of the seas will not be adequate.

Some encouraging precedents have been set: there are numerous bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements regulating the size

of fish catches; the North Sea has been peacefully divided into a five patch quilt; there are recurring suggestions that there be some form of sharing of the revenues from the extraction of minerals and oil from the deep sea bed; and, of course, we are about to embark on another major conference on the Law of the Sea.

Still, the problems and issues that lie ahead are legion. The disposal of nuclear waste, for instance, is going to be a world problem. Where do you hide a deadly material with a half life measured in tens of thousands of years? There is now a serious suggestion that these or other wastes can be disposed of in subduction zones in the ocean depths where the earth's crust is creeping inexorably over itself. To meet the challenge of deciding whether such practices will save or peril mankind we must regulate our use of the seas. Yet ironically at the same time if we are to exploit the full potential of the seas we must promote greater freedom to use the seas. What we need is regulation for the benefit of all not nationalization for the benefit of the few.

This brings us to the third major use of the seas, recreation for mankind. Just last year over 46 million Americans alone spent over 4 billion dollars on their pleasure boats. The trend is similar in the rest of the developed world. And, perhaps most important of all is what a long glimpse of that cobalt colored sea will do for a man's soul on a quiet day, when the fresh salt air is wafting through his nostrils. I won't wax romantic on you, but I think anyone who has ever spent any time near the sea will agree that it is a priceless heritage which must be protected for the good of all peoples.

Looking over this whole spectrum of uses of the seas from military to commercial to recreational, what do these growing demands mean for mankind? It seems to me that they pose an exciting challenge for us; an opportunity of great portent. All around the globe today, on land and on sea, rational solutions to many of our common problems are imperiled by the spirit of nationalism and sovereignty. Sovereignty indeed has a fundamental place in our world society, but if

sovereignty can be defined as an ability to influence events of importance to a nation, there are an increasing number of events that can not be influenced by any one nation acting singly. To insist on full national sovereignty in such circumstances is to forsake sovereignty. In the years ahead the world must find ways in which to balance the legitimate demands for sovereign independence and the necessity for collective response to problems that transcend the competence of sovereign powers acting individually.

Is it possible that facing up to the issues of how to encourage the full utilization of the seas can establish some useful precedents? Perhaps it will be easier to work around the emotional concept of sovereignty in the environment of the seas. After all, nations are less attached by past ownership, culture, or history to patches of the ocean than to pieces of territory. Moreover, the necessity for cooperation on the problems of the oceans is more readily apparent. Perhaps it is just the mental image of the fluidity with which those problems are carried around the world; perhaps it is the lack of ownership

of most of the oceans which makes it difficult to pass the buck; perhaps truly international problems on the oceans just are more tractable than those on land.

What is needed, though, are imaginative steps to establish a regime of the seas which will make all nations feel that it works for them, that it enhances their effective sovereignty. Clearly this will not be easy. On the one hand there are some countries whose lives have been intertwined with freedom of the seas for so long that they will find it difficult to appreciate that freedom at sea can not be infinite. There are others who approach the new vista for the seas with an attitude of seeking compensation for the paucity of their own resources in the riches of the world's oceans or of seeking retribution for what they look on as dictatorial regulation of the seas in the past.

It will take mature leadership and some firm direction to sort these matters out to the benefit of the entire world. The leadership that is needed must come from nations which understand sea power; from nations that

appreciate the common need for a good measure of freedom on the oceans; from nations that are sensitive to the needs of others and recognize that their own long term welfare is inescapably related to how effectively all nations utilize the seas.

The role of the United States in helping to solve these problems will be crucial. Certainly we are well qualified as a sea-going nation to understand the issues involved. And I think that our long history of generosity and compassion for others ranks us high on the list of nations who can be trusted to act in the best interest of all concerned. The job cannot be done alone nor should it be. It must be a truly cooperative international undertaking. But the United States should contribute her ideas and leadership unstintingly to ensure that parochial interests are suppressed and a regime of the sea is established on the basis of what is good for mankind.


A truly international regime of the sea could demonstrate the importance of cooperation between nations so much more readily than has ever been possible on land, where the issues of sovereignty, ownership, and tradition are

closely entwined. Thus, perhaps it is just possible, that the influence which sea power will have on contemporary history will be an influence for harmony and peace. At least it appears to me that an unprecedented opportunity for this exists. We must attempt to grasp it.

MISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY

by

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College



One of the important challenges facing naval officers today is to define, then articulate, why we need a navy and what it should be able to accomplish for the country. The changes in national attitudes and military technology and the relationship of nations today are such that we cannot accept the traditional rationale for a navy as sacrosanct. We must reexamine and be willing to retain or reget, modify or add to, the well established missions of our navy. In 1970 the Chief of Naval Operations defined the current missions of the U.S. Navy as being Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore, and Naval Presence. As a starting point, we should perhaps examine how these four missions evolved. We can then go on to ask what they specifically mean today and whether they are an adequate explanation of our need for a navy.

The first and only mission of the earliest navies was Sea Control. A classic example of the importance of being able to move military forces by sea is the Battle of Salamis. In 480 BC, the Persian armies had pushed the Greeks to the wall. The Athenian Admiral, Themistocles, turned the tables by soundly defeating the Persian fleet at Salamis. Cut off from reinforcement and resupply, the Persian army was compelled to leave Athens and Attica.

As time went on, there were many technological milestones, new tactical concepts, and maritime initiatives, but the basic mission of navies was to ensure the safe movement of ground forces and their supplies across the sea. By the 18th century, however, sea trade routes were flourishing, exploration was becoming more far ranging, the horizons of imperialism were widening, commerce was growing, and with it, piracy. As nations began to depend on the seas for their economic well being, they needed security of movement by sea. Control of the sea became the sine qua non of economic growth. The Sea Control mission expanded from just support for military expeditions to the inclusion of the protection of shipping for nation's economy as well. At the end of the 19th century, Alfred Thayer Mahan defined maritime power to include merchant marine and naval forces plus all of the bases and coaling stations needed to support each. He popularized the concept of "control of the seas" as a key to expanding national power and prestige. To Mahan the term "control of

"the seas," meant both denying use of the seas to the enemy and asserting one's own use, both through the device of having a superior battle fleet that could defeat the enemy's.

British and German naval strategies in World War I reflected this heritage. Both navies believed that a decisive encounter of their battle fleets would determine control of the seas. Hence caution dominated the tactics of the Battle of Jutland. After that failure to defeat the British battle fleet, the Germans tried to challenge British sea power by indirect devices. First they employed surface ship commerce raiders, and later they resorted to unrestricted submarine warfare. The British reacted by attempting to blockade the German U-boats with mines laid across the exit to the North Sea. This failed, and the struggle for control of the Atlantic in World War I evolved into a gruelling war of attrition. Large numbers of allied anti-submarine ships and aircraft were pitted against a much smaller number of German submarines. Despite the difference between this and the classic concept that battle fleet engagements would determine control of the seas, few strategists understood how radically the concept of "control of the seas" had been altered by the advent of the submarine. British, German, Japanese, and American preparations for World War II all concentrated on potential battle fleet actions. Only a few voices pointed out that an additional submarine or two might be more useful than another battleship.

Equally few strategists forecast the dominant role that control of the air over a surface fleet would have. However, in March 1941, off Cape Matapan in Greece, the first engagement of major surface forces since Jutland demonstrated that it was the presence of a British aircraft carrier that allowed an otherwise weaker force to prevail. Throughout World War II the primary use of naval carrier based air power was in the sea control role of defeating enemy carriers and battleships, with a secondary role of providing close air support for amphibious assaults. By the end of World War II the idea of totally denying the seas to one's enemy while asserting one's own exclusive use had been overtaken by technology. On the one hand it was nearly impossible to deny an enemy submarine fleet access to the seas; on the other, there were likely to be areas of the sea where enemy air power would make the assertion of one's presence prohibitively costly. Yet, for the first several decades after the second World War, the U.S. Navy had such a monopoly on sea power that the term "control of the seas" understandably continued to carry its long established connotation.



The new term "Sea Control" is intended to acknowledge the limitations on control of the oceans brought about by the advent of the airplane and the submarine. It connotes a more realistic concept of control in limited areas and for limited periods of time. It is conceivable for a navy today to temporarily exert air, surface, and subsurface control in a limited area while

moving ships into position to project power ashore or to resupply overseas forces. It is no longer conceivable, except in the most restricted sense, to totally control the seas for one's own use, or to totally deny them to an enemy.

This may change with evolving technology and tactics, but in the meantime, we must approach the use of the term "Sea Control," from two directions: denying an enemy the right to use some seas at some time; and, asserting our own right to use some seas at some times. Any sea power may both assert its own right to use the seas and deny that right to the enemy at any given time. Its efforts will usually be divided between the two objectives. For instance, in Figure 1, if the U.S. were attempting in wartime to use the North Atlantic to reinforce Europe, it would be operating near the left side of the top left of the diagram with the greater percentage of its effort on asserting sea control. In a situation like the War in Vietnam, we operated on the right extreme, since our use of the seas was not challenged, but we did make a substantial effort to deny the other side access to Haiphong or infiltration into South Vietnam. An opponent, of course, will usually respond with countering objectives and tactics as in the lower half of the figure.

United States

Opponent



Sortie Control: Bottling up an opponent in his ports or on his bases can still be attempted. As opposed to the 18th and 19th century tactic of forcing a major fleet engagement at sea, today's blockade seeks destruction of individual units as they sortie. If we are asserting sea control we are interested in attriting the flow of his submarines, aircraft or surface raiders as they attempt to sortie into areas where they could attack our merchant shipping or naval forces. If we are exercising sea denial, we will want to stop the enemy's merchant shipping as it attempts to come and go from his ports. (Sea denial theoretically applies to interdicting the naval projection forces of an enemy, but today, as will be explained later, there are no other navies with a true projection of power capability).

Choke point control: If there is a geographical bottleneck through which the enemy must pass enroute from his base areas to our operating zones, this may be the best place to engage him.

| used. Choke point control would be used primarily to interdict enemy naval forces to free us from attack when attempting to assert our use of the seas. It is conceivable, though not too likely, that we would also interdict enemy merchant shipping in choke points when exercising sea denial.

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For those enemy forces that have cleared sortie and choke point operations, there are two remaining tactics.

Open area operations: Once the enemy is loose at sea or in the air, we can search for him and hope to locate and destroy him before he finds his prey. Again, this is primarily a tactic for asserting sea control.

Local Engagement: If an enemy is attempting to deny us use of the seas, he must eventually come to us. When he closes to within range for release of his weapons, we can attempt to destroy his launching platform prior to weapon release or attempt to deflect, or destroy the attacking weapons themselves. On the other hand, if we are denying use of the seas to someone else, local engagement amounts to positioning forces in a limited region and waiting in prey for the enemy.

Even if these are the four basic ways of exercising sea control, of what value or utility is it to us to talk in these terms?

First, it can assist us in planning and selecting the best tactical option.

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| | NATO War | Asia War - CPR's US / Allies | "Unilateral" with USSR | Limited war no USSR or CPR | Protection of Maritime shipping - against USSR |
|---------------------|----------|------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| Sortie Control | X | X | | | X |
| Choke Point Control | X | | X | | X |
| Open Area Search | X | X | | | X |
| Local Engagement | X | X | X | X | X |

Figure 2

Figure 2 displays a judgment as to whether each of [] these four tactics is applicable to each of five possible war scenarios:

Let us look at some of the considerations behind the way one or two of these columns are filled in:

NATO War: Sortie control would mean going into the opponent's back yard. Only nuclear submarines are likely to be able to patrol and survive in such an environment, though anti-submarine or anti-ship minelaying by submarine or aircraft is also a possibility. Against the sortie of aircraft, only air attacks on air bases appear feasible, but have the serious shortcoming of possibly being mistaken for a strategic nuclear attack. Both sortie and choke point control are attrition tactics of no potential against enemy forces [] ships that are pre-deployed. Open ocean search tactics are

dependent on the availability of fixed or mobile surveillance systems in the areas of concern. For a NATO war this has generally been presumed to be the North Atlantic. Local engagement forces are applicable anywhere, but past experience indicates that very large numbers of forces might be required, and today's threats are considerably more potent than yesterday's, e.g. nuclear vs. diesel propelled submarines; anti-ship cruise missiles vs. torpedoes.

Limited War, No USSR or CPR: A war against lesser powers than the Soviets or Chinese would not be a major naval war. Sortie control would be the preferable means of curtailing an enemy's sea movements. It would be more feasible than against a major power. Choke point control and open area search are less likely to be useful against a minor or coastal sea power. Local engagement or defensive forces would be important because even small powers can acquire a few sophisticated anti-ship weapons and it would be difficult to completely prevent them from gaining access to the sea. In view of the U.S. and Europe's dependence on oil from the Middle East, might the attacks on sea lines come elsewhere?

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Neither the way in which Figure #2 is filled out nor these abbreviated explanations of the factors taken into consideration in completing it are more than a matter of individual judgment. Other persons would likely see the uses of these tactics differently. The value of having such a table lies in the focus it can give to discussion of the appropriate tactical response in the different scenarios. Beyond that, it opens the door to a more logical discussion of which weapons systems best suit the preferred tactics as displayed in figure 3.

| <u>Our Weapons</u> | <u>Sortie</u> | <u>Choke</u> | <u>Open Area</u> | <u>Local</u> |
|----------------------|----------------|----------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| | <u>Control</u> | <u>Point Control</u> | <u>Search</u> | <u>Engagement</u> |
| Enemy weapons | | | | |
| SSN | H | H | H | H |
| VS/VP Aircraft | | | M | H |
| VA Aircraft | L | | H | M |
| VF Aircraft | | H | M | |
| Mines | H | H | | |
| Surveillance Systems | | M | | L |
| Surface Escorts | M | L | L | H |
| Amphibious Forces | M | M | M | M |

Figure 3

H - High Utility
 M - Medium Utility
 L - Low Utility

If in Figure 3 we look at each weapons system across the four tactics we can determine which tactic that weapon is supporting best, or whether it has general application. For example:

SSN's: SSN's clearly excell at anti-submarine Sortie and Choke Point Control. They are almost the only sortie control weapon system. They are useful across the board but decline in importance in

open ocean search due to the time it takes to close a contact at long range, and in local engagement due to the difficulties of coordination with surface and air unit.

Surface Escorts: Escort ships are primarily valuable in the local engagement role. In choke point control their range of coverage is likely to be too short to be useful. Escorts are the only weapons system with a potential against all three threats, air, submarine and surface ship, though against enemy ships equipped with anti-ship missiles their capability is low due to being outranged.

Again Figure 3 represents only one man's judgment. However, it does permit a focus for discussion of how and why different weapons suit our purposes. The chart can be employed to ensure that no tactic is being totally neglected by our allocation of resources, that all threats are being covered at least in accord with our assessment of the risk from each; and that appropriate priority in the allocation of resources is being given to the preferred tactic or tactics. In fact such judgments are always and inevitably made. Explicit delineation of naval missions and tactics can help ensure that the judgments are explicit, too. Moreover, once a weapon system is selected for support, attention to its appropriate tactics can assist in selecting its characteristics. For example, figures 4 and 5 display how weapons system characteristics can be compared with their tactics.

SSN Weapon System

| Weapon Characteristics | Sortie Control | Choke Point Control | Open Area Search | Local Engagement |
|------------------------|----------------|---------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Quietness | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| Speed | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Communications | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |

Figure 4

1 - Most vital
 3 - Least vital

What this table says is that the desired characteristics of SSNs intended for sortie or choke point control are different from those for open area search or local engagement. In sortie control operations close to enemy ASW forces, the use of high speed by an SSN can be dangerously revealing. Yet in local engagement operations an SSN must have the speed to keep pace with the force being protected. It may or may not be desirable to build two types of submarines for these several missions. Yet, if we settle on only one, the relative accent on quietness or on speed will implicitly reflect our judgment on which tactic we expect to be the most valuable.

Priority of Characteristics for aSurface Escort Weapons System

| Characteristic | Sortie Control | Choke point Control | Open Area Operations | Local Engagement |
|---------------------------------|----------------|---------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Passive Sonar Search Capability | - | 1 | - | 4 |
| Long Range Active Sonar | - | 3 | - | 2 |
| Helo Search Capability | - | 2 | - | 3 |
| Helo Reaction Capability | 4 | - | - | 1 |

Figure 5

Again the desired characteristics vary considerably. In choke point operations the accent is on long range detections, preferably passive so as not to alert the enemy submarine. Prosecution for kill can usually come from aircraft. In local engagement, immediate protection of the force is paramount. Quick reaction to any clue of the enemy submarine's presence is important.

Figure 6 summarizes the weapons systems applicable to the various tactics of Sea Control:

WEAPONS SYSTEMS APPLICABLE TO SEA CONTROL TACTICS

| Weapons Systems \ Tactics | Sortie Control | Chokepoint Control | Open Area Operations | Local Defense |
|---------------------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------|
| Submarines | X | X | X | X |
| ASW Aircraft | | X | X | X |
| Fighter Aircraft | | X | | X |
| Surveillance Systems | X | X | X | X |
| Attack Aircraft | X | X | X | |
| Mines | X | X | | |
| Escort Ships | X | X | X | X |
| Amphibious Forces | | | X | |
| Minesweeping | | | X | X |

Figure 6

In executing Sea Control tactics, two passive techniques deserve particular mention:

Deception: Assertive Sea Control objectives do not necessarily demand destruction of the enemy's force. If the enemy can be sufficiently deceived to frustrate his ability to press an attack, we will have achieved our Sea Control objective. Force routing, deceptive/imitative devices, and other anti-search techniques can be employed, often in combination with other tactics.

Intimidation: The perceptions of other nations of our Sea Control capability relative to that of other major powers can influence military decisions. What a nation says about its capabilities influences whether or not it is accepted. A sea control force that is recognized by the enemy,

may inhibit the enemy's willingness to commit his sea denial forces, much as in the "fleet in being" concept.

In summary, Sea Control tactics include:

SEA CONTROL

- Sortie Control
- Chokepoint Control
- Open Area Operations
- Local Engagement

By the early 19th century, another important naval mission had evolved—the projection of ground forces from the sea onto the land. Amphibious warfare, in the modern sense, began during the Wars of the French Revolution. Ground troops traditionally transported by sea to some staging area began to use sea platforms as combat springboards. A new dimension in tactics was given to commanders in the Projection of Power Ashore through amphibious assault. During World War I the first major amphibious assault was attempted at Gallipoli. Its failure due to poor execution came close to killing the amphibious assault concept. World War II, however, saw amphibious assault play a major role in both theaters. The Inchon assault in Korea in 1950 was a stunning tactical maneuver.

The tactics of amphibious assault are largely a function of the size of the operation and can be divided as follows:

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT TACTICS

| | MAF | MAB | MAU* | Raid / Inshore Warfare |
|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|------------------------|
| Troops | To 33,000 | 8000-12,000 | 1800-4000 | 50-250 |
| Ships | 43-52 | 15-17 | 4-6 | 1-2 |
| Helos | 250-300 | 75-120 | 30-36 | 10-14 |
| Attack Aircraft | 50-60 | 18-20 | 6-8** | 2-4** |
| Boats | 320-350 | 80-100 | 30-40 | 2-10 |
| Gunfire Support | 8-10 8" | | | |
| | 22-30 5"/54 | 12-14 5"/54 | 2 4 5"/54 | 0-3 5"/54 |

*MAF - Marine Amphibious Force

MAB - Marine Amphibious Brigade

MAU - Marine Amphibious Unit

**VTOL

Figure 3 7

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The War in Korea and later the war in Vietnam brought into play two new ways of Projecting Power Ashore; naval bombardment and naval tactical air. Naval bombardment was undoubtedly used on occasions as far back as the 18th century to interfere with enemy coastal communications and installations. Until 1950, however, it was employed primarily as a part of amphibious assault. Both Korea and Vietnam have long, exposed coastlines with significant road and rail lines. Here naval bombardment came into its own as an independent way of projecting power ashore.

Naval bombardment is presently available from naval guns in destroyers utilizing two tactics: direct fire and indirect fire. If the target is visually observable from the firing ship, direct fire is the most simple and accurate method. If it is not, fire directed by a spotter on the beach, a spotter in an aircraft or

8(5)

pre-arrangement based on geographical coordinates must be employed. In short, in deciding on the tactics of bombardment, a commander must evaluate whether the targets can be observed well enough for either direct or indirect fire to make the dedication of resources worthwhile.

The tactical air projection mission evolved in the post-World War II period when the Navy was looking for missions in the temporary demise of sea control for lack of an opponent. The marriage of the jet aircraft and improved, lighter weight munitions gave the aircraft carrier a capability of extending its reach far past the shoreline. During World War II, in the Doolittle raid early in the war and in the bombing of the Japanese islands toward the end of the war, naval tactical air had been moving into the projection of power role. It was not until the war in Korea, however, that naval tactical air came to play a major role in support of land campaigns; strategic air attack on enemy industry, transportation, and cities; air superiority over the battlefield; and close air support of ground forces.

The four basic tactics of tactical air in the Projection of Power Ashore role are: deep interdiction; battlefield interdiction; close air support; and counterair/anti-air warfare.

The applicability of these tactics to likely scenarios can be portrayed as follows:

| | <u>Priority of Naval Tactical Air Tactics</u> | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| | NATO War | Asia War CPR vs US/Allies | Unilateral War with USSR | Limited War no USSR or CPR |
| Deep Interdiction | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Battlefield Interdiction | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Close Air Support | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Counter Air/Anti-air | 4 | 3 | 1 | 3 |

Figure 8

1 - Most urgent

4 - Least urgent

Again, these are individual judgments, not provable facts. Exposing them in this way, however, enables a discussion of the use of tactical air to proceed from common points. For instance:

NATO War: Tactical air is so necessary to all aspects of this scenario that it is difficult to delineate relative importance.. Stopping a Pact ground thrust quickly is the primary objective. Therefore either battlefield interdiction or close air support appears to deserve priority. The former is probably more amenable for assignment to naval air since it would come from sizeable distances and the close support situation could be very fluid. Counter-air/anti-air comes in last because it would be least amenable to assignment to distant support forces.

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The rationale for assignment of priorities in the other

scenarios can similarly be debated. As with Sea Control, the subsequent step is to decide what kinds of forces can best fulfill these tactics:

AIRCRAFT AND WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS FOR
TACTICAL AIR PROJECTION MISSIONS

(H-high; M-medium; L-low)

| | Deep Interdiction | Battlefield Support | Close Air Support | Counterair |
|------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------|
| Aircraft | | | | |
| Speed | H | M | L | H |
| Maneuverability | H | M | H | H |
| Range | H | M | L | M |
| Endurance | M | M | H | M |
| All Weather Capability | H | M | L | M |
| Sophisticated Weapons | | | | |
| Delivery System | H | M | M | - |
| ECM Capability | H | M | L | H |
| Weapons Payload | H | M | M | - |
| Weapons | | | | |
| Long Range | H | M | L | M |
| Large Warhead | H | M | L | L |
| Antipersonnel | L | M | H | - |
| Antimaterial | H | H | H | - |
| Sophisticated (Smart) | H | M | L | |

Figure 4/9

Again, the only usefulness of this type of display is to enforce discipline in resource allocation discussions. For instance, if from Figure 8, we decided to place a high value on close air support capability, aircraft and weapons characteristics would be quite different than for deep interdiction. It would be desirable to be infinitely flexible and have maximum characteristics in all aircraft and weapons. Unfortunately, the laws of both physics and economics prevent that. Hence, some evaluation of probable use and likely need can be valuable in assuring that we do not inadvertently procure to only one tactic.

Deep Interdiction: Attacks conducted to destroy, neutralize, or impair the enemy's military potential before it can be directed against friendly forces are deep interdiction. Targets may be military or civilian, remote from the battle area and, perhaps more strategic than tactical. To prevent the enemy from moving forces and material under the protective cover of darkness or adverse weather, an all weather attack capability is important.

Battlefield Interdiction: Sometimes referred to as Direct Air Support (DAS), battlefield interdiction differs from deep interdiction in two ways: targets are usually military and of immediate tactical importance, and air space control must be closely coordinated with front line support operations. Sustained battlefield interdiction can restrict the enemy's capability to move supplies/reinforcements or maneuver his forces.

Close Air Support: Providing direct support to front line ground forces, close air support is generally exercised in a similar manner as call-fire support from field artillery. Therefore, very close coordination with gunfire support elements is necessary.

Counterair/Anti-air Warfare: In order to conduct the three types of air strike operations, counterair forces are employed to neutralize the enemy's air capabilities, minimizing expected attrition of our forces. The threat over enemy territory may be surface-to-air missiles (SAMS), anti-aircraft guns (AAA) and/or fighter interceptor aircraft. Counters to these range from attack

on enemy air bases or weapons sites to direct protection with our fighters or electronic counter-measures. When the situation is reversed, and an opponent is attempting to project his air power over our territory, anti-air warfare operations employing fighters, SAMS, and AAA are used to exact attrition on enemy aircraft.

The desirable weapons and aircraft characteristics to carry out these tactics are shown in the following table:

PROJECTION OF POWER ASHORE

- Amphibious Assault
 - Marine Amphibious Force
 - Marine Amphibious Brigade
 - Marine Amphibious Unit
 - Raid
- Naval Bombardment
 - Direct
 - Indirect
- Tactical Air
 - Deep Interdiction
 - Battlefield Interdiction
 - Close Air Support
 - Counterair/Antiair

Before leaving the projection mission, we should note that only a fine distinction separates some aspects of the Sea Control and Projection of Power Ashore missions. Many weapons and platforms are used in both missions. Amphibious assaults on choke points or tactical air strikes on enemy air bases can be employed as a part of the Sea Control mission. Sea based tactical aircraft are used in Sea Control missions for anti-air warfare and against enemy surface combatants. The distinction in these cases is not in the type of forces nor the tactics which are employed, but in the purpose of the operation. Is the objective to secure/prevent use of the seas or is it to directly support the land campaign? For instance, much of the layman's

confusion over aircraft carriers stems from the impression that they are employed exclusively in the Projection of Power Ashore role. Actually, from the Battle of Cape Matapan through World War II, aircraft carriers were used almost exclusively to establish control of the ocean's surface. Today they clearly have a vital role to play in both the Sea Control and Projection of Power missions.

Both the Sea Control and the Projection of Power Ashore missions are what we term "war fighting" missions. We buy forces to be capable of executing these missions in combat, if necessary. The Navy's two other missions are "deterrent" in nature. We buy forces to ensure against having to engage in combat.

During the 19th century, the term "gunboat diplomacy" came into naval vocabulary. In the quest for colonies, powerful nations paraded their naval forces to intimidate sheiks and pashas and to serve warning on each other. In time the range of this activity extended from warnings and coercion to demonstrations of good will and humanitarian assistance. Simply stated, the Naval Presence mission today is the use of naval forces, short of war, to achieve political objectives.

We attempt to accomplish these objectives with two tactics: preventive deployments and reactive deployments. The key difference is whether we initiate a show of presence in peacetime (preventive) or whether we are responding to a crisis (reactive). In

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a preventive deployment our force capabilities should be relevant to the kind of problems which might arise, clearly cannot be markedly inferior to some other naval force in the neighborhood, but can rely to some extent on the implication that reinforcements can be made available if necessary. On the other hand, in a reactive deployment any force deployed needs to possess an immediately credible threat and be prepared to have its bluff called. If another sea power is in the area, a comparison of forces will be inevitable.

We should also recognize that a reactive deployment need not actually involve an actual movement or deployment of forces. There will be instances when threat of doing so, perhaps communicated through an alert or mobilization order, will produce a desired reaction in itself.

In deciding to insert a presence force, we must consider what size and composition of force is appropriate to the situation. There are basically five actions with which a Naval Presence force can threaten another nation:

Amphibious Assault

Air Attack

Bombardment

Blockade

Exposure through reconnaissance

In addition, almost any size and type of presence force can imply that the United States is concerned with the situation and may decide to bring other military forces or non-military pressures to bear.

All too often, especially in reactive deployments, we tend to send the largest and most powerful force that can move to the scene rapidly. The image created may not be appropriate to the specific problem. For instance, the threat of major air attack on a small oil sheikdom would not be credible, but the threat of an amphibious assault on such a nation's capital might be; or, sailing a major fleet to show support for a small government threatened with insurrection might be more unsettling than stabilizing, perhaps prompting overaction.

When selecting a Naval Presence force, we must also take into account how the countries that we want to influence will perceive the situation. There are three distinctly different categories of national perceivers:

The Soviet Union: When contemplating a U.S. presence force, the Soviets must assess their comparative naval strength available over time, and the expected degree of U.S. resolve. Their principal strength comparison would probably be on which country can exercise sea control in the area in question since the United States is not likely to pose a threat of projecting power directly against the USSR, except in a worldwide crisis of the most serious proportions.

Nations Allied to the Soviets: Nations with close ties to the Soviets must assess relative US-USSR capabilities in the particular circumstances. These powers will be asking the question, "Can the United States project its assembled power onto my shores?" and "Can the USSR deny them that capability?"

Thus third nation appraisal of relative sea control strengths may be the most critical factor. We should note, however, that third power assessments may not correspond to either U.S. or Soviet assessments of identical military factors.

Unaligned Third Nations: There will be cases where a nation is not able to invoke major power support in a dispute with the United States. The perceptions of such a country would likely focus on U.S. capability and will to project its power ashore to influence events in that country itself.

Thus, the naval presence mission is simultaneously as sophisticated and sensitive as any, but also probably the least understood of all Navy missions. A well orchestrated Naval Presence can be enormously useful in complementing diplomatic actions to achieve political objectives. Applied deftly but firmly, in precisely the proper force, Naval Presence can be a persuasive deterrent to war. If used ineptly, it can be disastrous. Thus, in determining presence objectives, scaling forces, and appraising perceptions, there will never be a weapons system as important as the human intellect.

In summary, the tactics of the Naval Presence mission

NAVAL PRESENCE

- Preventive Deployments
- Reactive Deployments

The second naval deterrent mission came with the introduction of Strategic Deterrence as a national military requirement. Again, combination of improved aircraft performance and smaller packaging of nuclear weapons made the aircraft carrier capable of contributing to this new mission. With the Navy struggling to readjust

its missions to peacetime needs and with the U.S. Air Force at that time just establishing its own place in the military family, it is understandable that there was a sense of competition for this new role. However, by the mid-1960's the development of the Polaris submarine concept eliminated any question of appropriateness of this mission for the Navy. Our strategic deterrence objectives are:

- to deter all-out attack on the United States or its allies;
- to face any potential aggressor contemplating less than all-out attack with unacceptable costs; and
- to maintain a stable political environment within which the threat of aggression or coercion against the United States or its allies is minimized.

In support of these national objectives, we have three principal military "tactics" or force preparedness objectives.

The first is to maintain an assured second strike capability in the hope of deterring an all-out strategic nuclear attack on the United States. Today that means dissuading the Soviets from starting a nuclear war. We hope to achieve this by maintaining a strategic attack force capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on any enemy even after he has attacked us. The Navy's Polaris/Poseidon/Trident forces are fundamental to this deterrence because of their high nuclear survival probability.

A second tactic is to design our forces to ensure that the United States is not placed in an unacceptable position by a partial nuclear attack. If the Soviets attacked only a portion of our strategic forces, would it then make sense for the United States to retaliate by striking Soviet cities, knowing that the Soviets still possessed adequate forces to strike our cities? In these circumstances do we need an alternative of controlled response? This means making our strategic strike forces quickly responsive to changes in targeting and capable of accurate delivery. SSBN forces can be well tailored to these requirements.

A third objective is to deter third powers from attacking the United States with nuclear weapons. Because of the great disparity between any third country's nuclear arsenal and ours, the same forces deterring the Soviet Union should deter others.

Finally, we maintain a quantity and quality of strategic forces which will not let us appear to be at a disadvantage to the Soviet Union or any other power. If we were to allow the opinion to develop that the Soviet strategic position is markedly superior to ours, we would find that political decisions were being adversely influenced. Thus we must always keep in mind the balance of power image that our forces portray to the non-Soviet world. In part, this image affects what and how much we buy for strategic deterrence. In part, it affects how we talk about our comparative strength and how we criticize ourselves.

In summary, the strategic deterrence mission is divided into four tactics:

S
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C
E

- Assured Second Strike
- Controlled Response
- Deter Third Powers
- Balance of Power Image

There is very little overlap between strategic deterrence and other Navy mission areas at present. However, significant improvements in enemy ASW technology could reduce the ability of SSBN's to survive without assistance from friendly Sea Control forces. With this exception and the fact that aircraft carriers still possess the potential for nuclear strikes, naval forces for strategic nuclear deterrence are almost exclusively devoted to that mission.

There is a good deal of overlap in the overall field of deterrence. There is no doubt that our strategic deterrent forces inhibit at least ourselves and the Soviet Union from engaging in non-strategic or conventional warfare. It is also true that the very existence of our Sea Control and Projection of Power Ashore forces deters conventional warfare, over and above whether we consciously employ them in the Naval Presence role.

There is very likely even some interplay between our conventional force capability and the way in which our strategic deterrent forces are perceived, e.g., a Sea Control capability is essential to the security of our sea-based strategic deterrent forces. Thus the boundary lines between the four naval mission areas cannot be precise. More than anything, they each express a somewhat different purpose. Despite these inevitable overlaps and interdependence, we can understand the Navy far better if we carefully examine each mission individually. We must know what each mission's objectives are so that we do not overlook some useful new tactic or weapon and, so that we can strike the proper balance whenever these missions compete for resources.

Additionally we must be careful not to view these mission areas and the relative importance of them as rigidly fixed. We swung from a primary emphasis on Sea Control with a secondary interest in amphibious assault before and during World War II, to a primary emphasis on strategic deterrence and tactical air projection for the 20 to 25 years following that war. In about the mid-1960's, the dramatic and determined growth of Soviet naval capabilities forced renewed attention to Sea Control. The even more recent national disinclination to engage ground forces in support of allies should perhaps today place more attention on the conventional deterrent mission of Naval Presence. The dynamic nature of world conditions will demand a continuing reassessment

of the relation of one mission to another and the comparative emphasis on their individual tactics.

Perhaps this constant flow and counter flow of mission emphasis and tactical adaptation is even more accentuated today than in the past. On the one hand, the pace of technological innovation is forcing this. On the other, the changing nature of world political relationships and domestic attitudes demands a continual updating of naval capabilities to support national policy. Naval officers, as professionals, must understand the Navy's missions, continually question their rationale, and provide the intellectual basis for keeping them relevant and responsive to the nation's needs. Unless we do, we will be left behind attempting to use yesterday's tools to achieve today's objectives.

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There are many issues that must be faced relatively soon which an understanding of naval missions and tactics can help resolve. A particularly vital one is the balance between the so-called Hi-mix ships and aircraft and the Lo end of the mix.

I invite you to be CNO for a few minutes. In the following chart, Figure 10, using

H (high) to mean expensive, sophisticated, multi-mission
 L (low) to mean cheap, simple technology, single mission
 indicate under each mission whether high (H) or low (L) sophistication characteristics need to be built into aircraft, ships, submarines, weapons, and sensors to carry out the specific tactic.

FORCE MIX

| MISSIONS | | SEA CONTROL | | | | | PROJECTION OF POWER | | | PRESENCE | | | |
|------------|----------|----------------|---------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| | | SORTIE CONTROL | CHOKE POINT CONTROL | OPEN AREA OPERATIONS | LOCAL ENGAGEMENT | DEEP INTERDICTION | AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT | NAVAL BOMBARDMENT | DEEP INTERDICTION | BATTLEFIELD INTERDICTION | CLOSE AIR SUPPORT | COUNTER AIR/ANTI-AIR | PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT |
| TACTICS | FORCES | DEFENSIVE | OFFENSIVE | DEFENSIVE | OFFENSIVE | DEFENSIVE | OFFENSIVE | DEFENSIVE | OFFENSIVE | DEFENSIVE | OFFENSIVE | DEFENSIVE | OFFENSIVE |
| | AIRCRAFT | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SHIPS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SUBMARINES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SENSORS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| WEAPONS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Figure 10

33-3

Other typical issues the Navy faces today can best be viewed in terms of missions and their tactics are:

- In Strategic Deterrence can we maintain our balance of power image and accent controlled response without appearing to be developing a first strike capability?
- In Sea Control should future SSN's be designed for employment in barriers (attrition) or as escorts (local engagement)?
- In Amphibious Assault should we design lift forces and tactics differently for different size assaults?
- In Naval Bombardment and Amphibious Assault should the vanishing 6 inch and 8 inch guns be replaced? If so, by what?
- In Tactical Air how much high performance capability is needed (or can we afford) for deep interdiction and what tactical application could VSTOL aircraft best fulfill?
- In Naval Presence are there different operating policies that would yield a greater presence capability and is the Presence mission becoming sufficiently important to warrant building or designing forces for that purpose?

Obviously we cannot resolve these issues in a vacuum. We must consider both what our national political objectives are and what any potential opponent is doing. Our principal military concern, of course, is the growing Soviet Navy. The evolution of their post World War II navy would indicate that they started with a sea denial orientation as evidenced by their emphasis on submarines. There are those who argue that

this was intended only to deny us access to waters from which we could Project Power into the Soviet Union. There are others who contend that their sea denial capability now includes being able to interdict our resupply operations over a wide span of oceans. It also seems clear that the Soviet Navy has chosen to exercise its Naval Presence capabilities aggressively. Whether they look on this as a fall-out of their other capabilities or have done so deliberately is difficult to assess. With the advent of Soviet aircraft carriers and the continuing expansion of their amphibious forces, there is a growing question of whether they have ambitions for Projection of Power Ashore capability. If so, it would logically be accompanied by assertive Sea Control capabilities to defend their projection forces. Figure 11 compares U.S. Navy and Soviet Navy mission capabilities as they appear to stand today:

COMPARATIVE U.S. NAVY AND SOVIET NAVY
MISSION CAPABILITIES

| | <u>U.S. NAVY</u> | <u>SOVIET NAVY</u> |
|------------------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Sea Control | | |
| Assertive | | |
| Under land base air umbrella | X | X |
| World wide | X | |
| Sea Denial | X | X |
| Projection of Power Ashore | | |
| Amphibious Assault | X | |
| Naval Bombardment | X | |
| Tactical Air | X | |
| Naval Presence | | |
| Preventive | X | *(limited areas) |
| Reactive | X | * |
| Strategic Deterrence | | |
| Assured Second Strike | X | X |
| Controlled Response | X | ? |
| Deter Third Powers | X | X |
| Balance of Power Image | X | X |

Figure 11

* Note that Soviet presence can not imply or threaten a Projection of Power Ashore capability as can U.S.

In time even smaller non-allied navies, such as the Chinese, will have to be taken into account. They, as the Soviets, are starting with a sea denial orientation. With relatively simple sea denial weapons such as anti-ship missiles and mines proliferating and extending in reach, the threat of sea denial in restricted waters from even the smallest navies may well increase in the future.

On Laptops
There ~~will always~~ be a constant flow and counter flow of mission emphasis and tactical adaptation. ~~Perhaps~~ it is even more accentuated today than in the past. On the one hand, the pace of technological innovation is forcing this. On the other, *domestic affairs* the changing nature of world political relationships demands a continual updating of naval capabilities to support national policy. Naval officers, as professionals, must understand the Navy's missions, continually question their rationale, and provide the intellectual basis for keeping them relevant and responsive to the nation's needs. Unless we do, we will be left behind attempting to use yesterday's tools to achieve today's objectives.

VADM TURNER'S REMARKS - CHANGE OF COMMAND USS ALBANY 14 JUNE 1975

CAPTAIN EKELUND, CAPTAIN HEENAN, HONORED GUESTS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN AND MEN OF THE ALBANY.

IN A FEW MINUTES CAPTAIN EKELUND WILL PASS THE BATON OF COMMAND TO CAPTAIN HEENAN.

THE FABRIC, THE RESPONSIBILITY, OF COMMAND WILL REMAIN INTACT. THERE WILL NOT BE A MOMENT WHEN ONE OF THESE TWO OUTSTANDING OFFICERS DOES NOT HAVE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS SUPERB WARSHIP AND HER ENTIRE CREW.

IT IS TO THAT CREW--THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF ALBANY--THAT I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS MY BRIEF REMARKS THIS MORNING.

YOU HAVE BEEN CHALLENGED BY A WHIRLWIND OF ACTIVITY SINCE ALBANY ASSUMED THE ROLE AS SECOND FLEET FLAGSHIP IN JANUARY.

ALTHOUGH YOU WERE CERTAINLY NOT IDLE PRIOR TO MY AND THE STAFF'S ARRIVAL, THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT YOU HAVE CARRIED AN EXTRA BURDEN SINCE JANUARY.

SINCE THAT TIME, WE HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THREE MAJOR FLEET EXERCISES, INCLUDING OUR MOST RECENT, SOLID SHIELD, IN WHICH WE WORKED WITH OUR SISTER SERVICES, THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE.

WE ALSO PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE MOMENTOUS BOSTON VISIT HOSTING THE SOVIET WARSHIPS.

ALBANY HAS THUS BEEN IN THE THICK OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY AND IMPORTANT REPRESENTATIONS LIKE THE BOSTON VISIT.

IN THAT TIME YOU HAVE SUPPORTED OUR MISSION IN A MOST PROFESSIONAL WAY AND I HAVE BEEN MOST PLEASED TO ^{CALL} ALBANY MY FLAGSHIP.

2-2-2-2

IN PARTICULAR I WANT TO REITERATE MY PRAISE FOR THE OUTSTANDING APPEARANCE OF THE SHIP IN BOSTON. I KNOW THAT IT TOOK LONG HOURS TO GET HER READY AND KEEP HER SHINING.

EVEN MORE THAN THAT, THE SPIRIT OF ENTHUSIASM AND ATTITUDE WITH WHICH EVERY MAN ON ALBANY APPROACHED HIS RESPONSIBILITY TOWARD HOSTING THE SOVIET SHIPS WAS VERY MEANINGFUL TO ME. IT CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THE HIGH SENSE OF DEDICATION AND MORALE THAT CAPTAIN EKELUND HAS INFUSED INTO THIS FINE CREW.

AND BECAUSE YOU HAVE DONE SUCH A GOOD JOB, NATURALLY, THERE IS MUCH MORE TO COME:

- THE AUGUST CRUISE DOWN SOUTH TO THE CARIBBEAN FOR ANOTHER MAJOR FLEET EXERCISE

- THE FALL CRUISE TO EUROPE AND OUR BIG NATO EXERCISE
THERE WILL BE LITTLE TIME FOR REFLECTION AND RELAXATION AS WE PREPARE FOR THESE CRUISES.

BUT, I WANT YOU TO PUT ALL THIS HARD WORK IN PERSPECTIVE AND SEE IT IN A LARGER SENSE.

I THINK THE PRESIDENT PUT IT VERY WELL LAST APRIL WHILE SPEAKING TO RECRUITS IN SAN DIEGO WHEN HE COMPARED HIS OWN EXPERIENCE IN THE NAVY WITH THAT WE FACE TODAY.

HE SAID, " THE GOAL OF OUR PEACETIME NAVY IS MORE CHALLENGING AND MORE COMPLEX THAN EVER. EVERY ONE OF YOU MUST ALWAYS BE READY FOR WAR. BUT, YOU ALSO HAVE A WIDE RANGE OF PEACETIME ACTIVITIES--DUTIES THAT REQUIRE SKILL, DISCIPLINE, TRAINING AND DIPLOMACY."

YOU MEN IN ALBANY, SINCE SHE BECAME THE FLEET FLAGSHIP, HAVE BEEN LIVING THOSE WORDS MORE THAN EVER. THE NEED FOR YOU TO KEEP THIS SHIP COMBAT READY IS GREATER THAN BEFORE BECAUSE THE FATE OF MANY OTHER

3-3-3-3

YOU MEN IN ALBANY, SINCE SHE BECAME THE FLEET FLAGSHIP, HAVE BEEN LIVING THOSE WORDS MORE THAN EVER. THE NEED FOR YOU TO KEEP THIS SHIP COMBAT READY IS GREATER THAN EVER BECAUSE THE FATE OF MANY OTHER SHIPS RIDES WITH YOU. THE NEED FOR YOU TO BE PROFESSIONALS IN THE PEACETIME ROLE OF NAVAL DIPLOMACY IS HEIGHTENED BECAUSE YOU ARE CONTINUALLY ON CENTER STAGE.

I AM MOST PLEASED AT THE WAY YOU HAVE RESPONDED TO THESE DUAL CHALLENGES DURING THE PAST FIVE MONTHS.

THAT YOU HAVE DONE SO WELL IS IN LARGE MEASURE A TRIBUTE TO THE FINE OFFICER WHO HAS LED YOU--CAPTAIN EKELUND.

I HAVE HAD THE PRIVILEGE OF SERVING WITH YOUR CAPTAIN BEFORE. I KNEW HIM THEN AS AN OFFICER IN A SHORE ASSIGNMENT THAT REQUIRED THE HIGHEST INTELLECTUAL SKILLS. HE EXCELLED IN THAT CAPACITY. WE HAVE ALL KNOWN HIM NOW IN HIS ROLE OF COMMANDING OFFICER OF A MAJOR WARSHIP. HERE HIS INTELLECT HAS SHOWN THROUGH EQUALLY AND WITH IT A GREAT SENSE OF STRONG, DECISIVE YET COMPASSIONATE LEADERSHIP. YOU MEN OF ALBANY ARE EACH BETTER MEN FOR HAVING SERVED UNDER CAPTAIN EKELUND. I KNOW THAT YOU JOIN WITH ME IN WISHING HIM AND HIS LOVELY FAMILY SMOOTH SAILING AS HE MOVES ON TO A MOST IMPORTANT POST AT OUR NAVAL WAR COLLEGE.

AS WE LOOK TO THE FUTURE OF ALBANY ~~and~~ THE CHALLENGES TO CONTINUE ~~YOU~~ FINE PERFORMANCE IN PREPARING FOR COMBAT AND PERFORMING IN PEACE, YOU ARE FORTUNATE TO HAVE CAPTAIN HEENAN TAKING COMMAND TODAY.

HE COMES TO YOU WITH OUTSTANDING CREDENTIALS AS A SAILOR, AS A COMMANDING OFFICER, AND AS AN OFFICER WITH A BREADTH OF EXPERIENCE AND OUTLOOK. CAPTAIN HEENAN, WE ALL WELCOME YOU AND YOUR FAMILY AND WISH YOU WELL IN THIS CHALLENGING, IMPORTANT ASSIGNMENT.

OPENING REMARKS
CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM
26 JUNE 1973

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. I realize that a good many people are still arriving, but I'd like to get the Forum underway. Time is going to be at a real premium come Thursday noon and I don't want to set a bad example.

For those of you who have not been to the Naval War College previously, let me set the background briefly. We are a mid-career educational institution for military officers and career government civilian. We have two courses here for U.S. students. In one the students are at the LCDR/Major rank, they average 33 years of age and have 12 years of commissioned service. The other course is for CDR's/LCOL's and CAPT/COL. Their average age is 41 with 18 years of service. Our student body is 60% Navy, with the remainder from the Marine Corps, the Army, the Air Force, the Coast Guard, the State Department, the CIA, and a number of civilians from various Defense agencies.

There are 414 students in these courses. We also have two corresponding courses for international students, with 45 officers from 39 countries. Our school year is ten months long and we believe that it is a demanding academic experience, equivalent to most master's degree programs.

There is a big difference, however, between our program and that of most graduate schools. The ordinary graduate program works with young men and women who have high academic

talent, & fertile imaginations, but who have not yet achieved much. The university's task is to focus this talent onto a relatively specialized area so that all that imagination will become specifically productive.

Our students, in contrast, come to us having already specialized, already having achieved a great deal. Our task, then, is to re-expand their horizons from the narrow to the broad and to open their outlook and imagination. They come to us from a world of right and wrong answers to technical or operational problems. We are attempting to teach them to deal with the uncertainty of choosing between alternatives that can not be precisely measured or tested. It is a challenging task for us to attempt to do this. I hope that it is an intellectually challenging and expanding opportunity for them. Since they are a hand picked lot and many will go on to top leadership positions, we look on this as an important undertaking for our long term security interests.

So much for background - now onto this, the twenty-fifth annual forum at the Naval War College. The first forum was held in 1949 and was called the Round Table Discussions. There were 66 outside guests including 15 Senior Naval Reserve Officers. At least two of the guests at that first session are here today, two men who are currently on the Naval War College Board of Advisors, the distinguished military writer Hanson Baldwin and a loyal naval reservist, RADM Jack Bergen. The Navy and the Naval War College dearly need such staunch supporters whose advice is so valuable. I'd like to extend a personal thanks and welcome home to Hanson and Jack. (ask them to stand - applause)

The Round Table Discussion soon changed its name to Global Strategy Discussions and grew to about 100 civilian guests plus senior reserve officers.

By last year, the number of participants in the Global Strategy Discussions had swollen to 273 civilians and 125 Senior Reserves. Its very popularity had become a problem. The value of intimate discussions between students and people like yourselves from civilian walks of life was being lost. So, too, was the concept of these discussions as a climax to the students academic year.

Thus this year we have again changed the name, to Current Strategy Forum, and returned the size to about the original size of the early '50's when Hanson Baldwin, Jack Bergen Rafe Bates, who was here on the faculty then, and others set the tone and style. (770 Auditorium) We hope in your 2½ days here to pack in almost as much good discussion as in the 5 days of the recent GSD's. That is why we have pared down the social events and substituted working sessions in the evenings. A highly social event is an anachronism in today's era, it seems to me. We in the military are being forced to live within an ever diminishing share of the National Budget. At the same time, we are up against the toughest military opposition to have roamed the world's oceans in 30 years. We can't afford the frills today. The whole reason for the Current Strategy Forum is to permit a free exchange of ideas among all of you and the students here.

There is a great need in our Navy today for an officer corps that is well qualified to determine future strategies and to manage and operate our resources, - the ships, aircraft, and men of the fleet. This demands that we in uniform be able to communicate outside the uniformed active duty military--that is to converse easily & clearly with the public and to be sure that our message is understood even if not fully accepted.

Professor Sam Huntington, of Harvard recently alleged that today's "military policy is ... the haphazard outcome of bureaucratic politics and procedures, of vested agency interests and manipulative personalities". In his opinion "... the size, shape, and functions of the military establishment are as much the product of past history and future visions as they are of either current politics or current logic". There is a lot of truth in his cynicism. This year's course at the Naval War College has attempted to familiarize our students with the problems that they will face in these areas. More importantly, it has attempted to develop in them the background and methodologies necessary to be creative in combatting such problems. The students have examined military strategy using slices of history covering 2400 years. They have worked in detail with the enormous difficulties in managing the \$80 B corporation called the Department of Defense. They also have dissected today's weapons systems and searched for better ways to employ our fleet than current doctrine provides. We haven't attempted

to brief them on all the details of current strategies, policies and operations. Such information is too perishable. We have played for the long run, preparing these men to delve into any problem, to look for alternative solutions, to evaluate them and to make decisions.

You will have an opportunity to see how well we have or have not succeeded. For the last 2 weeks of their course, we divided the students into committees of about 10 men each. They were assigned topics concerning the role of today's military, and how the Navy should play its part. They were asked to lay out their collective views as to the factors to be considered and the alternatives to be weighed in setting national or naval policy in these areas. We assigned several committees to most topics, hoping to generate divergent views. Here is a list of those committee topics.

The broad subject of National Interests in the Post Containment Era and the Role of the Military in Supporting Them will be the basis for most of your seminar discussions today and tomorrow. You have each been given these 15-20 page papers and, will be asked to tear them apart and cast differing light on them with the students in your seminar group. Then Thursday, we will present to you a condensation of the ideas in these other, more technical and military papers.

In these ways we hope to bring the Forum into close relation with our curriculum, both to cap the students' year of academic effort, and to offer you an inside view of what and how your military leaders of tomorrow are thinking.

In addition to your seminar discussions with students, you'll have a chance to hear some very fine speakers: Today Governor Jimmy Carter who is intimately familiar with both the military and the civilian point of view; tomorrow Charlie Dibona who is today in one of our most publicized hot-spots as the President's advisor on Energy, and Dr. Alice Rivlin from the prestigious Brookings Institution with her penetrating views on the domestic economic picture. Admiral Zumwalt, the CNO arrives tomorrow night for his address and the Secretary of the Navy, John Warner, will close the Forum Thursday noon.

Now, to open this year's Current Strategy Forum, I will be followed here on the platform by Captain Bob Bathurst, our resident Kremlin watcher and holder of the Layton Chair of Intelligence. Bob was a Moscow attache, is an accomplished Russian linguist, and consistently provides all of us here with some very cogent and erudite views. After Bob's introductory intelligence briefing, Professor Bing West of our Management Department will set the stage for our objectives and discussions.

REMARKS TO VINCE DAVIS SEMINAR AT PATTERSON SCHOOL

Saturday, 6 April 1974

It really is a delight to be here, a delight to have this opportunity to exchange ideas with a distinguished group of educators. My College is what we believe to be mid-career education, rather than what I imagine most of you are dealing with, undergraduate and graduate education. Our students are about 28 to 48 in age. They are people who have achieved a great deal already in their professional experience instead of looking forward to starting in it, as most of your students are. Still, I think there is a great deal that we have in common as educators and I look forward in our question period to sharing some of those things and discussing them.

I think that we in the military have been falling on our swords too much in recent years in the effort to explain and articulate in a rational manner why we do need military forces in the era of peace and detente that we have with us today. I think it's quite understandable that the public and the Congress are questioning the Defense budget these days. After all the 1975 proposed budget is the largest peacetime military budget in history despite at least 4 substantial pressures in the opposite direction.

First the perceived decline in the utility of military force today. I think we only have to look back to our experience in Vietnam, where the greatest and strongest military

power in the world was unable to force its political will on a third or fourth rate military power. We only have to consider that the nuclear balance backdrop that influences all of our political and military decisions today is a very inhibiting factor on the use of military force by either of the so called superpowers.

Second, I think we also perceive that there is a decline in the acceptability of the use of military force, at least in the major western democracies where public opinion has an influence on public policy. I attribute this to the explosion in the communications capabilities of the world. There is, as a result of this, a greater moral revulsion towards the use of force today than there has been in the past. There is also a greater public awareness of the issues that could lead to the use of military force. In short, the public is taking an interest in the game earlier today than it did in years past.

Third you are more aware than I that there are great clamoring demands for alternative uses of the funds that are put into Defense today.

Fourth, we have this new word, "detente," and with it the feeling that detente is a reason for lessening the size and investment in our military forces. Let me come back to that a little bit later. But what I'm suggesting is that we in the military, and all others who are interested in

national security affairs, need to be more articulate in answering the question: Why do we need sizeable standing military forces in the peacetime circumstances with which we are faced today, particularly, when a large standing military is contrary to American tradition?

Let me try to run through for you briefly what I see as some of the most cogent reasons for having this military establishment today. To begin with, I think there is rather little debate on whether we do need forces for strategic nuclear deterrence. We really cannot run the risk of not deterring the ultimate holocaust that could spell destruction and doom for the entire world. Now, clearly, the amount of strategic deterrent force we need and what kind we want is open to great debate, but I think there would be general agreement that we do need to fulfill that function.

I would think there would be equal agreement in our country that we need to be able to defend the United States. There is, though, great room for debate on how and where we must accomplish that; on our shorelines, in some overseas location where aggression takes place, or even in some area where there are economic influences on our national position. So I think there is room for legitimate debate on what our overseas commitments ought to be. If you take a consensus, I think you would also find that most people would agree that we would probably want to help to defend Western Europe. Some others, I think, would extend that further and say we ought to help to

defend Western Europe and Israel. There are still others who would say that this policy is too restrictive, that we must be able to do more but they would probably be less precise about where else they would be willing to commit American military force.

The real issue I think we're grappling with in trying to develop a rationale for military forces of the conventional type today is how far from our shore do U.S. vital interests truly extend. I would submit that at one extreme a fortress America concept of defending our shoreline is totally outdated, I also would submit to you a simple axiom for approximating the sizing of U.S. military forces.

I would suggest that the United States must have the plainly evident capability to defend our vital national interests, with military force if necessary, wherever those interests lie. Now this does not mean necessarily that resort to military force would be our first response in any kind of a crisis situation. In fact I would suggest that the emphasis in this axiom be on the words plainly evident. Now the emphasis is on the evident part because it's perceptions that we want to create, perceptions that will make our military capability deter rather than have to be employed.

The essence of deterrence is perception - three basic perceptions of principal concern to us:

First, there are perceptions of the Soviets of our military capability. I think it is very important that we not

encourage the Soviets to perceive such an imbalance in military capabilities that they might be tempted either to apply leverage on us, or actually to employ military force against us.

Another perception with which I think we must be most concerned is our own estimate of our position in the world balance of power. I think it's most important because we hear many people saying today that the United States military cannot aspire to be first in everything. But I think it is very important that the public of the United States not come to perceive that we are at such a military disadvantage it would be better to be "Red than dead." I feel it is very important we not come to a perception that we have lost the pride and leadership on which the free world has been dependent for over a quarter of a century. No matter what we say today about our declining capabilities, about our willingness to assume the burdens of being policemen to the world, we the United States are still the major power that supports the dignity, the freedom and rights of individual men.

Thirdly, I think we must be concerned about the perceptions other nations hold towards us and the Soviet Union, both individually and as we balance against each other. The perceptions of these other nations will obviously influence their diplomatic, economic, and military actions. So it is important to us that we take the perceptions of these other nations into account, because again, despite the pressures

in this country to retrench, to reduce commitments and not be the world's policemen, I would suggest that our national interests are, in fact, extending farther overseas rather than receding today. Now I know that there are a lot of people who would not agree with me; let me recite five brief examples as to why I believe that's the case:

First, let's look at the burgeoning economies of Western Europe and Japan. We have a Gross National Product of twelve hundred billion dollars. The European Economic Community nations total is something over six hundred billion and Japan about three hundred. If we were to add either of those to the approximate five hundred billion of the Soviet Union I think you can see the great economic power if either one of those slipped into the Soviet orbit.

Secondly, U.S. reliance on the import of raw materials from overseas is clearly increasing. We're not talking just of the oil energy situation; we're talking of the ninety percent of our chromium, rubber, manganese, cobalt, and graphite that all come in from overseas. We're talking about the fact that sixty nine of the seventy-one critical raw materials that this country consumes are imported, in some measure, from overseas. This contrasts with only two of those seventy-one which are imported by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the more we import the more we clearly must export to keep our payments balanced. So trade all around the world is going to be increasingly important to this country in the years ahead.

Next, it seems clear that the entire world is coming to a greater dependence on exploiting the vast resources of the oceans. This will involve us more in interests overseas than in the past because exploiting the resources of the oceans does not simply mean going out to the limit of our territorial jurisdiction. I live on the edge of the Atlantic Ocean and only twelve miles away there is frequently a very extensive Soviet fishing fleet. On top of that, a very few nations of the world today control some of the most vital waterways through which this commerce on which we are all going to depend must pass. Malaysia and Indonesia for the Straits of Malacca; Egypt, if Bernie's (Abrahamsson) predictions are true, the Suez Canal which will be open before long; Spain with the Straits of Gibraltar, etc. So again, we are going to be involved. We are going to be concerned with these strategic overseas areas.

Fourth, I see at least a continuing, if not an increasing, resort to the use of military force as an instrument of national policy by many of the countries that are just below the major power level in the world. The Arabs and Israelis, the Pakistanis, the Indians, the Iraqis the North and South Vietnamese. The potential in the near future for insurgency such as is going on in Cambodia today, inspired by the success of the North Vietnamese is very high. In short, if these other powers do get involved in military conflict there is always that danger of one or both of the major powers being inadvertently and unwillingly dragged in and we must be concerned.

Lastly, I would like to mention there is a great potential for international strife in the future as a result of the growing disparities between the economies of the lesser developed countries and the industrial nations. We just cannot turn our backs on the severe problems within the lesser developed countries in the years ahead.

Let me hastily emphasize that I do not necessarily see this growing interest and concern with overseas areas as creating an increasing probability of our intervention with military force. I'm simply suggesting we must consider the perceptions of these other countries. We must consider how they view the power balance between us and the Soviet Union, particularly because of the impact it will have on their political and economic decisions.

This brings me back to detente. There are some who say that detente indicates the Soviets will never take advantage of us. "in any event, even if other nations perceive a discrepancy between our capabilities and theirs. Well, that's a very hopeful attitude. It's one we should try to encourage becoming fact, a risky matter on which to base your policy. In the first place, we see no sign of any decreasing emphasis in the size and capability of military forces within the Soviet Union. In fact, I think we can clearly establish that the opposite is the case. Even more important, when we look at detente from the Soviet point of view rather than through rose colored glasses, I think we have to recognize that they view detente not as a cessation of competition with the United

States, but as a continuation of that competition but in non-military areas. That shift of competition may be a good thing, something we should encourage, but at the same time we should not delude ourselves into thinking that the world has become non-competitive.

We must recognize that, if we were to become too weak in a military sense, we might actually destroy the incentive for detente by tempting the Soviets to take advantage of us through military force. We have to be particularly careful here because we are dealing with a closed society. There is no way we can be assured that we can predict when the Soviets might suddenly turn 180° and reject the concept of detente. Mutual reductions in military forces under a concept of detente or limitations on forces are one thing. Unless we have a mutually agreeable position, a unilateral reduction on the United States' part could upset the basic balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union and injure the forces that are helping to encourage and develop detente today. This is the reason, in my view, that the defense budget must stay at its current level. However, I would add that the real purchasing power of the 1975 budget in constant dollars is under the pre-Vietnam level. It is the smallest in real purchasing power since 1951.

Still, there are those who will misunderstand this budget. They will raise the objection that the mere existence of military forces will encourage their use. I cannot deny that there exists some possibility with which we must be seriously

concerned. At the same time all of us recognize from history that a lack of preparedness has, on occasions like World War I, World War II and Korea, encouraged aggression. So we must look today at the alternatives.

We could, of course, disarm more rapidly than the Soviets and possibly risk upsetting detente. On the other hand, and I think more feasible, we might simply exercise firm civilian control so that having force does not necessarily encourage its use unless that is truly a conscious, civilian directed policy. In short, I don't suggest that turning into a eunuch is the best possible way to avoid possible pregnancies.

Let me wrap up by saying that in our thinking in national security affairs today we must learn to separate our willingness to use military force from the necessity for maintaining forces, which does not mean we must employ them. Too often we do not appreciate that letting the balance of force slide against us and becoming impotent relative to the Soviets could, in fact, push us into the commitment of military force that we would like to avoid. I think it's important also that we separate the desire to encourage detente from this same necessity for maintaining military forces. Too often we do not appreciate that maintaining military forces does not necessarily mean we must dampen our progress towards detente. Too often we do not appreciate that, if we let the balance slide against us or become impotent relative to the Soviets, we could in fact kill the very incentive that has brought the Soviets to agree to move towards detente. At the same time, we in uniform and all of

you who are interested in national security affairs must certainly recognize the need for continually rethinking the size and kind of military forces that are applicable to this country, as well as the policies and tactics applicable to them.

Essentially, I think we must ensure that our military forces today are ready, not only to do combat, but to support our national policy in all its aspects. Now this may seem overly simplistic or trite; people like Clausewitz told us this over a century ago. Today there is still a lingering tradition that the American military is designed to fight, to win, to destroy the enemy capabilities to resist. In 1953, when we negotiated a settlement to the Korean War, I think it became obvious that we had to begin looking at our military purpose as being a bargaining instrument to help obtain an acceptable political solution. Yet I believe that one of the great problems during Vietnam, on both the military side of the house and in the public, was that neither of us fully understood this.

To go back to the beginning, the utility and acceptability of the employment of military force is declining today, but I think this only means that we must be increasingly aware that military force has to be an adjunct to national policy, not an end in itself. Yes, there are many alternative uses for the resources that we're dedicating to military forces today, but the defense budget is declining in purchasing power.

Hopefully, it is unlikely that the Congress will make risky and substantial cuts in the defense budget. The answers to the social ills of this country do not really lie in diverting resources from the defense of our nation, as too often people are inclined to believe. And finally, detente must have its impact on our military force structure and it certainly will, through negotiations.

We must continue to recognize that, while the world is becoming multi-polar in a political and economic sense, it is still basically bi-polar in a military sense. As long as it is, our decisions on military policy and posture must be taken against a backdrop of our overall balance versus the Soviet Union.

I'm delighted to see so many of you from the educational field here exploring this topic of national security interests. I believe it is one of the most exciting fields of academic endeavor today. We require a much more sophisticated approach to the use of military force, to the maintainence of military force, and to the conduct of national security affairs in general. We in the military are trying hard to recognize that there is that necessity for greater depth of thinking in these areas. As Vince Davis said, we have tried at the Naval War College to completely revamp the program, to push and encourage our students into deep probing and thinking in these areas. I would like to conclude by saying that we very much need your

help, your stimulation, your probing, and that of your students as well. That's why I'm so pleased that you've taken the time to participate in this series of seminars and I'm so grateful to Vince for organizing it. Thank you.

QUESTIONS FOLLOWING THE ADDRESS:

1. How do we build a perception in our nation of our need for a military--how do we regenerate conviction that we need a military?
2. What are your views on SALT I and prognosis for SALT II?
3. Why did SecDef make the announcement on retargeting?
4. How can we correct cost overruns?
5. How long do you foresee the world remaining militarily bipolar?
6. What do you consider to be the effect of the Nixon difficulties on the world's perception of our military power and national will?
7. What do you consider to be a security issue (e.g. environment, scarcity of resources, distribution of wealth)?
8. What is national interest and how do you define it?
9. There are those who claim that the existence of a strong military creates the tendency to use it. How do we prevent the military from becoming instigators, not a deterrent?

BEFORE CLEARANCE

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THE USES AND MISUSES OF MILITARY FORCE
IN THE DECADE AHEAD

The utility of military force for furthering political ends has diminished in the last 15 years and with it has gone the traditional rationale for a standing military. How did this lessening of utility occur and what does it portend for the future?

First and most obvious, the advent of nuclear weapons, followed by the achievement of Soviet-U.S. nuclear parity, has rendered unthinkable the option of resolving superpower differences by means of military force. The closeness of the ties between each superpower and its major allies has enlarged considerably the group of sovereign countries who recognize the possibly suicidal consequences of using either conventional or nuclear force to solve their problems.

Second, the very real limitations of a major military power, trying to exercise its will over a minor power through the use of military force, were demonstrated in both Korea and Vietnam. This was partly because the major powers almost always had to fight a limited war for limited objectives against a minor power fighting a total war for survival, and partly because the dispersal of technology permitted the small powers access to enough sophisticated equipment to give a major power a very difficult time.

Third, there is an increased worldwide concern for improved national economic, rather than political, position. Politicians are concerned with a steady improvement of their country's standard of living, based on potential to improve and not on a comparison with the standards of country X or country Y. Thus, in what is a non-zero sum game, military force is less applicable to furthering these economic desires.

Fourth, the acceptability of the use of military force has declined in the Western world. Instant worldwide communications have engendered a greater sense of world community. A greater appreciation of the horrors of war, its apparent futility, and a professed humanitarianism have contributed to the popularity of detente.

It would be a mistake, however, for us to overstate this idea of diminishing utility for military force. Many countries still feel they can benefit from the use of force because there are many others who feel insecure under the threat of force. They have only to look to the Middle East, the continuing strife in Cambodia, tensions in India-Pakistan, and the many other smaller conflicts in recent years, whose focus seems to be in the more developed Third World countries rather than the very underdeveloped ones. Major power interest in these potential conflicts has been considerable. There is always the danger that conflict will lead to superpower involvement (The Middle East situation is a classic example.) or that a major power will obtain dominant influence through

the use of either direct or surrogate military power. The effect on vital raw material sources and world trade patterns would be of concern to all.

As a consequence, it appears that military force planning in the decade ahead will be dominated by three missions:

First, the retention of strategic nuclear deterrence, but with consideration of alternatives to mutual assured destruction. In many ways this concept is responsible for the public apathy or opposition to military forces.

Second, the maintenance of a military balance in Western Europe. Despite the greater importance today of political and economic factors in deterring a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, the use of our military forces is an important reassurance to our European allies of the link between U.S. nuclear power and their invulnerability to invasion.

Third, the need to maintain some form of military balance in the Third World, both to deter major power adventurism and to contain possible intra-Third World conflicts.

If these missions present a new or changed raison d'etre for the military, then their commonality (deterrence rather than defense or active warfare) may change significantly the thrust of U.S. military force planning. This change will pose some difficult problems which we must be prepared to address.

Deterrence forces are more difficult to structure than defensive forces. If we mean by deterrence, forces which will discourage an enemy by confronting him with unacceptable risks,

we are working with the enemy's intentions. Defensive forces on the other hand, are designed to counter the enemy's capabilities and thus reduce our cost and risk in the event deterrence fails. The proverbial response that because enemy intentions can change quickly we must base our plans on enemy capabilities is not helpful. Technology has pushed the costs of weapons so high that we have only two choices if we plan forces against enemy capability: limit the areas we are prepared to defend (Western Europe for example); and be only partially prepared for worldwide defense requirements. Whichever choice we make, we are, in effect, estimating intentions. We are estimating either that Europe is the primary threat area or that we can take a chance with thin forces on all fronts. In essence this is part of the difficulty in acknowledging the limited power of the United States. We hope that our force structure will somehow be adequate if we must defend. Sometimes, however, we find we have to redefine the threat downward in order to be reassured. Should we not give more attention to the realistic requirements of deterring conflict?

For us in uniform this is most difficult. Our primary force sizing technique has been the analysis of specific scenarios. Deterrence is less amenable to concise scenario definition and analysis. This is true in part because deterrence relies on perceptions. There are many perceptions we must consider; our own, the Soviets, a Third World power hoping

for Soviet assistance, and a Third World power acting alone. The perception by a Third World country of the relative balance between us and the Soviets and our relative ability to influence the situation by force is important. This perception may differ from either the Soviet or U.S. perception of the same situation. Of course, it's possible that more than one of these perceptions may be at work simultaneously. Unfortunately, we do not know much about the impact of military force on perceptions like these. In the Navy, for instance, there is always a tendency when called upon for gunboat diplomacy to send the nearest ship. If there is a choice, this decision is always in favor of the largest and most powerful ship. Yet there are times when the largest and most powerful may not be the most credible or the most applicable to any particular situation. Supersonic airplanes are likely to pose only small threat to a very underdeveloped nation, whereas a Marine helicopter assault on the capitol of a country may be very meaningful indeed. Overall, we need considerably more study on the operative factors of military presence or deterrence.

Another substantial problem is selling this concept to the Congress and the public given the difficulty of defining and understanding deterrence. If we talk of deterrence in terms of balance or in Dr. Janowitz's term of "stabilizing", rather than in terms of defense and superiority, the obvious

conclusion will be that we need less. If we ask for less we will probably get much less. In view of this, the best bureaucratic strategy may well be to continue to play up the threat and ask for forces for warfighting capability in the hope that we will have enough for a deterrent strategy.

There is also a great danger today in the euphoria, caused by an imperfect understanding of detente, which pervades in the Congress. After sitting through three days of Pacem in Terris with Congressmen, intellectuals, businessmen, and other community leaders, I can assure you that there is a lot of illogical or uninformed thinking about the term "detente." Detente is a fragile, changing thing. A column in the Washington Post recently stated, "detente is finished" because on September 27th the Soviet Union knew what day the Arabs were going to attack Israel and did not tell us. I believe the author took an overly simplistic and idealized view of detente. He made no allowance for the constantly changing nature of any relationship. Detente consists of both forward and backward movements within the boundaries of a state of relative trust and confidence. Our present state of detente is nowhere near the level of trust and confidence which would permit the revelation of that sort of information.

What would affect the present detente adversely? The development of a military imbalance (conventional and strategic) between the U.S. and the Soviet Union? The perception of increased vulnerability to attack by the other? The awareness by one of a marked military advantage over the other? Any

of these would likely cause a breakdown in detente. History has not show many cases of countries forsaking an advantage over a rival. I believe this, though I consider the U.S. the most magnanimous country in the history of the world. Not many would have pressed for a policy of containment, not detente, even while possessing a monopoly of nuclear weapons for over five years.

We must now recognize the assymmetries in the U.S. and Soviet approaches to detente. One reason that the Soviet Union, Red China, and the U.S. have agreed to detente was to preclude facing opponents on two fronts. Instead of us each dropping one opponent and keeping one, in a trianglar situation, we in the United States have a double detente. That will have an impact on Soviet and American attitudes toward detente.

Furthermore, the Soviets have different needs for military forces. If I were a Soviet military leader, I would be reluctant to reduce my forces when I considered my responsibilities on the Eastern front and in the eastern European nations. If I were a Soviet political leader, the tradition of using force to preserve domestic order and security would make me reluctant to reduce military forces. The Soviet Union does not have the anti-military tradition we inherited from our founding fathers.

I also see no reason to believe that the Soviets will not exercise force to threaten other people. They are clearly building up their Navy beyond any legitimate requirement. Even if they do not purposely exercise force, possession of large forces is perceived as a threat by many nations. We need to think more about such perceived threats.

A few days ago I was talking with a civilian academician involved in a study of Japanese security requirements. Inevitably the subject of the very long jugular from the Persian Gulf to Japan came up. I asked what he would have the Japanese do. He said that this vital supply line was so extended and so difficult to defend that there was no point in building naval forces to protect it. I suggest this is a misunderstanding of perceptions of military power. There is a fatal difference between a zero threshold at which another power can pose a threat with military force and a 10, 20, or 30 percent capability.

A few weeks ago, the British newspapers reported that Norway has discovered oil in her territorial waters. The Norwegians, however, have come to feel that the Norwegian Sea is a Soviet lake; so they have elected to develop those oil fields only in the very southern part of their coast line. We need to be sure that we understand more about the perceptions of threat, how they affect political and economic decisions.

The search for meaningful uses of military forces in the next decade is not a simple problem and its solution cannot be found by the military acting alone. I have attempted briefly to state the dilemmas facing the military establishment today and to outline some of the considerations in developing a meaningful future strategy. In a sense we in the Navy are at a crossroads. The decisions made today will shape the Navy of tomorrow. Can we design the right Navy for tomorrow's challenges?

Remarks on Naval Aviation

by

STANSFIELD TURNER

Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

(From an address to the Seapower Symposium at the Naval Aviation Commandery, 23 May 1973)

It's indeed a pleasure to be here at the Naval Aviation Commandery's Second Annual Seapower Symposium. When Admiral Chris Cagle asked me to be the leadoff speaker, I felt that we had reached a new era in the Navy. As you can see, I'm not an aviator, although as a Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Commander, I had the privileged opportunity of commanding a Carrier Task Group of the SIXTH fleet in the Mediterranean. There was a time when the Navy was so parochial that no aviator would trust a "blackshoe" to command carrier forces or to speak in public about carriers. A great sign of progress in the Navy today is that we are moving away from parochialism of this sort - parochialism that all of us are guilty of, by no means just the aviation community.

We have entered a world of multi-power negotiations: It requires a military posture that has virtues other than simply being capable of defeating the next fellow's. In fact, in an era of negotiations you may achieve your military purpose, or fail to do so, without directly engaging the enemy, or perhaps by engaging only a fraction of his force in a quick engagement that is hastily terminated. I suggest that today's environment

will require us to pay more attention to the responsiveness of our military forces to political and diplomatic needs, than heretofore.

What are the implications of these trends for naval aviation? In my view it places increasing demands on the aviation element of the Navy. It also demands that we carefully review what type aviation forces can best fulfill the broad spectrum of uses that is evolving.

Essentially, we are working between two extremes. At the one, we have the spectre of full scale conflict with the only other major sea power, the Soviet Union. At the other, we have a need for the stabilizing influence of a display of U.S. military might in troubled international situations.

In the former case, against the Soviets, Naval Aviation clearly needs sophisticated weaponry. We need F-14's that can out-maneuver the growing number of different advanced Soviet fighters. The F-14 and Phoenix combination is the only weapons systems on the U.S. drawing boards that can touch the high altitude fighter-bomber coming into the Soviet inventory.

When we talk of engagement with the Soviets, however, we simply can not ignore that feature of naval aviation which receives abundant publicity - the vulnerability of our carriers. The nuclear submarine, especially if equipped with long-range missiles, is a real threat. So, too, are the Soviets' long range bombers with their missile capability. And we even have

to concern ourselves with missile-equipped surface combatants. If we assume that our carriers will operate close to enemy shores, as in Korea and Viet Nam, these three threats will look very formidable. In Korea and Viet Nam the mission of carriers was to provide either air support close to our own troops, or interdiction of enemy supply lines more distant from the front. There was no seaborne opposition. We would face a formidable threat, however, if we engaged the Soviet Union. We simply must acknowledge that carriers are not going to operate adjacent to any Soviet territory to conduct close air support or deep interdiction in the early days of a war. Our foremost task here would be the traditional one of ensuring control over those portions of the sea we need. No other part of our strategy could succeed unless we can ship reinforcements, equipment and supplies by sea. In the early days of a major war, then, the carriers will be involved in securing the seas. Only they are equipped to handle the triple threat, air, surface and submarine. This requires quantities of fighters to knock down the enemy bombers which can fire at a naval force or convoy from over 100 miles away. It requires attack aircraft to knock out enemy surface combatants. It also requires antisubmarine, fixed wing aircraft and helos. That is why we have started a program to equip each of our carriers with antisubmarine aircraft, even at the expense of a few attack aircraft. Some people see this as a

step backward. That's true only in the sense that it takes us back to the original mission of aircraft carriers - control of the sea. The first great success of American carriers was in the battle of Midway. There, we checked the eastward advance of Japanese naval forces. Today the carrier is the key element to stopping possible Soviet advances into our sea lanes, whether it be with submarines, aircraft or surface combatants. As, in the course of time, these threats are progressively eaten away, more and more of the carriers' effort can be freed for close air support and interdiction.

When we look at the next lower order of naval warfare, we must consider the possibility of warfare involving the Soviet Union, but limited in some manner, probably geographically. Perhaps we are each supporting an ally and become directly involved ourselves. Here, the role of the carrier would depend on just how the rules of engagement were perceived by each side. For instance, we might anticipate a much lesser air threat, probably limited to that which could be based within the allied nation. We might even find submarines ruled out since anti-submarine measures tend to be geographically expansive. We would still require highly sophisticated weapons, but the time it would take to shift from sea and air control to attack operations might be considerably foreshortened.

On the next rung down the ladder, we must imagine the possibility of future Koreas or Vietnams, as unlikely or unpopular as that may seem today. Here the role of the carrier shifts abruptly to maintaining air superiority above the battlefield, close air support and interdiction. The naval threat would be limited. Only the possibility of partial Soviet manning of third country submarines would render anti-submarine aircraft necessary. How sophisticated the remaining aircraft need be is a factor of how much, if any, Soviet equipment had been supplied to our opponent.

Finally, we must look down to the bottom rung. Here a carrier can clearly be a strong expression of peacetime presence displaying United States' concern. The carrier has unique advantages in this role. A show of carrier force can threaten destruction of forces or interruption of communications by bombing. It can threaten to halt all shipping in the area. It can threaten to expose a situation to surveillance that may incriminate one side or the other. Finally, the carrier constitutes the biggest of "sticks", in Theodore Roosevelt's terminology. It transmits an unmistakable message of U.S. concern - concern that may ultimately result in punitive actions, military or non-military.

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can operate. Less capable units can handle the lower end of the spectrum, and numbers may be important there for two reasons. One is an ability to respond rapidly as a result of having lots of units strategically displaced. The other is the ability to apply forces in one area without having to denude our military posture elsewhere.

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Thus, as we move into the era of the All-Volunteer Force, the public must assume a greater responsibility for providing direction to the military establishment. The end of the draft must not mean the end of public concern for and interest in your armed forces. In short, giving a sense of positive direction to military purpose is an essential element to ensuring that such force is both tailored and employed only as the national will dictates.

Thank you.

NAVAL AVIATION COMMANDERY

SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM

23 MAY 1973

It's indeed a pleasure to be here at the Naval Aviation Commandery's Second Annual Seapower Symposium. When Admiral Chris Cagle asked me to be the leadoff speaker, I felt that we had reached a new era in the Navy. As you can see, I'm not an aviator, although as a Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Commander, I had the privileged opportunity of commanding a Carrier Task Group of the SIXTH Fleet in the Mediterranean. There was a time when the Navy was so parochial that no aviator would trust a "blackshoe" to command carrier forces or to speak in public about carriers. A great sign of progress in the Navy today is that we are moving away from parochialism of this sort - parochialism that all of us are guilty of, by no means not just the aviation community.

In my present job at the War College, I am attempting to scotch parochialism by ensuring that all officers study about all phases of the Navy. We are insisting that the Naval War College be naval - not primarily an institution of international relations or diplomacy. I am involved in directing the mid-career education of 450 hand-picked officers and career civilians from all of our military services, the State Department,

Coast Guard and the CIA. These are men who are destined for top leadership positions. They come to the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. from what I call a Newtonian Universe, a universe of rational explanations for almost all phenomena. Their vocational experience and most of their training and education have been in a technical world where right and wrong answers must exist and an authoritarian world of military decisions that are either correct or incorrect.

Our objective at the Naval War College is to develop in these officers a concept of thinking about three very imprecise subjects with which all senior decision makers must grapple. The first subject is Strategy or the uncertain world of broad strategic questions such as "How does the United States adapt from the bi-polar world of just the U.S. and Soviet Union of the 1950's and 60's to the multi-polar environment of the U.S., Soviets, European community, China and Japan, of the 1970's and 80's?"

The second subject that we cover is the inexact world of management where we face decisions such as "Do we purchase one very capable and survivable billion dollar aircraft carrier or do we buy two or three smaller carriers each with limited capabilities?"

Thirdly, we deal with the probabilistic world of tactical decisions amidst technologies which are changing so rapidly that standard doctrines are always outdated. Compounding the complexities in all of these cases, we face the ultimate un-

certainty of not having a standard of measure such as most of you gentlemen enjoy in the profit and loss statement! (At least I hope that most of you are enjoying yours.)

When I say that we do not have a specific standard of measure for our \$80B corporation in the DOD, I mean two things. First, our corporation, the Department of Defense, cannot agree upon basic objectives as easily as can those of you in business. Why do we want a military? Where and when might we employ it. These questions regarding objectives are less amenable to clarification than is the question of how a corporation or a company best sets out to satisfy a consumer's needs. Secondly, we also have difficulty in measuring performance. How well did the Navy satisfy its customers - you the public last year? Compared with the Army? Now in the business world there are fortunately many good measures such as sales, profit as a percent of sales, turnover, return on assets, return on stockholders investment. We lack such tools.

There is a great need for military men who can approach complex problems such as establishing military objectives and measuring success without waiting for the test of war. To do these things we need men who are not only skilled craftsmen at the relatively exact arts of driving ships and aircraft, but men who are architects of inexact policies of vast national and international import.

The task that these officers face in 1973 is compounded by the fact that the very foundation on which we have based our military objectives since World War II has disappeared.

George Kennan's policy of containment has gone the way of monolithic communism. We can no longer justify military force on pushing back communism wherever it may exude.

We are accustomed to measuring our objectives in terms of readiness for military action anywhere along the Soviet-Chinese periphery. We measured our success in terms of how well our foreign policy, backed by military preparedness, held the line. Interestingly, the only extension of communism since 1949 was to Cuba, not an extension of perimeter, but a leapfrog across the seas.

With containment gone we must now redefine our objectives and our measures of success in new terms. Thus, in our course at the Naval War College, we insist on taking the students back to the two fundamental reasons for military power - first, insurance in case of war and second, use as an instrument of foreign policy in peacetime.

Today, though, there are some who avow that our need for military insurance has diminished if not disappeared. This is as understandable, just as understandable as it is for a man who has paid for a new sprinkler system in his factory to ask whether he can reduce his fire insurance premiums. Detente appears to be approaching; in turn, military preparedness appears to be less critical.

There are also those who contend that it is not in our interests today to use--the presence of military forces in support of foreign policy. They point out that our domestic needs are too urgent to afford this capability or that sabre rattling is too risky.

One could argue each of these points interminably. The debate would not be between the extremes of no insurance or no presence capability on one hand and overwhelming superiority to all potential opponents on the other. The debate would be about some point in between, some point where it appears acceptable for this country to set its defenses. I think that we can bracket that point.

I would start from the assumption that one acceptable point between the extremes would be our honoring our NATO commitments if Western Europe were assaulted. There are few people in this country who do not agree that our vital interests lie in preventing Western Europe from falling into the orbit of the Soviet Union. How much military power we require to prevent this, and of what kind, is a matter for considerable debate.

Now, nearer to the other extreme, most people today want to avoid involvement in another prolonged ambiguous ground war in Asia. National consensus on our need for military forces must lie somewhere in between support for NATO and aversion to more Vietnams. The spectrum covers a vast scope of insurance against potential conflicts and possible ways to employ military force,

for diplomatic purpose. Even with the best techniques that tools like systems analysis can offer us, precise numerical analysis is not capable of identifying this point. It is a matter of weighing national priorities.

We must weigh those priorities in light of the changes both in the world environment and in domestic attitudes. On the international scene this means recognizing the impact of our emergence from the bi-polar world into a multi-polar one.

At the War College we start our students with the study of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian Wars, in the 5th Century B.C. This was an era of a bi-polar focus. We point out that bi-polar periods have been aberrations in history. More often there have been a number of powers to balance against each other. Balance of power, means just that. You must have

power to be a player in the game. Power, though, is not limited to military force. National power is comprised of industrial strength, national will, moral stature, organizational ability and other elements in addition to military strength. The issue for military students, is to probe for that type of military force which the country needs to complement our other sources of power. If a prime purpose of having military forces in the 1970's is to balance, or, to provide negotiating pressure, rather than to contain by military action as in Korea and Vietnam, the construction of those forces may be different. It requires sophistication for a military man to think in terms of influencing rather than fighting and winning, especially in understanding how other's perceptions of our military might can influence their diplomatic decisions.

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In other words, ~~the~~ world of multi-power negotiations requires a military posture that has virtues other than simply being capable of defeating the next fellow's. In fact, in an era of negotiations you may achieve your military purpose or fail to do so, without directly engaging the enemy, or perhaps by engaging only a fraction of his force in a quick engagement that is hastily terminated. I suggest that today's environment will require us to pay more attention to the responsiveness of our military forces to political and diplomatic needs, than heretofore.

What are the implications of these trends for naval aviation? In my view it places increasing demands on the aviation element of the Navy. It also demands that we carefully review what type of aviation forces can best fulfill the broad spectrum of uses that is evolving.

Essentially we are working between two extremes. At the one, we have the spectre of full scale conflict with the only other major sea power, the Soviet Union. At the other, we have a need for the stabilizing influence of a display of U.S. military might in troubled international situations.

In the former case, against the Soviets, Naval aviation clearly needs sophisticated weaponry. We need F-14's that can out-maneuver the growing number of different advanced Soviet fighters. The F-14 ~~s~~ and Phoenix combination is the only

weapons system on the U.S. drawing boards that can touch the ~~very~~ high altitude fighter-bomber coming into the Soviet inventory.

When we talk of engagement with the Soviets, however, we simply can not ignore that feature of naval aviation ~~that which~~ receives abundant publicity - the vulnerability of our carriers. The nuclear submarine, especially if equipped with long-range missiles, is a real threat. So, too, are the Soviets' long range bombers with their missile capability. And we even have to concern ourselves with missile-equipped surface combatants. If we assume that our carriers will operate close to enemy shores, as in Korea and Viet Nam, these three threats will look very formidable. In Korea and Viet Nam the mission of carriers was to provide either air support close to our own troops, or interdiction of enemy supply lines more distant from the front. There was no sea ^{bomb} opposition. However, we would face a formidable threat, if we engaged the Soviet Union. We simply must acknowledge that carriers are not going to ~~pull~~ operate ^{admiral to} ~~up right off~~ any Soviet territory to conduct close air support or deep interdiction in the early days of a war. Our foremost task ~~in such a war~~ would be the traditional one of ensuring control over those portions of the sea we need. No other part of our strategy could succeed unless we can ship reinforcements, equipment and supplies by sea. In the early days of a major war, then, the carriers will be involved in securing the

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When we look at the next lower order of naval warfare, we must consider the possibility of warfare involving the Soviet Union, but limited in some manner, probably geographically. Perhaps we are each supporting an ally and become directly involved ourselves. Here, the role of the carrier would depend on just how the rules of engagement were perceived by

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There is no simple way for the public to express that will under our democratic process. It must, of course, be through the Congress and the President. I submit though, that this requires from the public a positive approach to military matters. The most dangerous course I can imagine would be for us to back into an evaluation of military needs through disinterest in the military or through dismay at the magnitude of the task. Nothing could be more extravagant. We could well end up with the military preparing for a set of objectives that might be 180° out from an unexpressed public opinion.

Thus, as we move into the era of the All-Volunteer Force, the public must assume a greater responsibility for providing direction to the military establishment. The end of the draft must not mean the end of public concern for and interest in your armed forces. In short, giving a sense of positive direction to military purpose is an essential element to ensuring that such force is both tailored and employed only as the national will dictates.

We are striving, through higher military education today, to be ready to work with the civilian public in locating the consensus on military purpose that we require. The task demands higher and more flexible intellectual capabilities in military men than ever before. The risks in making errors or in inadequate preparation are severe in this age of swift and treacherous weaponry and of intricate balancing of international forces.

We are dedicated in higher military education to ensuring that the military leaders of tomorrow are sensitive to the public's direction and worthy of its relying on them for whatever purpose is selected. Your help in reaching this goal would be deeply appreciated.

Thank you.

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There is no simple way for the public to express that will under our democratic process. It must, of course, be through the Congress and the President. I submit though, that this requires from the public a positive approach to military matters. The most dangerous course I can imagine would be for us to back into an evaluation of military needs through disinterest in the military or through dismay at the magnitude of the task. Nothing could be more extravagant. We could well end up with the military preparing for a set of objectives that might be 180° out from an unexpressed public opinion.

Thus, as we move into the era of the All-Volunteer Force, the public must assume a greater responsibility for providing direction to the military establishment. The end of the draft must not mean the end of public concern for and interest in your armed forces. In short, giving a sense of positive direction to military purpose is an essential element to ensuring that such force is both tailored and employed only as the national will dictates.

We are striving, through higher military education today, to be ready to work with the civilian public in locating the consensus on military purpose that we require. The task demands higher and more flexible intellectual capabilities in military men than ever before. The risks in making errors or in inadequate preparation are severe in this age of swift and treacherous weaponry and of intricate balancing of international forces.

We are dedicated in higher military education to ensuring that the military leaders of tomorrow are sensitive to the public's direction and worthy of its relying on them for whatever purpose is selected. Your help in reaching this goal would be deeply appreciated.

Thank you.

NAVAL AVIATION COMMANDERY

SEAPOWERS SYMPOSIUM

23 MAY 1973

It's indeed a pleasure to be here at the Naval Aviation Commandery's Second Annual Seapower Symposium. When Admiral Chris Cagle asked me to be the leadoff speaker, I felt that we had reached a new era in the Navy. As you can see, I'm not an aviator, although as a Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Commander, I had the privileged opportunity of commanding a Carrier Task Group of the SIXTH Fleet in the Mediterranean. There was a time when the Navy was so parochial that no aviator would trust a "blackshoe" to command carrier forces or to speak in public about carriers. A great sign of progress in the Navy today is that we are moving away from parochialisms of this sort - parochialism that all of us are guilty of, by no means not just the aviation community.

In my present job at the War College, I am attempting to scotch parochialism by ensuring that all officers study about all phases of the Navy. We are insisting that the Naval War College be naval - not primarily an institution of international relations or diplomacy. I am involved in directing the mid-career education of 450 hand-picked officers and career civilians from all of our military services, the State Department,

Coast Guard and the CIA. These are men who are destined for top leadership positions. They come to the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. from what I call a Newtonian Universe, a universe of rational explanations for almost all phenomena. Their vocational experience and most of their training and education have been in a technical world where right and wrong answers must exist and an authoritarian world of military decisions that are either correct or incorrect.

Our objective at the Naval War College is to develop in these officers a concept of thinking about three very imprecise subjects with which all senior decision makers must grapple. The first subject is Strategy or the uncertain world of broad strategic questions such as "How does the United States adapt from the bi-polar world of just the U.S. and Soviet Union of the 1950's and 60's to the multi-polar environment of the U.S., Soviets, European community, China and Japan, of the 1970's and 80's?"

The second subject that we cover is the inexact world of management where we face decisions such as "Do we purchase one very capable and survivable billion dollar aircraft carrier or do we buy two or three smaller carriers each with limited capabilities?"

Thirdly, we deal with the probabilistic world of tactical decisions amidst technologies which are changing so rapidly that standard doctrines are always outdated. Compounding the complexities in all of these cases, we face the ultimate un-

certainty of not having a standard of measure such as most of you gentlemen enjoy in the profit and loss statement! (At least I hope that most of you are enjoying yours.)

When I say that we do not have a specific standard of measure for our \$80B corporation in the DOD, I mean two things. First, our corporation, the Department of Defense, cannot agree upon basic objectives as easily as can those of you in business. Why do we want a military? Where and when might we employ it. These questions regarding objectives are less amenable to clarification than is the question of how a corporation or a company best sets out to satisfy a consumer's needs. Secondly, we also have difficulty in measuring

performance. How well did the Navy satisfy its customers - you the public last year? Compared with the Army? Now in the business world there are fortunately many good measures such as sales, profit as a percent of sales, turnover, return on assets, return on stockholders investment. We lack such tools.

There is a great need

for military men who can approach complex problems such as establishing military objectives and measuring success without waiting for the test of war. To do these things we need men who are not only skilled craftsmen at the relatively exact arts of driving ships and aircraft, but men who are architects of inexact policies of vast national and international import.

The task that these officers face in 1973 is compounded by the fact that the very foundation on which we have based our military objectives since World War II has disappeared.

George Kennan's policy of containment has gone the way of monolithic communism. We can no longer justify military force on pushing back communism wherever it may exude.

We are accustomed to measuring our objectives in terms of readiness for military action anywhere along the Soviet-Chinese periphery. We measured our success in terms of how well our foreign policy, backed by military preparedness, held the line. Interestingly, the only extension of communism since 1949 was to Cuba, not an extension of perimeter, but a leapfrog across the seas.

With containment gone we must now redefine our objectives and our measures of success in new terms. Thus, in our course at the Naval War College, we insist on taking the students back to the two fundamental reasons for military power - first, insurance in case of war and second, use as an instrument of foreign policy in peacetime.

Today, though, there are some who avow that our need for military insurance has diminished if not disappeared. This is as understandable, just as understandable as it is for a man who has paid for a new sprinkler system in his factory to ask whether he can reduce his fire insurance premiums. Detente appears to be approaching; in turn, military preparedness appears to be less critical.

There are also those who contend that it is not in our interests today to use the presence of military forces in support of foreign policy. They point out that our domestic needs are too urgent to afford this capability or that sabre rattling is too risky.

One could argue each of these points interminably. The debate would not be between the extremes of no insurance or no presence capability on one hand and overwhelming superiority to all potential opponents on the other. The debate would be about some point in between, some point where it appears acceptable for this country to set its defenses. I think that we can bracket that point.

I would start from the assumption that one acceptable point between the extremes would be our honoring our NATO commitments if Western Europe were assaulted. There are few people in this country who do not agree that our vital interests lie in preventing Western Europe from falling into the orbit of the Soviet Union. How much military power we require to prevent this, and of what kind, is a matter for considerable debate.

Now, nearer to the other extreme, most people today want to avoid involvement in another prolonged ambiguous ground war in Asia. National consensus on our need for military forces must lie somewhere in between support for NATO and aversion to more Vietnams. The spectrum covers a vast scope of insurance against potential conflicts and possible ways to employ military force,

for diplomatic purpose. Even with the best techniques that tools like systems analysis can offer us, precise numerical analysis is not capable of identifying this point. It is a matter of weighing national priorities.

We must weigh those priorities in light of the changes both in the world environment and in domestic attitudes. On the international scene this means recognizing the impact of our emergence from the bi-polar world into a multi-polar one.

At the War College we start our students with the study of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian Wars, in the 5th Century B.C. This was an era of a bi-polar focus. We point out that bi-polar periods have been aberrations in history. More often there have been a number of powers to balance against each other. Balance of power, means just that. You must have

power to be a player in the game. Power, though, is not limited to military force. National power is comprised of industrial strength, national will, moral stature, organizational ability and other elements in addition to military strength. The issue for military students, is to probe for that type of military force which the country needs to complement our other sources of power. If a prime purpose of having military forces in the 1970's is to balance, or, to provide negotiating pressure, rather than to contain by military action as in Korea and Vietnam, the construction of those forces may be different. It requires sophistication for a military man to think in terms of influencing rather than fighting and winning, especially in understanding how other's perceptions of our military might can influence their

In other words, a world of multi-power negotiations requires a military posture that has virtues other than simply being capable of defeating the next fellow's. In fact, in an era of negotiations you may achieve your military purpose or fail to do so without directly engaging the enemy, or perhaps by engaging only a fraction of his force in a quick engagement that is hastily terminated. I suggest that today's environment will require us to pay more attention to the responsiveness of our military forces to political and diplomatic needs, than heretofore.

What are the implications of these trends for naval aviation? In my view it places increasing demands on the aviation element of the Navy. It also demands that we carefully review what type of aviation forces can best fulfill the broad spectrum of uses that is evolving.

Essentially we are working between two extremes. At the one, we have the spectre of full scale conflict with the only other major sea power, the Soviet Union. At the other, we have a need for the stabilizing influence of a display of U.S. military might in troubled international situations.

In the former case, against the Soviets, Naval aviation clearly needs sophisticated weaponry. We need F-14's that can out maneuver the growing number of different advanced Soviet fighters. The F-14's and Phoenix combination is the only

weapons system on the U.S. drawing boards that can touch the very high altitude fighter-bomber coming into the Soviet inventory.

When we talk of engagement with the Soviets, however, we simply can not ignore that feature of naval aviation that receives abundant publicity - the vulnerability of our carriers. The nuclear submarine, especially if equipped with long-range missiles, is a real threat. So, too, are the Soviets' long range bombers with their missile capability. And we even have to concern ourselves with missile-equipped surface combatants. If we assume that our carriers will operate close to enemy shores, as in Korea and Viet Nam, these three threats will look very formidable. In Korea and Viet Nam the mission of carriers was to provide either air support close to our own troops, or interdiction of enemy supply lines more distant from the front. There was no sea opposition. However, we would face a formidable threat if we engaged the Soviet Union. We simply must acknowledge that carriers are not going to pull up right off any Soviet territory to conduct close air support or deep interdiction in the early days of a war. Our foremost task in such a war would be the traditional one of ensuring control over those portions of the sea we need. No other part of our strategy could succeed unless we can ship reinforcements, equipment and supplies by sea. In the early days of a major war, then, the carriers will be involved in securing the

seas. Only they are equipped to handle the triple threat, air, surface and submarine. This requires quantities of fighters to knock down enemy bombers that can release weapons at a naval force or convoy from over 100 miles. It requires attack aircraft to knock out enemy surface combatants. It also requires anti-submarine fixed wing aircraft and helos. That is why we have started a program to equip each of our carriers with anti-submarine aircraft, even at the expense of a few attack aircraft. Some people think that this is a step backward. That's true only in the sense that it takes us back to the original mission of aircraft carriers - control of the sea. The first great success of American carriers was in the battle of Midway. There, we checked the eastward advance of Japanese naval forces. Today the carrier is the key element to stopping possible Soviet advances into our sea lanes, whether it be with submarines, aircraft or surface combatants. As, in the course of time, these threats are progressively eaten away, more and more of the carriers' effort will be freed for close air support and interdiction.

When we look at the next lower order of naval warfare, we must consider the possibility of warfare involving the Soviet Union, but limited in some manner, probably geographically. Perhaps we are each supporting an ally and become directly involved ourselves. Here, the role of the carrier would depend on just how the rules of engagement were perceived by

each side. For instance, we might anticipate a much lesser air threat, probably limited to that which could be based within the allied nation. We might even find submarines ruled out since anti-submarine measures tend to be geographically expansive. We would still require highly sophisticated weapons, but the time it would take to shift from sea and air control to attack operations might be considerably foreshortened.

On the next rung down the ladder, we must imagine the possibility of future Koreas or Vietnams, as unlikely or unpopular as that may seem today. Here the role of the carrier shifts abruptly to maintaining air superiority above the battle field, close air support and interdiction. The naval threat would be limited. Only the possibility of partial Soviet manning of third country submarines would render anti-submarine aircraft necessary. How sophisticated the remaining aircraft need be is factor of how much, if any, Soviet equipment had been supplied to our opponent.

Finally, we must look down at the bottom rung. Here a carrier can clearly be a strong expression of peacetime presence displaying United States' concern. The carrier has unique advantages in this role. A show of carrier force can threaten bombing destruction or interruption. It can threaten to halt all shipping in the area. It can threaten to expose a situation on land to surveillance that may incriminate one side or the other. Finally, the carrier constitutes the biggest of "sticks",

in Theodore Roosevelt's terminology. It transmits an unmistakable message of U.S. concern - concern that may ultimately result in punitive actions, military or non-military.

Between the extremes of these potential uses of naval aviation, there is a calculus of economics. The more we concentrate on the sophisticated demands at the upper end, the fewer units we can operate. Less capable units can handle the lower end of the spectrum, and numbers may be important there for two reasons. One is an ability to respond rapidly as a result of having lots of units strategically displaced. The other is the ability to apply forces in one area without having to denude our military posture elsewhere.

I have not been predicting which uses of naval aviation will most likely come into play in the decade ahead. The one we put our money on will largely determine the shape of naval aviation in those days. By we I don't mean just the military; it is a task for the public with our help.

The military man's role is to be prepared to comprehend and to follow whatever course the nation selects, and to do so with purpose, dedication, and proficiency. We also must advise whether our forces are capable of achieving the national objectives or strategy. The purpose of having a War College today is to intellectually prepare the next crop of naval leaders to do this - to understand the society they serve, and to deal intelligently with the imprecise, uncertain and subjective character of the national will.

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TASK OFFICERS FACE IN 1973 IS COMPOUNDED

FOUNDATION HAS DISAPPEARED

ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR OBJECTIVES

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READINESS FOR ACTION ALONG THE SOVIET - CHINESE PERIPHERY

ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR SUCCESS - HELD LINE

ONLY EXTENSION TO CUBA LEAP FROG ACROSS THE SEAS

WITH CONTAINMENT GONE WE MUST NOW REDEFINE OBJECTIVES & MEASURES

COURSE - TAKING THE STUDENTS BACK TO TWO FUNDAMENTAL REASONS

FIRST, DETERRENT IN PEACETIME

SECONDLY, INSURANCE IN CASE DETERRENCE FAILS

TODAY, SOME WHO AVOW THAT OUR NEED FOR MILITARY

INSURANCE HAS DIMINISHED

JUST AS UNDERSTANDABLE - NEW SPRINKLER SYSTEM

DETENTE APPEARS TO BE APPROACHING

6

DOMESTIC NEEDS ARE TOO URGENT

SABER RATTLING IS TOO RISKY

ARGUE EACH OF THESE POINTS INTERMINABLY DEBATE NOT BE
BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF

NO INSURANCE OR NO PRESENCE CAPABILITY & OVERWHELMING
SUPERIORITY

DEBATE ON POINT IN BETWEEN

WHERE ACCEPTABLE FOR COUNTRY TO SET ITS DEFENSES CAN BRACKET

START FROM THE ASSUMPTION - HONORING OUR NATO COMMITMENTS

HOW MUCH MILITARY POWER REQUIRED IS MATTER FOR DEBATE
NEARER TO THE OTHER EXTREME

7

AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN PROLONGED AMBIGUOUS GROUND WAR IN ASIA

CONSENSUS MUST LIE SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN

SPECTRUM - VAST SCOPE - INSURANCE - WAYS EMPLOY

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IS NOT CAPABLE OF IDENTIFYING THIS
EXPLICITLY

WEIGH PRIORITIES IN LIGHT OF THE CHANGES -

WORLD ENVIRONMENT

DOMESTIC ATTITUDES

IMPACT OF EMERGENCE FROM THE BI-POLAR WORLD

START OUR STUDENTS WITH THUCYDIDES

ERA A BI-POLAR FOCUS - ABERATION
NUMBER OF POWERS TO BALANCE

*8

INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH, NATIONAL WILL, MORAL STATURE,

ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY

ISSUE MILITARY STUDENTS PROBE FOR THAT TYPE OF MILITARY FORCE COUNTRY NEEDS.

COMPLEMENT OUR OTHER SOURCES OF POWER

IF A PRIME PURPOSE - MILITARY FORCES IN 1970's IS TO BALANCE OR PROVIDE NEGOTIATING RATHER THAN TO CONTAIN

CONSTRUCTION OF FORCES MAY BE DIFFERENT

SOPHISTICATION FOR A MILITARY MAN TO THINK OF

INFLUENCING

IN ADDITION TO FIGHTING

UNDERSTANDING HOW OTHER'S PERCEPTIONS CAN

INFLUENCE THEIR DIPLOMATIC DECISIONS

q

OTHER WORDS

A WORLD OF MULTI-POWER NEGOTIATIONS, REQUIRES

MILITARY POSTURE THAT HAS VIRTUES OTHER THAN SIMPLY BEING

CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE NEXT FELLOW'S

MAY ACHIEVE YOUR MILITARY PURPOSE

WITHOUT DIRECTLY ENGAGING THE ENEMY - ONLY A FRACTION OF HIS FORCE -

QUICK ENGAGEMENT - HASTILY TERMINATED

SUGGEST TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT

PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE INTERDEPENDENCE MILITARY,

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC FORCES

WHAT ARE IMPLICATIONS - TRENDS

MY VIEW INCREASING DEMAND AVIATION ELEMENT

ALSO DEMAND CAREFULLY REVIEW - TYPE OF AVIATION FORCES

BEST FULFILL BROAD SPECTRUM

ESSENTIALLY WORKING BETWEEN TWO EXTREMES

ONE : FULL SCALE CONFLICT WITH ONLY SOVIET UNION

AT OTHER: NEED STABILIZING INFLUENCE OF DISPLAY U.S. MIGHT
INTERNATIONAL SITUATIONS.

FORMER CASE - CLEARLY NEEDS SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY.

NEED F-14's ~~OR~~ MANEUVER ADVANCED SOVIET FIGHTERS

F-14's AND PHOENIX ONLY SYSTEM CAN TOUCH HIGH ALTITUDE
FIGHTER-BOMBER.

11

WHEN TALK OF ENGAGEMENT WITH SOVIETS - CAN NOT IGNORE FEATURE
RECEIVES PUBLICITY - VULNERABILITY

NUCLEAR SUBMARINE ESPECIALLY IF EQUIPPED - MISSILES

SO TOO LONG RANGE ²~~ARMED~~ BOMBERS WITH MISSILE CAPABILITY
MISSILE-EQUIPPED SURFACE COMBATANTS.

IF WE ASSUME CARRIERS OPERATE CLOSE (KOREA AND
VIET NAM) ~~OF~~ THREE LOOK FORMIDABLE

IN KOREA AND VIET NAM CARRIERS PROVIDE AIR
SUPPORT, INTERDICTION

NO SEA OPPOSITION

HOWEVER FORMIDABLE THREAT IF ENGAGED
SOVIET UNION

12

MUST ACKNOWLEDGE CARRIERS NOT GOING TO PULL UP OFF SOVIET TERRITORY
IN THE EARLY DAYS OF A WAR

FOREMOST TASK WOULD BE TRADITIONAL ONE - CONTROL OVER SEA

NO OTHER PART COULD SUCCEED SHIP BY SEA

IN EARLY DAYS THEN CARRIERS SECURING SEAS

ONLY THEY HANDLE TRIPLE THREAT

REQUIRES QUANTITIES OF FIGHTERS TO KNOCK DOWN

BOMBERS

ATTACK AIRCRAFT KNOCK OUT SURFACE COMBATANTS.

REQUIRES ANTI-SUBMARINE FIXED WING HELOS

THAT IS WHY STARTED PROGRAM TO EQUIP ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT, EVEN AT
EXPENSE OF FEW VA

13

SOME PEOPLE STEP BACKWARD

TRUE ONLY IN BACK TO ORIGINAL MISSION OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

FIRST GREAT SUCCESS MIDWAY

EASTWARD ADVANCE OF JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES

TODAY CARRIER KEY ELEMENT STOPPING SOVIET ADVANCES
INTO SEA LANES

AS THREATS ARE PROGRESSIVELY EATON AWAY MORE
CARRIERS' EFFORT FREED

WHEN LOOK AT NEXT LOWER ORDER CONSIDER USSR LIMITED GEOGRAPHICALLY
EACH SUPPORTING ALLY BECOME INVOLVED

HERE ROLE DEPEND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

MIHT ANTICIPATE LESSER AIR THREAT BASED WITHIN
ALLIED NATION

14

SUBMARINES RULED OUT

STILL REQUIRE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS BUT TIME TO SHIFT
FORESHORTENED.

NEXT RUNG DOWN POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE KOREAS OR VIETNAMS UNLIKELY
UNPOPULAR

HERE ROLE SHIFTS MAINTAINING AIR SUPERIORITY

NAVAL THREAT LIMITED

MANNING THIRD COUNTRY SUBMARINES

HOW SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT HOW MUCH SOVIET
EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED

15

FINALLY MUST LOOK BOTTOM RUNG

STRONG EXPRESSION PEACETIME PRESENCE

UNIQUE ADVANTAGES

CARRIER FORCE THREATEN BOMBING INTERRUPTION

THREATEN TO HALD ALL SHIPPING

THREATEN TO EXPOSE TO SURVEILLANCE

BIGGEST OF "STICKS"

BETWEEN EXTREMES CALCULUS OF ECONOMICS

MORE CONCENTRATE ON SOPHISTICATED FEWER UNITS

LESS CAPABLE HANDLE LOWER END NUMBERS MAY BE IMPORTANT

ONE ABILITY RESPOND RAPIDLY UNITS STRATEGICALLY

DISPLACED

16

OTHER ABILITY TO APPLY ONE AREA WITHOUT HAVING TO DENUDE ELSEWHERE

NOT PREDICTING WHICH USES

ONE WE PUT OUR MONEY ON

BY WE I DON'T MEAN JUST MILITARY

TASK FOR PUBLIC

17

OUR ROLE - PREPARED TO COMPREHEND AND TO FOLLOW COURSE THE

NATION SELECTS

PURPOSE, DEDICATION, AND PROFICIENCY

ALSO MUST ADVISE THE DEGREE FORCES CAPABLE OF

SUPPORTING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

PURPOSE OF A WAR COLLEGE

INTELLECTUALLY PREPARE THE NEXT CROP

TO UNDERSTAND THE SOCIETY THEY SERVE

DEAL WITH THE IMPRECISE, UNCERTAIN NATIONAL
CHARACTER -WILL

NO SIMPLE WAY FOR THE PUBLIC TO EXPRESS THAT WILL
THROUGH THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT

REQUIRES FROM THE PUBLIC A POSITIVE APPROACH
TO MILITARY MATTERS

DANGEROUS TO BACK INTO AN EVALUATION OF MILITARY NEEDS

DISINTEREST - DISMAY

EXTRAVAGANT END UP WITH THE MILITARY PREPARING

SET OF OBJECTIVES 180° - UNEXPRESSED PUBLIC OPINION

19

MOVE INTO THE ERA OF THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE

PUBLIC MUST ASSUME A GREATER RESPONSIBILITY

DIRECTION TO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

THE END OF THE DRAFT - NOT MEAN THE END OF PUBLIC
CONCERN

GIVING SENSE OF POSITIVE DIRECTION TO MILITARY
PURPOSE - ESSENTIAL ELEMENT

IN ENSURING SUCH FORCE BOTH TAILORED AND EMPLOYED
AS THE NATIONAL WILL DICTATES

STRIVING, THROUGH HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION

TO BE READY TO WORK WITH YOU

LOCATING CONSENSUS ON MILITARY PURPOSE WE REQUIRE AS
GUIDANCE

20

THIS DEMANDS HIGHER AND MORE FLEXIBLE INTELLECTUAL CAPABILITIES
RISKS OF ERRORS SEVERE - TECH AGE OF SWIFT AND TREACHEROUS
WEAPONRY AND BALANCING FORCES
DEDICATED IN HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
ENSURING LEADERS OF TOMORROW
SENSITIVE TO YOUR DIRECTION
WORTHY OF YOUR RELYING ON THEM
WHATEVER PURPOSE YOU SELECT

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ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR SUCCESS - HELD LINE

ONLY EXTENSION TO CUBA LEAP FROG ACROSS THE SEAS

WITH CONTAINMENT GONE WE MUST NOW REDEFINE OBJECTIVES & MEASURES

COURSE - TAKING THE STUDENTS BACK TO TWO FUNDAMENTAL REASONS

FIRST, DETERRENT IN PEACETIME

SECONDLY, INSURANCE IN CASE DETERRENCE FAILS

TODAY, SOME WHO AVOW THAT OUR NEED FOR MILITARY
INSURANCE HAS DIMINISHED

JUST AS UNDERSTANDABLE - NEW SPRINKLER SYSTEM

DETENTE APPEARS TO BE APPROACHING

6

DOMESTIC NEEDS ARE TOO URGENT

SABER RATTLING IS TOO RISKY

ARGUE EACH OF THESE POINTS INTERMINABLY DEBATE NOT BE
BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF

NO INSURANCE OR NO PRESENCE CAPABILITY & OVERWHELMING
SUPERIORITY...

DEBATE ON POINT IN BETWEEN

WHERE ACCEPTABLE FOR COUNTRY TO SET ITS DEFENSES CAN BRACKET

START FROM THE ASSUMPTION - HONORING OUR NATO COMMITMENTS

HOW MUCH MILITARY POWER REQUIRED IS MATTER FOR DEBATE
NEARER TO THE OTHER EXTREME

7

AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN PROLONGED AMBIGUOUS GROUND WAR IN ASIA

CONSENSUS MUST LIE SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN

SPECTRUM - VAST SCOPE - INSURANCE - WAYS EMPLOY

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IS NOT CAPABLE OF IDENTIFYING THIS
EXPLICITLY

WEIGH PRIORITIES IN LIGHT OF THE CHANGES -

WORLD ENVIRONMENT

DOMESTIC ATTITUDES

IMPACT OF EMERGENCE FROM THE BI-POLAR WORLD

START OUR STUDENTS WITH THUCYDIDES

ERA A BI-POLAR FOCUS - ABERATION
NUMBER OF POWERS TO BALANCE

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INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH, NATIONAL WILL, MORAL STATURE,

ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY

ISSUE MILITARY STUDENTS PROBE FOR THAT TYPE OF MILITARY FORCE COUNTRY NEEDS.

COMPLEMENT OUR OTHER SOURCES OF POWER

IF A PRIME PURPOSE - MILITARY FORCES IN 1970's IS TO BALANCE
OR PROVIDE NEGOTIATING RATHER THAN TO CONTAIN

CONSTRUCTION OF FORCES MAY BE DIFFERENT

SOPHISTICATION FOR A MILITARY MAN TO THINK OF

INFLUENCING

IN ADDITION TO FIGHTING

UNDERSTANDING HOW OTHER'S PERCEPTIONS CAN
INFLUENCE THEIR DIPLOMATIC DECISIONS

OTHER WORDS

A WORLD OF MULTI-POWER NEGOTIATIONS, REQUIRES

MILITARY POSTURE THAT HAS VIRTUES OTHER THAN SIMPLY BEING
CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE NEXT FELLOW'S

MAY ACHIEVE YOUR MILITARY PURPOSE

WITHOUT DIRECTLY ENGAGING THE ENEMY - ONLY A FRACTION OF HIS FORCE -
QUICK ENGAGEMENT - HASTILY TERMINATED

SUGGEST TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT

PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE INTERDEPENDENCE MILITARY,
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC FORCES

WHAT ARE IMPLICATIONS - TRENDS

MY VIEW INCREASING DEMAND AVIATION ELEMENT

ALSO DEMAND CAREFULLY REVIEW - TYPE OF AVIATION FORCES

BEST FULFILL BROAD SPECTRUM

ESSENTIALLY WORKING BETWEEN TWO EXTREMES

ONE : FULL SCALE CONFLICT WITH ONLY SOVIET UNION

AT OTHER: NEED STABILIZING INFLUENCE OF DISPLAY U.S. MIGHT

INTERNATIONAL SITUATIONS.

FORMER CASE - CLEARLY NEEDS SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY.

NEED F-14's ~~CO~~ MANEUVER ADVANCED SOVIET FIGHTERS

F-14's AND PHOENIX ONLY SYSTEM CAN TOUCH HIGH ALTITUDE

FIGHTER-BOMBER.

11

WHEN TALK OF ENGAGEMENT WITH SOVIETS - CAN NOT IGNORE FEATURE RECEIVES PUBLICITY - VULNERABILITY

NUCLEAR SUBMARINE ESPECIALLY IF EQUIPPED - MISSILES

SO TOO LONG RANGE BOMBERS WITH MISSILE CAPABILITY

MISSILE-EQUIPPED SURFACE COMBATANTS.

IF WE ASSUME CARRIERS OPERATE CLOSE (KOREA AND

VIET NAM) ~~ONE~~ THREE LOOK FORMIDABLE

IN KOREA AND VIET NAM CARRIERS PROVIDE AIR SUPPORT, INTERDICTION

NO SEA OPPOSITION

HOWEVER FORMIDABLE THREAT IF ENGAGED

SOVIET UNION

12

MUST ACKNOWLEDGE CARRIERS NOT GOING TO PULL UP OFF SOVIET TERRITORY
IN THE EARLY DAYS OF A WAR

FOREMOST TASK WOULD BE TRADITIONAL ONE - CONTROL OVER SEA

NO OTHER PART COULD SUCCEED SHIP BY SEA

IN EARLY DAYS THEN CARRIERS SECURING SEAS

ONLY THEY HANDLE TRIPLE THREAT

REQUIRES QUANTITIES OF FIGHTERS TO KNOCK DOWN

BOMBERS

ATTACK AIRCRAFT KNOCK OUT SURFACE COMBATANTS.

REQUIRES ANTI-SUBMARINE FIXED WING HELOS

THAT IS WHY STARTED PROGRAM TO EQUIP ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT, EVEN AT
EXPENSE OF FEW VA

13

SOME PEOPLE STEP BACKWARD

TRUE ONLY IN BACK TO ORIGINAL MISSION OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

FIRST GREAT SUCCESS MIDWAY

EASTWARD ADVANCE OF JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES

TODAY CARRIER KEY ELEMENT STOPPING SOVIET ADVANCES

INTO SEA LANES

AS THREATS ARE PROGRESSIVELY EATON AWAY MORE

CARRIERS' EFFORT FREED

WHEN LOOK AT NEXT LOWER ORDER CONSIDER USSR LIMITED GEOGRAPHICALLY

EACH SUPPORTING ALLY BECOME INVOLVED

HERE ROLE DEPEND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

MIGHT ANTICIPATE LESSER AIR THREAT BASED WITHIN

ALLIED NATION

14

SUBMARINES RULED OUT

STILL REQUIRE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS BUT TIME TO SHIFT
FORESHORTENED.

NEXT RUNG DOWN POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE KOREAS OR VIETNAMS UNLIKELY
UNPOPULAR

HERE ROLE SHIFTS MAINTAINING AIR SUPERIORITY

NAVAL THREAT LIMITED

MANNING THIRD COUNTRY SUBMARINES

HOW SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT HOW MUCH SOVIET
EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED

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FINALLY MUST LOOK BOTTOM RUNG

STRONG EXPRESSION PEACETIME PRESENCE

UNIQUE ADVANTAGES

CARRIER FORCE THREATEN BOMBING INTERRUPTION

THREATEN TO HALD ALL SHIPPING

THREATEN TO EXPOSE TO SURVEILLANCE

BIGGEST OF "STICKS"

BETWEEN EXTREMES CALCULUS OF ECONOMICS

MORE CONCENTRATE ON SOPHISTICATED FEWER UNITS

LESS CAPABLE HANDLE LOWER END NUMBERS MAY BE IMPORTANT

ONE ABILITY RESPOND RAPIDLY UNITS STRATEGICALLY

DISPLACED

16

OTHER ABILITY TO APPLY ONE AREA WITHOUT HAVING TO DENUDE ELSEWHERE
NOT PREDICTING WHICH USES
ONE WE PUT OUR MONEY ON
BY WE I DON'T MEAN JUST MILITARY
TASK FOR PUBLIC

17

OUR ROLE - PREPARED TO COMPREHEND AND TO FOLLOW COURSE THE
NATION SELECTS

PURPOSE, DEDICATION, AND PROFICIENCY

ALSO MUST ADVISE THE DEGREE FORCES CAPABLE OF
SUPPORTING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

PURPOSE OF A WAR COLLEGE

INTELLECTUALLY PREPARE THE NEXT CROP

TO UNDERSTAND THE SOCIETY THEY SERVE

DEAL WITH THE IMPRECISE, UNCERTAIN NATIONAL
CHARACTER - WILL

NO SIMPLE WAY FOR THE PUBLIC TO EXPRESS THAT WILL
THROUGH THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
REQUIRES FROM THE PUBLIC A POSITIVE APPROACH
TO MILITARY MATTERS

DANGEROUS TO BACK INTO AN EVALUATION OF MILITARY NEEDS

DISINTEREST - DISMAY

EXTRAVAGANT END UP WITH THE MILITARY PREPARING

SET OF OBJECTIVES 180° - UNEXPRESSED PUBLIC OPINION

19

MOVE INTO THE ERA OF THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE

PUBLIC MUST ASSUME A GREATER RESPONSIBILITY

DIRECTION TO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

THE END OF THE DRAFT - NOT MEAN THE END OF PUBLIC
CONCERN

GIVING SENSE OF POSITIVE DIRECTION TO MILITARY
PURPOSE - ESSENTIAL ELEMENT

IN ENSURING SUCH FORCE BOTH TAILORED AND EMPLOYED
AS THE NATIONAL WILL DICTATES

STRIVING, THROUGH HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION

TO BE READY TO WORK WITH YOU

LOCATING CONSENSUS ON MILITARY PURPOSE WE REQUIRE AS
GUIDANCE

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THIS DEMANDS HIGHER AND MORE FLEXIBLE INTELLECTUAL CAPABILITIES
RISKS OF ERRORS SEVERE - TECH AGE OF SWIFT AND TREACHEROUS
WEAPONRY AND BALANCING FORCES
DEDICATED IN HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
ENSURING LEADERS OF TOMORROW
SENSITIVE TO YOUR DIRECTION
WORTHY OF YOUR RELYING ON THEM
WHATEVER PURPOSE YOU SELECT